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Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment
It's a form of harassment every time I pick up a sledgehammer and
that prick laughs at me, you know. It's a form of harassment when a
journeyman is supposed to be training me and it's real clear to me
that he does not want to give me any information whatsoever. He
does not want me to be there at all .... They put me with this one
who is a lunatic ... he's the one who drilled the hole in my
arm .... It's a form of harassment to me when the working foreman
puts me in a dangerous situation and tells me to do something in an
improper way and then tells me, Oh, you can't do that! It's a form of
harassment to me when someone takes a tool out of my hand and
said, ... I'll show you how to do this, and he grabs the
sledgehammer from my hand and he proceeded to try to show me
how to do this thing ... you know, straighten up a post ... it's
nothing to it, you just bang it and it gets straight .... It's a form of
harassment to me when they call me honey and I have to tell them
every day, don't call me that, you know, I have a name printed right
on my thing .... Ah, you know, it's all a form of harassment to me.
It's not right. They don't treat each other that way. They shouldn't
treat me that way. It's a form of harassment to me when this one asks
me to go out with him all the time. You know, all this kind of stuff.
It's terrible.'
How should we understand sex-based harassment on the job? Its existence
is now part of the national consciousness. Over the past twenty years, feminists
have succeeded in naming "sexual harassment" and defining it as a social
problem.2 Popular accounts abound: Newspapers, movies, and television
programs depict women workers who are forced to endure sexual advances and
decry the fact that these women must contend with such abuse.3 The legal
system, too, has recognized the problem. The Supreme Court, on two separate
occasions,4 has affirmed that workplace sexual harassment violates Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act,5 and the lower federal courts have created a massive
1. MARY LINDENSTEIN WALSHOK. BLUE COLLAR WOMEN: PIONEERS ON "tIE MALE FRONTIER 221-22
(1981) (quoting a female welder).
2. Working Women United (WWU) is the first group known to have used the term -sexual
harassment." In May of 1975, WWU held a "Speak-Out on Sexual Harassment.- for purposes of which it
defined sexual harassment as "the treatment of women workers as sexual objects." Dierdre Silverman.
Sexual Harassment. Working Women's Dilemma, QUEST- FEwtlutsT Q.. Winter 1976-1977, at 15. 15.
3. For examples of recent newspaper articles depicting sexual harassment in negative terms. se Jane
Daugherty, Sexual Harassment Takes a Devastating Toll, DETorr NEws. Jan. 28. 1997. at DI; Lisa
Hoffman, Sex Harassment Last Straw for Career Soldier: Woman Finally Left Army out of Frustration.
Anger, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEwS, Feb. 16, 1997, at 3A; and A Mission for the Military. BOSTON GLOBE.
Feb. 7, 1997, at AI8. The Lifetime television network produced a movie told from the perspective of Kerry
Ellison, the plaintiff in Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). See Hostile Advances: The Kerry
Ellison Story (Lifetime television broadcast, May 27, 1996). But see DAVtD MAfiEr. OLEANNA (1992)
(depicting sympathetically a male professor accused of sexual harassment by a female college student).
4. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson. 477 U.S. 57
(1986).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). Title VII reads in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race.
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body of doctrine detailing the law's protection. All the while, public awareness
of legal rights has continued to develop, and workers have filed sexual
harassment complaints in increasing numbers.
6
That feminists (and sympathetic lawyers) have inspired a body of popular
and legal opinion condemning harassment in such a brief period of time is a
remarkable achievement. Yet the achievement has been limited because we
have not conceptualized the problem in sufficiently broad terms. The prevailing
paradigm for understanding sex-based harassment places sexuality-more
specifically, male-female sexual advances-at the center of the problem.
Within that paradigm, a male supervisor's sexual advances on a less powerful,
female subordinate represent the quintessential form of harassment.
Although this sexual desire-dominance paradigm represented progress
when it was first articulated as the foundation for quid pro quo sexual
harassment, using the paradigm to conceptualize hostile work environment
harassment has served to exclude from legal understanding many of the most
common and debilitating forms of harassment faced by women (and many
men) at work each day.7 The prevailing paradigm privileges conduct thought
to be motivated by sexual designs-such as sexual advances-as the core sex-
or gender-based harassment. 8 Yet much of the gender-based hostility and
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or ... to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
employee of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Ud § 2000e-3.
6. See Kirstin Downey Grimsley, Worker Bias Cases Are Rising Steadily; New Laws Boost Hopes for
Monetary Awards, WASH. POST, May 12, 1997, at AI (noting that the fastest growing area of employment
discrimination complaints is sexual harassment, up from 6127 complaints in 1990 to 15,342 complaints in
1996); Allen R. Myerson, As Federal Bias Cases Drop, Workers Take Up the Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
1997, § 1, at I (noting that the new bias cases often are more about pay, promotion, and harassment than
about hiring, and increasingly concern sex rather than race).
7. Title VII jurisprudence recognizes two different types of sex-based harassment: (1) quid pro quo
harassment, in which a supervisor seeks to condition employment benefits on a subordinate's grant of
sexual favors; and (2) hostile work environment harassment, in which supervisors or coworkers engage in
conduct that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and
create an abusive working environment."' Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
8. Throughout this Article, I use the terms "gender" and "sex" interchangeably. I use the terms to refer
to the complex process of socializing human beings into the identities of men and women, to the element
of social relationships based on differences that society attributes to people with those two identities, and
to the process of signifying power through those identities. See JOAN WALLACH SCOTr, GENDER AND TIlE
POLITICS OF HISTORY 28-50 (1988), for the views that come perhaps closest to capturing my own.
For many years, feminists distinguished between "sex"--the biological sex of a human being-and
"gender"ethe different social and cultural expectations and roles assigned to the sexes. Recently, this
distinction has come under challenge, as some feminists have questioned whether it makes sense to refer
to "sex" as an ontologically given category that we can comprehend free of perceptions that have already
been gendered. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM ANDTHE SUBVERSION OF IDENTrTY
(1990). For purposes of this Article, I need not take a position in this debate. Regardless of whether
something endowed by nature called "sex" can be known with any certainty, it is clear that the legal system
cannot ascertain it with any certainty. Thus, Title VIi's protection against discrimination based on "sex"
has ultimately, and necessarily, been construed to protect people from discrimination based on "gender,"
even though some courts may cling to the notion that they can discover natural sex differences that justify
differential treatment. See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
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abuse that women (and some men) endure at work is neither driven by the
desire for sexual relations nor even sexual in content.
Indeed, many of the most prevalent forms of harassment are actions that
are designed to maintain work-particularly the more highly rewarded lines of
work-as bastions of masculine competence and authority. Every day, in
workplaces all over the country, men uphold the image that their jobs demand
masculine mastery by acting to undermine their female colleagues' perceived
(or sometimes even actual) competence to do the work. The forms of such
harassment are wide-ranging. They include characterizing the work as
appropriate for men only; denigrating women's performance or ability to
master the job; providing patronizing forms of help in performing the job;
withholding the training, information, or opportunity to learn to do the job
well; engaging in deliberate work sabotage; providing sexist evaluations of
women's performance or denying them deserved promotions; isolating women
from the social networks that confer a sense of belonging; denying women the
perks or privileges that are required for success; assigning women
sex-stereotyped service tasks that lie outside their job descriptions (such as
cleaning or serving coffee); engaging in taunting, pranks, and other forms of
hazing designed to remind women that they are different and out of place; and
physically assaulting or threatening to assault the women who dare to fight
back. Of course, making a woman the object of sexual attention can also work
to undermine her image and self-confidence as a capable worker. Yet, much
of the time, harassment assumes a form that has little or nothing to do with
sexuality but everything to do with gender. As the female welder quoted above
put it, "Ah, you know, it's all a form of harassment to me .... They don't
treat each other that way. They shouldn't treat me that way." 9
In spite of the female welder's intuitive understanding that all these actions
are gender-based forms of harassment, there has been little or no recognition
of such a perspective in the law. Most feminists and other scholars sympathetic
to working women have either explicitly advocated or implicitly accepted the
prevailing sexual desire-dominance paradigm. This is not surprising, for
feminists played a prominent role in creating it. The focus on sexual conduct
emerged from an early radical feminist critique of heterosexual relations as a
primary producer of women's oppression. These early feminists saw rape as
a central metaphor for men's treatment of women, and they compared sexual
harassment to rape.1" More recently, feminist legal scholars have analogized
the law governing workplace harassment to rape law, criticizing harassment
law for its disregard of women's perspectives on sexuality and for its failure
to appreciate the unique harm inherent in the fact that harassment is a sexual
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. I (1995) (arguing that antdiscnmination law
incorrectly proceeds from the assumption of biological sex difference).
9. WALSHOK, supra note I, at 222; see supra text accompanying note I.
10. See infra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
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violation." Just as feminist analyses have conceived of harassment as sexual
abuse, most scholars who have addressed same-sex harassment have
characterized it in sexualized terms, analogizing same-sex harassment to
heterosexual sexual advances as an argument for legal regulation. 2 Thus,
even the most critical accounts of harassment law, like other accounts of
workplace harassment, 3 have assumed a sexuality-centered perspective that
portrays sexual advances and other sexually oriented conduct as the core of the
problem.' 4 They are rooted in the prevailing paradigm. 5
11. One of the clearest statements of this position appears in Susan Estrich's powerful article, Susan
Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813 (1991). As Estrich writes:
What makes sexual harassment more offensive, more debilitating, and more dehumanizing to
its victims than other forms of discrimination is precisely the fact that it is sexual. Not only are
men exercising power over women, but they are operating in a realm which is still judged
according to a gender double standard, itself a reflection of the extent to which sexuality is used
to penalize women. In my view, [harassment] cases are such a disaster in doctrinal terms
precisely because, as with rape, they involve sex and sexuality.
Id at 820. For additional examples of this perspective, see Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the
Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 769; Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask for It?: The
"Unwelcome" Requirement in Sexual Harassment Cases, 77 CORNELL L. RE',. 1558 (1992); and Miranda
Oshige, Note, What's Sex Got To Do with It?, 47 STAN. L. REv. 565 (1995). Cf. Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L REv. 1311, 1318 (1989) (arguing that sexual
harassment is "more clearly akin to... rape than to misogynistic refusal to accept women workers").
12. See, e.g., Charles R. Calleros, The Meaning of "Sex": Homosexual and Bisexual Harassment
Under Title VII, 20 VT. L. REV. 55 (1995); Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual
Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. LJ. I (1992); Lisa Wehren, Note,
Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Under Title VII: Garcia v. Elf Atochem Marks a Step in the Wrong
Direction, 32 CAL W. L. REV. 87 (1995).
13. Most of the large-scale empirical studies of sex-based harassment have also used a sexualized
definition of harassment limited to sexual advances and other conduct of a sexual nature. See, e.g.,
BARBARA GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE: THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND HARASSMENT ON
WOMEN, MEN, AND ORGANIZATIONS (1985); U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENr. AN UPDATE (1988) [hereinafter SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT]; U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE:
IS IT A PROBLEM? (1981) [hereinafter SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE]; WALSIIOK,
supra note 1; see also Patricia A. Frazier et al., Social Science Research on Lay Definitions of Sexual
Harassment, 51 J. Soc. ISSUES 21 (1995) (citing numerous studies of harassment that utilize a sexualized
definition).
14. A few writers have urged courts to construe 'itle VII broadly to prohibit all forms of gender-based
harassment, rather than focusing narrowly on sexual advances and other sexual conduct. See, e.g., L.
Camille Htbert, Sexual Harassment is Gender Harassment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 565 (1995); Frank S.
Ravitch, Contextualizing Gender Harassment: Providing an Analytical Framework for an Emerging
Concept in Discrimination Law, 1995 DET. C.L. REV. 853. Even such writers, however, have found it
difficult to escape the prevailing sexual paradigm. Some, for example, continue to make an artificial
analytical distinction between gender-based harassment and sexual harassment. See, e.g., Ravitch, supra,
at 856-57. Others subtly continue to highlight the sexual nature of harassment as a reason for condemning
it, even though they purport to understand harassment as a form of sexism rather than sexuality. See, e.g.,
Hdbert, supra, at 587. None of these writers advances an account of harassment that highlights its role in
preserving job segregation by constructing gender-based differences in work competence, as I do here.
15. A notable exception is Carlin Meyer, Feminism, Work and Sex: Returning to the Gates (1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Meyer insightfully discusses how feminist legal theorists'
emphasis on sexual harassment has neglected other fundamental work-related problems of concern to
women, such as sweatshops, occupational health and safety, pension issues, and the rise of home work and
contingent labor. See id. at 8-10. This Article, by contrast, shows how the courts' utilization of a
feminist-inspired paradigm to regulate sexual forms of harassment has neglected equally pernicious.
nonsexual forms of gender-based misconduct in the workplace-particularly conduct that denigrates
women's competence and thereby preserves work along gendered lines.
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This Article challenges the sexual desire-dominance paradigm. A
comprehensive examination of Title VII hostile work environment harassment
cases demonstrates the paradigm's inadequacy. Despite the best intentions of
its creators, the paradigm has compromised the law's protection. Principal
among its drawbacks, the paradigm is underinclusive: It omits-and even
obscures-many of the most prevalent forms of harassment that make
workplaces hostile and alienating to workers based on their gender. Much of
what is harmful to women in the workplace is difficult to construe as sexual
in design. Similarly, many men are harmed at work by gender-based
harassment that fits only uneasily within the parameters of a sexualized
paradigm. The prevailing paradigm, however, may also be overinclusive. By
emphasizing the protection of women's sexual selves and sensibilities over and
above their empowerment as workers, the paradigm permits-or even
encourages--companies to construe the law to prohibit some forms of sexual
expression that do not promote gender hierarchy at work. The focus of
harassment law should not be on sexuality as such. The focus should be on
conduct that consigns people to gendered work roles that do not further their
own aspirations or advantage.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by describing the sexual
desire-dominance paradigm for conceptualizing hostile work environment
harassment. It traces the roots of the paradigm in early feminist thought and
in the reasoning of early cases. As Part I shows, the major jurisprudential
barrier to recognizing a Title VII cause of action for quid pro quo harassment
was some courts' initial reluctance to hold that supervisors' demands for
sexual favors occurred "because of sex" within the meaning of the statute.
Influenced by radical feminist thought that highlighted the centrality of sexual
exploitation in creating women's inequality, feminists argued, and courts began
to recognize, that supervisors' sexual advances can constitute sex- or
gender-based discrimination. The resulting legal analysis was grounded in
sexual desire: A heterosexual male supervisor's advances toward a female
subordinate were based on sex because the supervisor would not make similar
sexual advances toward a man. This desire-based reasoning laid the foundation
for the prevailing paradigm.
To some extent, the sexual desire-dominance paradigm represented
progress. It was important for courts to recognize that gender discrimination
can take the form of sexual overtures. But the paradigm also portended
problems. By emphasizing sexual abuse, the paradigm threatened to eclipse
other, equally harmful forms of gender-based hostility. As Parts U and III
demonstrate, this concern has materialized. Part II documents the problem of
disaggregation: Courts consider only sexual advances or other sexual conduct
for purposes of establishing hostile work environment harassment, and they
consign less sexual forms of misconduct to a separate disparate treatment
analysis (if they consider such forms at all). Disaggregation obscures a full
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view of the conditions of the workplace and makes both the hostile work
environment and disparate treatment claims look trivial. When severed from
a larger pattern of discriminatory conduct, sexual advances or ridicule can
appear insufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable. By the same token,
when severed from sexual overtures, nonsexual forms of harassment may
appear to be gender-neutral hazing that has nothing to do with the victims'
womanhood. Indeed, when women are denied the training or support to
succeed on the job, they can easily be made to appear (or even become) less
than fully proficient at their jobs. This lack of proficiency then becomes the
justification for the very mistreatment that has undermined their performance.
Part III examines the question of causation. Ironically, courts that once
refused to recognize that sexual advances may occur because of sex now insist
on such advances and fail to perceive many other problems that confront
women workers as sex-based. Courts often search for deep-seated sexual
motivations for women's adverse treatment when gender-based considerations
lie close to the surface. Yet the courts' focus on sexual conduct has not
provided judges with a bright-line test; their inevitable disagreement about
whether challenged conduct is sufficiently sexual has created as many
inconsistencies as it has criteria for guidance. Thus, I argue that the judicial
focus on sexual conduct is not fueled by a beneficial certainty in line drawing,
but by judges' failure to comprehend the significance of workplace
discrimination in creating women's disadvantage.
The courts' traditional failure to comprehend the magnitude of women's
gender troubles at work, in fact, has only been exacerbated by the prevailing
paradigm's emphasis on sexual forms of harassment. Singling out sexual
advances as the essence of workplace harassment has allowed courts to feel
enlightened about protecting women from sexual violation, while at the same
time relieving judges of the responsibility to redress other, broader
gender-based problems in the workplace. It is not enough to focus on the harm
to women as sexual beings; the law must also address women's systematic
disadvantage-and facilitate women's equal empowerment-as creative,
committed workers. We need an account of hostile work environment
harassment that highlights its dynamic relationship to larger forms of gender
hierarchy at work.
Part IV advances a new account of hostile work environment harassment
that emphasizes its role in reproducing work and work competence along
masculine and feminine lines. In this account, harassment is not driven by a
need for sexual domination but by a desire to preserve favored lines of work
as masculine. By maintaining a hold on highly rewarded employment, men
secure a host of advantages in and outside the workplace. Some of these
advantages are material: Wage superiority over women, for example, ensures
men's position at the head of the household as well as their place at the helm
of most powerful institutions in society. Equally significant are powerful
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psychological factors: Both breadwinning and work competence are central to
the dominant cultural understandings of manhood. By protecting their jobs
from incursion by women, or by incorporating women only on inferior terms,
men sustain the impression that their work requires uniquely masculine skills.
Maintaining their jobs as repositories of masculine mastery, in turn, assures
men a sense of identity (even superiority) as men.
In this new account, hostile work environment harassment is closely linked
to job segregation by sex. Harassment serves a gender-guarding,
competence-undermining function: By subverting women's capacity to perform
favored lines of work, harassment polices the boundaries of the work and
protects its idealized masculine image-as well as the identity of those who
do it. As a female pipefitter explained:
You see it is just very hard for them to work with me because they're
really into proving their masculinity .... And when a woman comes
on a job that can work, get something done as fast and efficiently, as
well, as they can, it really affects them. Somehow if a woman can do
it, it ain't that masculine, not that tough.16
This analysis applies across occupational and class lines to blue-collar and
white-collar work, in high and low places. From medicine to sales to
construction, from boardrooms to restaurants to firehouses, from managers to
coworkers to subordinates, male workers have created environments that cast
doubt upon the capability of women who threaten the masculine privilege and
personae of their work.
As Part V shows, such harassment is not only directed at women, but also
targets men who threaten the work's masculine image. Just as some male
workers seek to protect their work from encroachment by women, so too may
male workers seek to denigrate and drive away other men who detract from
the perception of their jobs as the embodiment of an idealized manly
competence. Part V argues that, regardless of whether male harassees are
targeted or taunted on the basis of alleged homosexuality or on the basis of
other characteristics that the dominant male workers see as representing a lack
of manliness (and fear will diminish their own), such harassment is based on
gender within the meaning of Title VII. As the Supreme Court has instructed,
the statute prohibits pressuring people to conform to preconceived notions of
appropriate manhood or womanhood in connection with their work. 7 Yet the
16. JEAN SCHROEDEL, ALONE IN A CROWD: WoMEN iN THE TRADES TELL THEIR STORIES 20-21
(1985).
17. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228. 250-51 (1989) (construing Title VII to prohibit
gender stereotyping in the form of pressuring a female accountant to conform to stereotypically feminine
demeanor and appearance in order to be promoted to partner).
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law has not yet clearly recognized that male-on-male harassment that exerts
such pressure is a form of gender discrimination prohibited by Title VII.'
It is time for a reconceptualization of sex-based harassment-and
harassment law-along more comprehensive lines. It is time to focus on
gender along with sexuality, on the monopolization of work competence along
with sexual abuse. Part VI sketches some suggestions for how courts and
lawyers might implement the new competence-centered account of hostile work
environment harassment. That task involves returning to Title VII's original
purpose, which was to empower everyone-whatever their sex or gender-to
pursue their life's work on equal terms.
I. THE PREVAILING PARADIGM
A. The Sexual Desire-Dominance Paradigm
The prevailing paradigm defines unwanted heterosexual sexual advances
as the core conduct that constitutes sex-based harassment. The quintessential
case of harassment involves a more powerful, typically older, male supervisor,
who uses his superior organizational position to demand sexual favors from a
less powerful, typically younger, female subordinate. Sometimes, his
motivation is sexual desire: He wants her, and he uses his organizational
position to get her. Sometimes, it is a desire to subordinate: He wants to make
sure she remains below him in the workplace hierarchy, and he uses sexuality
to reinforce his position. Either way, his actions are an abuse of his power and
an abuse of her sex. Within this paradigm, heterosexual desire and male
dominance are inextricably linked. Men use their dominant positions at work
to extract sex from women, and extracting sex from women ensures their
dominance.
This sexual desire-dominance paradigm governs our understanding of
harassment. Its influence is reflected in the very fact that the category is
referred to as "sexual" harassment rather than, for example, "gender-based" or
"sex-based" harassment. The most publicized harassment cases have
accentuated this understanding. The Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas controversy
was the first case to receive widespread public attention, and it solidified the
view of harassment as sexual pursuit and predation. Hill, a reserved woman
who was at the time of the alleged events a novice lawyer in her mid-twenties,
18. The Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., No.
96-568, 1998 WL 88039 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1998), which was issued as this Article went to press, sends a
promising new signal to the lower courts. In Oncale, the Court reversed a Fifth Circuit decision that had
held that male-on-male harassment is never actionable under Title VII. The Court concluded that "nothing
in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of... sex' merely because the plaintiff and
the defendant ... are of the same sex." Id. at *2 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(a)(l) (1994)). In line with
the argument of this Article, the Court also made clear that "harassing conduct need not be motivated by
sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex." Id. at *4.
1692 [Vol. 107: 1683
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment
claimed that Thomas, her then-supervisor at the Department of Education and
subsequent Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
had pressured her repeatedly to go out with him.' 9 After a while, Thomas
"began to use work situations to discuss sex," regaling Hill with lewd accounts
of pornographic films and of his own sexual proclivities and prowess.20 Hill's
testimony at Thomas's confirmation hearings suggested that she believed the
harassment to be driven by a need for domination: "I never felt that [Thomas]
was genuinely interested in me--only in coercing me." 2' Thomas agreed that
the alleged conduct constituted actionable harassment, but described it as the
expression of a perverse kind of sexual desire. According to his supporters, a
person who did what Hill claimed would be a "psychopathic sex fiend or a
pervert." 22 This interpretation allowed Thomas to deny that he had ever
engaged in the alleged conduct: "If I were going to date someone outside of
the workplace ... I would certainly not approach [her] with this kind of
grotesque language." 23 Although Thomas stressed sexual desire and Hill
suggested domination, both parties-seasoned veterans of the EEOC familiar
with the legal conception of harassment-took for granted the prevailing
paradigm defining sexual advances as the core workplace harassment.
Other well-known harassment cases have followed the same pattern. In
October 1991, the same month that the Thomas confirmation hearings riveted
the nation, the news media broke the Tailhook story. In a corridor of the Las
Vegas Hilton, during the Tailhook Association's raucous annual convention,
seventy Navy and Marine aviators pushed more than two dozen women, some
of them Navy officers, down a gauntlet in which the drunken men shouted
sexually suggestive remarks, ripped at the women's clothes, and groped at their
bodies. 24 Widely referred to as a "sex abuse" scandal,' Tailhook's lurid
details captured the country's attention: "Tailhook ... was the scandal that
opened the Pandora's box on a problem that has festered for decades." 2 The
way the problem was defined, however, reveals much about the reigning
19. See JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELuNG OF CLARENCE THOMAS
95 (1994).
20. Id. at 96.
21. ld. at 97.
22. The Thomas Nomination; Excerpts from Senate's Hearings on the Thomas Nomination. N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, at A30 (quoting a statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
23. Id. (quoting a statement of Judge Clarence Thomas).
24. See John Lancaster, Navy 'Gauntlet' Probed; Sex Harassment Alleged at Fliers' Convention,
WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1991, at Al; H.G. Reza, Women Accuse Navy Pilots of Harassment. LA. TIMES.
Oct. 30, 1991, at BI.
25. E.g., Admiral Is Relieved of Duty for Delay in Sex Abuse Case. N.Y. TIMES. Nov. 6. 199 1. at A23;
Melissa Healy, Pentagon 's Tailhook Report Expected To Detail Obstrction. Cover- Up: Scandal: Separate
Inquiry Will Deal with Specific Charges in the Sexual Abuse of Women at an Aviators' Convention, LA.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 1992, at A14; Navy Cuts Ties to Group in Sex Abuse Case. N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31. 1991.
at A20; Sex Abuse Incident Brings Admiral Permanent Penalty. LA. TIMES. Dec. 21. 1991. at A20;. Sexual
Abuse in the Military, CHI. TRIB.. July 5. 1992. at 2.
26. Len Tayler, Operation: Parity; Assaults Renew Debate on Role of Women. NEWSDAY. July 27.
1992, at 6.
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paradigm. For years, researchers have documented wide-ranging forms of
discrimination, harassment, and second-class treatment of women in the armed
forces. Yet public officials have not focused on these broader practices, but
have singled out the problem of sexual abuse. The Senate Veterans Affairs
Committee, for example, heard testimony on the issue of sexual abuse in the
military, while newspapers decried the "armed force[s' failure] to protect
women from sexual exploitation by military personnel whose orders they are
supposed to obey."27 Veterans' centers established programs for victims of
sexual trauma,28 and the Navy set up a hot line and a system for tracking
complaints of sexual harassment, assault, and rape.29 All the while,
newspapers continued to report new incidents of sexual abuse in the
military,30 while devoting far less coverage to other, equally debilitating
forms of discrimination. In fact, some sources cited sexual exploitation as a
reason to question the wisdom of integrating women into the armed forces,
rather than as a sign of the need for broad structural reforms to facilitate
women's integration on more equal and empowering terms.
Press coverage of a lawsuit against Stroh's Brewery also reveals a fixation
on sexual abuse and the neglect of other discriminatory workplace dynamics.
In November 1991, several women who worked at a St. Paul, Minnesota
bottling plant owned by Stroh's filed a lawsuit alleging a hostile work
environment and denial of job advancement.32 Newcomers to the traditionally
masculine preserve of beer making, the women were subjected to a series of
severe acts of hostility. They were told that women could not hold certain jobs
27. Sexual Abuse in the Military, supra note 25; see also Elaine Sciolino, Military Women Report
Pattern of Sexual Abuse by Servicemen, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1992, at Al; The Sexual Abuse of
Servicewomen, BOSTON GLOBE, July 8, 1992, at 12; Soldiers and Sex Abuse, HARTFORD COURANT, July
7, 1992, at B10.
28. See Patricia Dibsie, VA Emphasizes Sexual Trauma Care for Women, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIll.,
Sept. 28, 1994, at BI; Dave Moniz, Veterans of Hell: Nightmares of Rape Haunt Female Ex-Gls, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 19, 1995, at 10.
29. See Navy Acts To Improve Women's Lot: 80 Recommendations To Be Implemented, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 14, 1992, at 10A.
30. See, e.g., Tom Bowman & Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, Victims List Grows to 34 at Aberdeen: Female
Soldiers Alleging Misconduct Double from 17; Hot Line Logs 5,204 Calls; Panel of Military and Civilians
Named To Study Army Culture, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 23, 1996, at IA; Nancy Ann Jeffrey, Rankling the
Ranks: The Battle over Sexual Harassment Rages on in the Military, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 1, 1992, at 4;
Michael Kilian, New Sex Scandal Hits Army Ranks: 3 Charged at Second Training Site, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
13, 1996, at 1; Ann LoLordo, Woman GI Fights Private War over Sex Assault Case, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Mar. 29, 1993, at Al; Dana Priest, Abuse in Army 'Not That Unusual': Sexual Misconduct by Trainers
Long-Standing Problem for Military, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1996, at Al; Andrea Stone: Women in
Military: Sex Harassment and Silence, USA TODAY, July 23, 1992, at 6A; West Point Students Claim
Sexual Harassment, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 2, 1994, at 2.
31. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, Bill Would Separate Men and Women in Basic Training, N.Y. TIMES, May
18, 1997, at A20 ("With sex scandals breaking out all over the military, legislation to segregate men and
women in basic training is gaining momentum in the House."); Elaine Sciolino, Sergeant Convicted of 18
Counts of Raping Female Subordinates, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1997, at Al ("Today's verdict is certain to
rekindle the debate on Capitol Hill and within the military about whether the American military's
experiment with integrating men and women has failed.").
32. See Carol Kleiman, Harassment Suit at Stroh Brewery Puts Focus on Company's Own Ads, CHI.
TRIO., Mar. 9, 1992, at 6.
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and that they should go home or get "women's jobs. 33 They were referred
to with demeaning epithets, like "bitch" and "squaw."3' They were physically
assaulted in both sexual and nonsexual ways: One woman was "grabbed...
on the rear end";35 a male coworker "displayed his pubic hair [to a second
woman] and grabbed [her] head and pushed it down to his crotch";& a male
coworker drove a forklift toward another woman; 3' a fourth woman "was
given an extra-heavy workload after she injured her back and requested light
duty, and was intentionally exposed by a fellow worker to toxic chemicals"; 38
several other women had their tools and machines sabotaged and their tires
slashed or deflated by male coworkers who "stop[ped] to taunt them with
gutter talk or just to watch their misery" while they "g[o]t ... down onto dirt,
ice or slush to fix the tires. 39 In addition, the women were subjected to a
barrage of sexual comments, graffiti, and pin-ups of the sort often thrust upon
women in blue-collar, male-dominated workplaces.40 At Stroh's, the campaign
of harassment was both vicious and successful. Ultimately, it drove all the
women plaintiffs away from the plant."
The Hill-Thomas controversy concerned sexual advances; Tailhook sexual
assault. The Stroh's case had the potential to clarify that women's workplace
troubles do not always assume such sexual forms. Yet, as Professor Carlin
Meyer has shown, the media did not focus on the broader implications. 2 It
sensationalized the one element of the case it found "sexy"-the allegation that
Stroh's use of the "Swedish Bikini Team" in its advertising campaign had
contributed to the harassment. Drawing on the company's traditional slogan,
"It doesn't get any better than this," the advertisements featured a bikini-clad
quintet of blonde women exclaiming, "It gets better," as they parachuted Old
Milwaukee beer to a group of men out in the woods. 3 The legal challenge
to the advertisements invoked the sexual desire-dominance paradigm: The
plaintiffs argued that the ads advanced a company-wide view of women as
sexual objects, which in turn encouraged male workers to make sexual
advances toward their female coworkers." Although the challenge to the
33. Tony Kennedy, Judge Says Stroh's Ad Strategies Won't Be Part of Harassment Trial; Ads Not in
Workplace To Be Excluded, Ruling States. STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis). Nov. 9. 1993. at ID.
34. Kleiman, supra note 32.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Meyer, supra note 15, at 12.
38. Id. at 13.
39. Jean Steiner, There's More to Sexual Harassment than a Swedish Bikini Team. STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Dec. 19, 1991, at 27A.
40. See Kleiman, supra note 32; Meyer, supra note 15, at 12.
41. See Meyer, supra note 15, at II. The Stroh's suit ultimately settled: the terms of the settlement
were kept confidential. See id. at 12 n.37.
42. See id. at 14-15.
43. Swedish Bikini Team Taking Vacation from TV. STAR TRiB. (Minneapolis). Feb. 14. 1992. at 2D
(describing a Stroh's television commercial).
44. See, e.g., Edward Walsh, Stroh Workers Charge Ads Fuel Harassment; 'Bikini Team' TV Spots
Prompt Lawsuits, WASH. PosT, Nov. 30. 1991, at A3 ("When the company as a whole is treating women
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advertisements was only one small aspect of a complex case, the press treated
the claim about the ads as if it were the case, announcing the lawsuit with such
headlines as "Bikini Ad Prompts a Sexual Harassment Suit."4 As in the
Hill-Thomas controversy and the Tailhook incident, the media coverage of the
Stroh's case reflected-and in turn reproduced-the prevailing, sexuality-
centered paradigm.
B. Origins of the Paradigm
Where did the sexual desire-dominance paradigm come from? How did it
come to have such a strong hold on our understanding of harassment?
Although the origins of the paradigm are complex,46 an integral part of the
story involves early feminists' struggle to establish the concept of sexual
harassment in Title VII law. Like other concepts that have mobilized social
action,47 the concept of sexual harassment took root in the context of
litigation designed to achieve reform.
1. Early Radical Feminist Ideas
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, as the women's movement gained
momentum, two strands coalesced to forge a focus on sexual harassment in the
workplace. First, strong elements of the movement concentrated on helping
women achieve economic independence by opening work and training
as sexual objects, as body parts, it pretty much sends a message to the employees,' said ... the only female
machinist at the plant. 'What I want Stroh's to do is to take a look at that and understand that they're
giving a big stamp of approval.').
45. Bikini Ad Prompts a Sexual Harassment Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1991, at A ll. For stories with
similar headlines, see Stuart Elliott, Suit over Sex in Beer Ads Comes as Genre Changes. N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 1991, at D22; Doug Grow, Stroh's and Its Ads Square OffAgainst an Angry Young Lawyer, STAR TRIO.
(Minneapolis), Nov. 10, 1991, at 3B; Paul McEnroe, Women Cite Sexy Ads in Harassment Suit Against
Stroh's, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Nov. 8, 1991, at IA; Martha T. Moore, Taste Test: Debate Brews over
Selling Beer with Sex, USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 1991, at IB; and George Will, Misguided Suit Targets
Swedish Bikini Team, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 2, 1991, at 3B.
46. A complete account of the origins of the paradigm would map the more remote historical
antecedents of the phenomena discussed in this Article. The cultural-radical feminist traditions discussed
in the next subsection, for example, might be traced to the social purity wing of the 19th-century women's
movement. For a description of the views of sexuality articulated within that movement, see Ellen Carol
DuBois & Linda Gordon, Seeking Ecstasy on the Battlefield: Danger and Pleasure in Nineteenth-Century
Feminist Sexual Thought, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SExUALITY 31 (Carol S. Vance
ed., 1984). In addition, a more comprehensive historical account might trace the emergence of widespread
cultural fears of the homosexual predator. Cf George Chauncey, Jr., The Postwar Sex Crime Panic, in
TRUE STORIES FROM THE AMERICAN PAST 160 (William Graebner ed., 1993) (showing how the post-World
War I panic about sex crime contributed to a new, more ominous stereotype of homosexual men as
criminals and child molesters). Even though Title VII harassment law has been most centrally concerned
with men's sexual violation of women, the specter of men's sexual pursuit of other men has haunted the
legal conception of harassment from the very beginning. See infra note 93.
47. See, for example, MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS
OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994), an excellent study of the mobilization of law in the pay equity movement.
1696
19981 Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment 1697
opportunities that had formerly been closed.' s Although women of diverse
political perspectives embraced this goal,49 the women's rights wing of the
movement turned to legal reform as a central strategy. The National
Organization for Women (NOW) was formed in 1966 to bring public pressure
on the EEOC to enforce Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination in
employment.50  NOW members filed suits challenging sex-segregated
advertising, lobbied the Department of Labor to include women in its
affirmative action guidelines for federal contractors, persuaded the Federal
Communications Commission to open up opportunities for women in
broadcasting, and helped secure the passage of the 1972 amendments to Title
VII to allow the EEOC to fight discrimination more effectively.5 ' Other
feminists launched their own Title VII lawsuits, including across-the-board
challenges to systems of sex segregation at work.5"
At the same time, radicals within the women's liberation movement were
beginning to focus on gender-related problems in the spheres of private
life-including sexual relations.53 Although radical feminism was the creation
48. See Jane Sherron De Hart. The New Feminism and the Dynamics of Social Change. in WOMEN'S
AMERICA: REFOCUSING THE PAST 493, 510 (linda K. Kerber & Jane Sherron De Hart cds.. 3d ed. 1991)
("The fact that so many women continue to rely on men not only for financial support but also for social
status and even self-esteem, feminists argueld], deprives such women of the economic and psychological
freedom to determine their own lives, to make real choices. to be judged as individuals on the basis of their
own merit and accomplishments, not those of fathers or husbands."); id. at 500-07 (describing the role of
women's growing presence in the workforce in creating conditions for modem feminism, and describing
feminist efforts to make work and training opportunities more widely available to women).
49, In addition to mainstream women's rights advocates, more militant feminists from traditions
concerned about poverty and economic justice also focused on the sex-based stratification of work as a key
element in women's oppression. See id. at 510 ("Feminists whose socialism was forged in the New Left
of the 1960s [saw] oppression as the inevitable result of a capitalist system that keeps women economically
dependent on men."); see also Heidi Hartmann, Capitalism, Patriarchy and Job Segregation by Sex. I
SIGNS 206 (1976) (arguing that the sexual division of labor is the most fundamental mechanism for
reproducing women's oppression).
50. The EEOC was slow to begin enforcing Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination in
employment. See De Hart, supra note 48, at 506. Although a number of sources have characterized the
prohibition against sex discrimination as a joke-a last-ditch effort by opponents to defeat the legislation.
see, e.g., Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and VTile VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1167 (1971})-some scholars have challenged that view. see. e.g.. Michael
Evan Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons Congress Added Sex to Title Vii and Their
Implication for the Issue of Comparable Worth, 19 DuQ. L. REV. 453. 457-69 (1981) (arguing that. even
if the members of Congress who introduced the amendment adding sex did so in an effort to defeat the bill.
the majority of Congress did not have that motivation when it approved the amendment).
51. See De Hart, supra note 48, at 506 (referring to Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. Pub.
L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994)).
52. For examples of early, across-the-board challenges. see Kyriazi %'. Western Electric Co.. 461 F.
Supp. 894 (D.NJ. 1978); and Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146. 1149 (W.D. Pa.
1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975). vacated on other grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976). Both cases are
discussed in BARBARA R. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 106-10 (1986).
53. See, e.g., JOHN D'EMIuIo & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 308 (1988) ("Women's liberation ... analyzed the erotic as a vehicle for
domination which, in complex ways, kept [women] in a subordinate place in society."). AUCE ECttoLS.
DARING To BE BAD: RADICAL FEMINISM IN AMERICA 1967-1975. at 3-4 (1989) ("Radical feminists
articulated the earliest and most provocative critiques of the family. marriage, love, normative
heterosexuality, and rape.").
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of many groups with varying views, most agreed that heterosexual sexual
relations were fraught with power dynamics that subordinated women to
patriarchal norms."4 Beneath the unifying umbrella of a challenge to
prevailing sexual politics, there were tensions in early radical feminist thought.
Some saw heterosexual sexuality as redeemable, even potentially empowering,
if purged of sexism; others saw it as intrinsically dominated by men.
5
Radical feminists also differed on men's motivations: They debated whether
"men defend[ed] their power in order to get services [including sex] from
women," or "demanded services from women in order to affirm their sense of
power., 56 These controversies translated into competing characterizations of
rape: Some feminists asserted that "rape is violence-not sex," while others
challenged the boundary between rape and "normal" male sexual aggressionY
As Ellen Willis has shown, these tensions gave way in the mid-1970s to
a new strand of cultural-radical feminism. 8 According to this emergent
analysis, sexual desire and domination were inextricably linked in the
institution of heterosexuality-which was central to male superiority.
According to this view, women were subordinate to men and heterosexual
sexual relations were the primary mechanism of enforcing women's
oppression: "[Al sexist behavior [wa]s an extension of the paradigmatic act
of rape. From this standpoint sexual violence was the essence and purpose of
male dominance, the paradigmatic 'male value,' and therefore feminism's
central concern. 5 9
Given early feminists' dual focus on sexuality and work, it is not
surprising that feminist activists began to highlight women's sexual
exploitation on the job. In 1975, a group of activists in Ithaca, New York,
formed Working Women United (WWU). They held the first "Speak-Out on
54. My analysis here draws on ELLEN WILLIS, Radical Feminism and Feminist Radicalism, in No
MORE NiCE GIRLS: COUNTERCULTURAL ESSAYS 117 (1992). For other descriptions of the early radical
feminist critique of heterosexual sexual relations, see D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 53, at 308-14:
and ECHOLS, supra note 53, passim.
55. See WILLIS, supra note 54, at 130-32 (comparing the views of the Redstockings and the
Feminists). According to Willis,
[Redstockings] took for granted women's desire for genital sexual pleasure ... and focused
[their] critique on the ways men repressed and frustrated women sexually ... [They] rejected
sexual separatism as a political strategy, on materialist grounds-that simply refusing to be with
men was impractical and unappealing for most women, and in itself did nothing to challenge
male power.
Id. at 132. The Feminists, by contrast, "assumed that the primary institutions of women's oppression-
[including] ... heterosexuality-were entirely defined by sexism, that their sole purpose was to perpetuate
the 'sex-role system."' Id. at 130. They "were the first radical feminist group to suggest that living or
sleeping with men was collaborating with the system." Id. at 131. Their manifesto suggested "that any
special interest in or desire for genital sex, heterosexual or otherwise, was a function of sexism." Id. at 132.
56. Id. at 133 (describing differences in philosophy between earlier radical feminist groups and the
New York Radical Feminists).
57. Id. at 143.
58. See id. at 143-44.
59. Id. at 144.
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Sexual Harassment," and organized the first survey devoted solely to the
issue.6' The group clearly conceptualized harassment in terms of sexual
advances. An early article by one of the group's founders, Dierdre Silverman,
defined sexual harassment as "the treatment of women workers as sexual
objects."'6' According to Silverman, harassment exists "when job retention,
raises or promotions depend on tolerating, or submitting to, unwanted sexual
advances," the form of which "varies from clearly suggestive looks and/or
remarks, to mild physical encounters (pinching, kissing, etc.) to outright sexual
assault."62
Lin Farley, another of WWU's founders, adopted a similar conception in
her book, Sexual Shakedown.6 3 The book begins with a description of two
instances of sexual harassment.64 The first involves a dentist who repeatedly
made sexual advances toward his receptionist and eventually tried to rape her,
all the while telling her that this was why he had hired her and that it was only
a matter of time before he would have her.6 The second involves a restaurant
manager who tried to extort sex from teenage girls who applied for jobs.6
Although Farley's book hinted at a broader conceptualization by defining
harassment as "unsolicited nonreciprocal male behavior that asserts a woman's
sex role over her function as worker,"67 subsequent passages defined the
content of the female role exclusively in sexual terms. Harassment, Farley
explained, can be "any or all of the following: staring at, commenting upon,
or touching a woman's body; requests for acquiescence in sexual behavior;
repeated nonreciprocated propositions for dates; demands for sexual
intercourse; and rape. '68 Just as sexual advances lay at the core of sexual
harassment, sexual harassment lay at the core of women's oppression. Farley's
colleague Silverman argued that "the paradigm for interactions between men
and women in our society is that of the prostitute and her customer." To
these early feminists, sexual harassment was top-down and male-female.
At the same time that feminist activists were articulating this view,
however, there were other commentators who might have laid a foundation for
conceptualizing women's harassment on the job in more encompassing terms.
60. See Silverman, supra note 2, at 15.
61. Id. See, in addition, the definition adopted by the Alliance Against Sexual Coercion, an
anti-harassment group founded by women in Boston who had been active in rape crisis work: -Sexual
harassment is any unwanted sexual attention a woman experiences on the job, ranging from leeinng.
pinching, patting, verbal comments, and subtle pressure for sexual activity, to attempted rape and rape.-
THE ALLIANCE AGAINST SEXUAL COERCION, FIGHTING SEXUAL HARAssM.I"'r AN ADVOCACY HANDBOOK
9 (1981).
62. Silverman, supra note 2, at 15.
63. LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB (1978).
64. See id. at 3-11.
65. See id. at 3.
66. See id. at 4-9.
67. Id. at 14-15.
68. Id. at 15.
69. Silverman, supra note 2, at 15.
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Carroll Brodsky's book, The Harassed Worker,7° for example, was one of the
first sources to use the term "sexual harassment."' Brodsky was a
psychiatrist with a doctorate in anthropology who founded a work clinic at the
University of California School of Medicine. He based his analysis on more
than a thousand cases in which workers sought unemployment compensation
on the ground that harassment had left them unable to work.72 Rather than
defining harassment as a form of sexual exploitation, Brodsky defined the
problem in broad, nonsexualized terms: "Harassment behavior involves
repeated and persistent attempts ... to torment, wear down, frustrate, or get
a reaction from another. It is treatment that persistently provokes, pressures,
frightens, intimidates, or otherwise discomforts another person."" He saw
harassment as a means of competing for material resources and for the respect
accorded those who "have it made": "Harassment is a mechanism for achieving
exclusion and protection of privilege in situations where there are no formal
mechanisms available." 74 In Brodsky's conception, harassment takes different
forms, which vary with the occupational setting and with the peculiar
vulnerability of those who have been targeted for victimhood; it includes
teasing, joking and horseplay, scapegoating, name-calling, physical abuse,
social isolation and exclusion, stepping up work pressures, and sexual
harassment.75
To Brodsky, the term "sexual harassment" itself referred not only to sexual
advances, but to all uses of sexuality as a way of tormenting those who felt
"discomfort about discussing sex or relating sexually., 76 Indeed, sexual
harassment by his account included men teasing other men about sexual
potency or interest.77 As this example makes clear, Brodsky did not see
sexual harassment as rooted in sexual desire or a need for sexual
domination,78 but rather in the same motives as other nonsexual forms of
harassment. In Brodsky's conception, harassment could be directed not only
top-down, from supervisor to subordinate, but also horizontally, from peer to
peer, and even bottom-up, from subordinate to boss79-- because competition
for privilege occurs in all these directions.
70. CARROLL M. BRODSKY, THE HARASSED WORKER (1976).
71. Id. at 27-28.
72. See id at vii, xi-xii.
73. Id. at 2.
74. Id. at 4.
75. See id at 2-3.
76. Id. at 28.
77. See id
78. See id. at 27 (observing that in most cases it appeared that "the male aggressor did not actually
wish to have sexual relations, nor even an extended social contact, with his female target" and that
"[i]ndeed, one often suspected that he chose [his] victim precisely because he knew she would never agree
to his suggestions").
79. See id. at 48-59.
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Although there were legal parallels to racial harassment that would have
justified broad conceptualization of sex-based harassment in Brodsky's
terms,80 early feminist ideas and emerging Title VII case law worked together
to inspire lawyers and activists to articulate the sexual desire-dominance
paradigm. Early feminists were unified about the need to expose and hold men
accountable for the intimate violations that for too long had been rationalized
as beyond reach as part of the private sphere."' They founded organizations
that provided research and support, which empowered lawyers to initiate
litigation challenging workplace harassment.8 2 Most of the earliest Title VII
cases challenging on-the-job harassment involved precisely the sort of top-
down, supervisor-subordinate, male-female sexual extortion envisioned by
feminist radicals. Both the facts of these cases and the need to refute judges'
reasoning contributed toward shaping the understanding of sexual harassment
exhibited in the sexual desire-dominance paradigm.
2. Early Quid Pro Quo Harassment Cases
Women lost some of the first Title VII cases challenging harassment.8 3
These cases involved the by-now-familiar fact pattern: Female plaintiffs
complained that they had been fired or mistreated for refusing their male
superiors' sexual advances. Although there were a few doctrinal twists, early
courts tended to reject the plaintiffs' claims by reasoning that the women's
adverse treatment occurred because of their refusal to engage in sexual affairs
with their supervisors and not "because of sex" within the meaning of the
statute.m This reasoning reflected the view of sexual relations as a private
80. The first case to recognize a cause of action for a race-based hostile work environment established
a broad definition of the types of conduct that might comprise an illegal hostile work environment. See
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971); see also infra text accompanying notes 143-144.
81. See D'EMIuo & FREEDMAN, supra note 53, at 311-14; ECHOLS. supra note 53. at 200-02; JEFFREY
WEEKS, SEXUALrTY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 255-56 (1985).
82. See, e.g., Elvia R. Arriola, "What's the Big Deal?": Women in the New York City Construction
Industry and Sexual Harassment Law, 1970-1985, 22 COLUNI. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 21. 36 (1990) (arguing
that the Working Women's Institute "empowered feminist lawyers to begin the process of codifying the
political argument that unwanted sexual advances towards working women constituted abuse, harassment
and employment discrimination"); Enid Nemy, Center Helps Fight Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES. Mar.
3, 1980, at D7 (announcing the opening of the National Sexual Harassment Legal Backup Center in New
York City to prepare amicus briefs, to assist lawyers, and to seek an extension of legal protection): cf.
Silverman, supra note 2, at 23 (declaring an intent to open the WWU Institute to do -research in the area
of sexual harassment as well as education and litigation necessary to bring the problem to public
consciousness").
83. For descriptions of the lower court decisions in these early cases, see CAT1HARINE A. MAcKNNON.
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISIMINATION 59-77 (1979): Arriola.
supra note 82, at 40-44; Jill Laurie Goodman, Sexual Harassment: Some Observations on the Distance
Traveled and the Distance Yet To Go, 10 CAP. U. L. REv. 445. 459-65 (1981); and KTi Weisel.
Comment, 7itle VII: Legal Protection Against Sexual Harassment. 53 WASH. L REv. 123, 124-29, 138-41
(1977).
84. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.. 422 F. Supp. 553. 556 (D.NJ. 1976)
(concluding that a male supervisor's sexual advances on a female subordinate were not discrimination based
on sex within the meaning of Title VII and stating that even though "'[iln this instance the supervisor was
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phenomenon not amenable to public scrutiny that feminists were intent on
repudiating. By treating sexual advances as a purely personal matter beyond
the scope of legal inquiry, courts refused to acknowledge that the sphere of
sexuality can be infused with gender discrimination-in other words, that
sexual relations can be an arena in which people are disadvantaged because of
their identities as women or men.
Drawing on feminist ideas, lawyers responded to this reasoning with
arguments explaining why unwanted sexual advances should be seen as
discrimination because of sex. In one of the earliest law review pieces on
sex-based harassment, feminist Kerri Weisel argued that sexual harassment was
due to gender "based either on the presumption that the supervisor is
heterosexual, or [on] the belief that sexual harassment reflects a general
stereotyped view of women, or both. 85 Weisel first argued that the law
should presume that a male supervisor who harasses a female employee is
heterosexual and that the supervisor's heterosexuality supplies an inference that
the harassment is gender-based. 86 This argument assumed that harassment
consists of sexual advances driven by sexual desire. Otherwise, there would be
no reason why a heterosexual man would be any more likely than a
homosexual or bisexual man to harass a woman worker. If harassment were
a means of competing for privilege, as in Brodsky's model, gay or bisexual
men would be just as likely as heterosexual men to harass their female
coworkers.
Weisel's second argument confirmed this desire-based interpretation. She
argued that the law should presume that a supervisor's harassment amounts to
illegal stereotyping of women as sexual objects, unless the supervisor shows
that he is bisexual.8 7 Under this argument, a heterosexual male supervisor's
sexual advances toward a woman would be based on gender because he would
not have made such advances toward-and thereby stereotyped as an object of
sexual desire-a male employee. Similarly, a homosexual male supervisor's
sexual advances toward a man would be based on gender because the
supervisor would not have made such advances toward-and sexually
stereotyped-a female employee. Weisel's tying of the supervisor's presumed
heterosexuality to the presumed illegal stereotyping reveals that, in her
male and the employee was female, [the] gender lines might as easily have been reversed, or even not
crossed at all"), rev'd, 568 F2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123,
124 (D.D.C. 1974) (concluding that the "substance of plaintiff's complaint," that her position was abolished
when she refused to have sexual relations with her supervisor, "is that she was discriminated against, not
because she was a woman, but because she refused to engage in a sexual affair with her supervisor"), rev'd
sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 E2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390
F Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (characterizing the verbal and physical sexual advances of plaintiffs'
supervisors as "nothing more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism" and an attempt at
"satisfying a personal urge"), vacated, 562 F2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
85. Weisel, supra note 83, at 133.
86. See id. at 133-35.
87. See id. at 136.
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analysis, heterosexual male sexual desire was closely aligned with male
domination. Thus, even though her analysis included the possibility of
harassment by a gay supervisor, what she really had in mind was harassment
of a woman by a heterosexual male supervisor.8 Like most feminists of the
day, Weisel assumed that heterosexual male sexual advances were the core of
sexual harassment, that such advances were driven by sexual motivations, and
that such motivations supplied an inference of gender discrimination.
This line of reasoning was soon adopted by the courts. Barnes v. Castle9
was one of the first cases to adopt it. Paulette Barnes was stripped of her job
because she refused her supervisor's sexual advances. The district court
rejected her claim and held that she was discriminated against, "not because
she was a woman, but because she refused to engage in a sexual affair with
her supervisor."9 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed. Writing for the court, Judge Robinson concluded that Barnes's firing
had occurred "because of sex" within the meaning of Title VII because
Barnes's "job was conditioned upon submission to sexual relations-an
exaction which the supervisor would not have sought from any male."9'
In a puzzling passage, Judge Robinson claimed that his conclusion
"stemmed not from the fact that what [her boss] demanded was sexual
activity-which of itself is immaterial," but solely from the fact that "but for
her gender she would not have been opportuned." 92 Yet, Robinson proceeded
to justify his conclusion with the observation that "there is no suggestion that
[the] allegedly amorous supervisor is other than heterosexual."93 Thus, his
88. Like most feminists of that time, Weisel assumed that in most situations. sexual desire and sexual
stereotyping converge. She showed unusual foresight and sophistication, however. in acknowledging that
the two do not always coexist. In a footnote, she stated that bisexuality would not be an irrebuttable
defense: "[A]Ithough a bisexual supervisor may not have a sexual preference for women, he might still
harass only women in response to the prevailing stereotype." Id. at 137 n.63.
89. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
90. Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123. 124 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd sub nor. Barnes
v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
91. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 989.
92. Id. at 989 n.49 (emphasis added).
93. Id. That Judge Robinson's conclusion was grounded in sexual desire is supported by an additional
passage in which he adopted the analysis proposed by Weisel. In this passage, Robinson stated that sexual
advances made by a homosexual supervisor on a same-sex subordinate would constitute disenmination
"because of sex" within the meaning of Title VII--becausc the supervisor would not have directed such
advances toward a person of the opposite sex-while advances made by a bisexual supervisor upon men
and women alike would not. See id. at 990 n.55.
A number of commentators have criticized the court for suggesting that a bisexual supervisor who
directs sexual advances toward both men and women would escape Title ViI liability for such sexual
exploitation. See, e.g., Sandra Levitsky, Note, Footnote 55: Closing the "Bisexual Defense" Loophole in
Tile VI Sexual Harassment Cases, 80 MINN. L. REv. 1013 (1996); Deborah McFarland. Note. Beyond Sex
Discrimination: A Proposal for Federal Sexual Harassment Ltigaton, 65 FORDHAI L REv. 493, 520
(1996). My criticism is different. Rather than criticizing the court for permitting sexual overtures by a
bisexual supervisor to go unpunished, my analysis suggests that the focus on harassment as sexual overtures
is the source of the problem. Once such a focus is abandoned and harassment is understood more broadly
to include any kind of conduct directed at someone because of gender, it becomes clear that the sexual
orientation of the harasser is irrelevant. Indeed, if harassment is grounded in a drive to mamtan favored
lines of work as masculine, there is little reason to suppose that heterosexual men would be any more likely
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analysis came full circle: That the conduct was sexual in nature was irrelevant,
he claimed, because the salient inquiry was whether it was directed toward one
sex but not another. Yet, the only basis for inferring that the conduct would
not have been directed at a male employee was precisely the fact that the
conduct consisted of sexual advances, advances which the court coded through
a matrix of heterosexual desire. Had Barnes's supervisor yelled at her or
insulted her intelligence, the court would have had a much more difficult, if
not impossible, time concluding that such conduct would not have been
directed at a man. Thus, in spite of the court's own effort to ground the
decision in analysis based on gender rather than on the sexual content of the
conduct, the decision equated the pursuit of heterosexual sexual relations with
gender discrimination.
Barnes ushered in the new legal paradigm. Its reasoning formed the basis
for recognizing quid pro quo harassment-a supervisor's attempt to condition
employment benefits on sexual favors-as a violation of Title VII. Within
three years, at least two other courts of appeals had followed its reasoning.'
In addition, the EEOC issued a comprehensive set of guidelines on sex-based
harassment.95 These guidelines not only prohibited the quid pro quo
harassment involved in Barnes, but also approved the notion of hostile work
environment harassment. 6
These trends established a paradigm for understanding workplace
harassment. To the extent that this paradigm acknowledged that gender
discrimination can take the form of sexual advances and exploitation, it
represented progress. But to the extent that it went beyond this recognition to
define sexual advances and gender-based harassment as coextensive, it
portended problems. The EEOC guidelines, for example, could be read to limit
the universe of gender-based harassment to sexual conduct. According to the
guidelines, harassment involved: "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature."
97
Published around the same time as the EEOC guidelines, Catharine
than men of any other sexual orientation to engage in such harassment.
94. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas
Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
95. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 62 Fed. Reg. 63,622 (1980) (codified
at 29 C.FR. § 1604.11 (1997)).
96. The guidelines define actionable harassment as follows:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature ... when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or
implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of
such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such
individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.
29 C.FR. § 1604.11 (a). On the two different types of sex-based harassment, see supra note 7.
97. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (emphasis added). Indeed, as I discuss throughout the following pages, the
guidelines were so read.
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MacKinnon's book on sexual harassment law further conflated sexual
exploitation and gender inequality.98 Articulating the new line within cultural-
radical feminism, MacKinnon argued that harassment is problematic precisely
because it is sexual in nature-and because heterosexual sexual relations are
the primary mechanism through which male dominance and female
subordination are maintained.99 In MacKinnon's words, "A major substantive
element in the social meaning of masculinity, what men learn makes them 'a
man,' is sexual conquest of women; in turn, women's femininity is defined in
terms of acquiescence to male sexual advances.'' ° To MacKinnon, gender
and sexuality were coextensive: The inequality between men and women was
constructed primarily through sexual relations, and sexuality had no significant
existence outside gender hierarchy.'0 '
With these developments, the sexual desire-dominance paradigm was
firmly in place. Forged of noble intentions by feminists and sympathetic legal
reformers, the paradigm would have serious consequences for the development
of Title VII harassment law-and for the women and men who needed the
law's protection from forms of harassment that did not fit easily within its
parameters.
98. See MACKINNON, supra note 83.
99. See id passim; see also KATHLEEN BARRY. FtALE SEXUAL SLAVERY 164-65 (1979)
("Sex-is-power is the foundation of patriarchy.... Institutionalized sexism and misogyny-from
discrimination in employment, to exploitation through the welfare system. to dehumanization in
pomography--stem from the primary sexual domination of women in one-to-one situations."): ANDREA
DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 126 (1987) ("Intercourse as an act often expresses the power men have over
women. Without being what the society recognizes as rape, it is what the society, when forced to admit
it, recognizes as dominance.").
100. MACKINNON, supra note 83, at 178.
101. For a passage expressing this view, consider, for example. MacKinnon's critique of the feminist
proposition that rape is violence, not sex:
The radical distinction between rape and intercourse-rape is violence, intercourse is
sexuality-is both the most basic and the least examined premise of this approach.
...'But is ordinary sexuality, under conditions of gender inequality, to be presumed
healthy? What if inequality is built into the social conceptions of male and female sexuality, of
masculinity and femininity, of sexiness and heterosexual attractiveness? Incidents of sexual
harassment suggest that male sexual desire itself may be aroused by female vulnerability....
Analysis of sexuality must not be severed and abstracted from analysis of gender .... If
sexuality is set apart from gender, it will be a law unto itself.
Id. at 218-21. This analysis foreshadowed the more trenchant statement in MacKinnon's later essay:
Gender socialization is the process through which women come to identify themselves as
sexual beings, as beings that exist for men .... According to this revision, one "becomes a
woman"--acquires and identifies with the status of female-not so much through physical
maturation or inculcation into appropriate role behavior as through the experience of
sexuality....
Women and men are divided by gender, made into the sexes as we know them, by the
social requirements of heterosexuality, which institutionalizes male sexual dominance and
female sexual submission. If this is true, sexuality is the linchpin of sexual inequality.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory. 7 SIGNS 515.
531-33 (1982).
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C. An Illustration from the Case Law
The Seventh Circuit's decision in King v. Board of Regents of the
University of Wisconsin System"°2 provides an illustration of how courts have
utilized the prevailing paradigm to limit Title VII law. Katherine King was an
assistant professor of occupational therapy who was denied tenure at the
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM). The very first semester King
began teaching, her assistant dean, Steven Sonstein, "began making suggestive
innuendoes as well as leering at her in a sexually suggestive fashion."' 3 As
the semester wore on, he "became progressively more bold and offensive with
respect to his sexual behavior toward King. He repeatedly leered at King and
would from time to time touch her, rub up against her, place objects between
her legs, make suggestive remarks and comment upon various parts of her
body."' Sonstein's behavior, which "was blatant enough for other faculty
members to notice and comment upon,"' 5 culminated in a sexual assault. At
the department's annual Christmas party, Sonstein followed King into a
bathroom, told her he "had to have her," and forcibly kissed and fondled
her.' 6 After King "discussed the problem with Sonstein," he falsely accused
her of using UWM photocopying equipment for personal use, a serious charge
of which King was eventually cleared.0 7 She later filed a formal complaint
of sexual harassment against Sonstein within the university; as part of the
settlement, Sonstein was to abstain from voting on matters relating to King's
appointment.'
King also alleged that the director of the occupational therapy program,
Franklin Stein, had contributed to the hostile work environment at UWM.
Stein's hostility, however, took a nonsexual form: Over the course of a six-
year period, he created conditions that undermined her ability to do her job and
made it difficult for her to get tenure. According to King, Stein gave her a
heavier workload and a lower salary; he subjected her to an unprecedented
number of teaching evaluations; he gave her poor appraisals; he mistreated her
during faculty meetings; he interfered with the tenure process; and he
attempted to limit her research time and increase her teaching load. At trial,
"King supported these allegations with a variety of incidents occurring over the
six year period she was with UWM."' 9 For example, Stein sought to defund
102. 898 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1990). For an article on King that places the case in the context of other
sex discrimination cases against the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, see Scott Kerr, The System: While
UWM Pays a $300,000 Settlement, Officials Say 'the System' Is Working Fine; Those Who Complain Say
It's the Cause of the Problems, SHEPARD EXPRESS (Milwaukee), Dec. 13, 1990, at 1.
103. King, 898 F.2d at 534.
104. Id. at 534-35.
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a grant she had received to allow her to buy time for research by hiring a
substitute to teach her courses. Subsequently, Stein insisted on presenting
King's file to the tenure committee over King's objection that Stein would fail
to present it in a favorable light. King's concern appears to have been
well-founded, for Stein voted against her on the tenure committee. The
committee found that she had failed to meet the department's tenure standards,
"whether it was because of discriminatory treatment or her own failings.""0
Although a jury held Stein, Sonstein, and UWM liable for engaging in
discriminatory treatment of King and creating a hostile work environment
based on her sex,"' the district court overturned the jury's verdict on all but
the harassment claim against Sonstein. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court
of appeals distinguished Sonstein's sexual misconduct from the other nonsexual
mistreatment directed at King. For purposes of King's hostile work
environment harassment claim, the court considered only the sexual conduct:
"Sonstein repeatedly verbally assaulted King, fondled her, and at one point,
physically attacked her. His advances were unwelcome and he was so
told.".. 2 By contrast, the court analyzed the nonsexual hostility directed at
King-including Stein's imposition of "workload and salary disparities, lack
of guidance, and unequal treatment during the tenure/contract renewal
process,"'" 3 and Sonstein's false accusation of personal photocopying and
interference with King's ability to satisfy the tenure requirements-not under
the hostile work environment claim, but under a separate discriminatory
treatment claim." 1
4
According to the court, the difference between disparate treatment and
hostile work environment harassment is that whereas "claims of disparate
treatment must affect the terms or conditions of employment," " 5 in a hostile
work environment claim, "a loss of a tangible job benefit is not necessary
since the harassment itself affects the terms or conditions of employment" (so
110. Id. at 536.
111. The Seventh Circuit began its opinion by noting that "[a jury issued a special verdict ....
finding discrimination, harassment, and retaliation by three employees of UWM and vicanous liability of
UWM." Id. at 534. Later, in its recitation of the facts, the court suggested that the jury perhaps did not find
Stein liable for sexual harassment: "The jury found, in a special verdict. that Sonstein subjected her to
sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, and retaliation and that Stein subjected her to sexual
discrimination, retaliation, and deprivation of a property interest without due process." Id. at 536. In the
beginning of its legal analysis, however, the court made clear that, "[o]n appeal. King alleges sexual
discrimination based on disparate treatment, environmental sexual harassment, retaliation . and
deprivation of a property interest without due process. She makes these claims against both Stein and
Sonstein under both Title VII and section 1983." Id. (emphasis added). Thus. regardless of what the jury
may have found with respect to the hostile work environment harassment claim against Stein. it seems that
the court considered this claim to have been part of the appeal (though it did not specify exactly how the
claim was raised).
112. Id. at 538.
113. Id. at 537.
114. See id. at 541.
115. Id. at 537.
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long as it is sufficiently severe or pervasive)." 6 Yet this doctrinal distinction
provided no reasoned basis for distinguishing the sexual conduct from the
nonsexual conduct. Neither class of conduct-from Sonstein's sexual assault
on King to Stein's efforts to limit her research time-in and of itself effected
a formal job loss like the decision to deny King tenure. Moreover, King
alleged that both sets of conduct created conditions that undermined her status
and performance on the job and made it difficult for her to satisfy the tenure
requirements. The court simply took for granted that hostile work environment
harassment refers to "sexual" harassment, which the court envisioned as sexual
advances. As a result, the court had little difficulty concluding that Sonstein's
sexual overtures constituted hostile work environment harassment that violated
Title VII."'
The King court made explicit the implicit premise of Barnes v. Costle and
other early quid pro quo harassment cases: It is the presence of heterosexual
desire that indicates an allegedly harassing action was taken "because of sex"
within the meaning of the law. Sonstein argued that "his actions were merely
the result of his desire for King as an individual and, therefore, were not
sex-based harassment.""' Although the Seventh Circuit might have
responded to this argument in any number of ways, it responded as the D.C.
Circuit had in Barnes, by defining sexual desire as the sine qua non of
gender-based harassment:
This argument ... misses the point. Sonstein wanted to have an
affair, a liaison, illicit sex, a forbidden relationship. His actions are
not consistent with platonic love. His actions were based on her
gender and motivated by his libido.
... Sonstein's sexual desire does not negate his intent; rather it
affirmatively establishes it." 9
The court's analysis foreshadowed that it would rule against King on her
other claims. Once the court had disaggregated the sexual advances from the
other offending conduct, it became difficult to envision the discriminatory
character of the nonsexual conduct. Even though a jury found in King's favor
on her disparate treatment claims, the court of appeals upheld the lower court's
grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, rejecting the finding that Stein
had subjected King to workload and salary disparities based on her gender.
The appellate court acknowledged being "troubled" by King's "other, more
nebulous" allegations of discriminatory treatment by Stein-such as his
limiting her research time and negatively presenting her tenure case-but
116. Id.
117. See id. at 538-39.
118. Id. at 538.
119. Id. at 539.
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concluded that "no term, condition or privilege of employment was affected
as a result of these actions"' 20 because King had failed to prove that any of
them "caused her failure to meet the requirements for contract renewal."' 
21
Similarly, even if Sonstein's false accusation that King had engaged in
personal photocopying did amount to discrimination, "King did not prove that
she lost a job benefit ... as a result of this incident."'22 Although King
protested that all the discriminatory treatment-taken together-had
psychologically and materially disabled her from satisfying the tenure
requirements, the court rejected this argument as well.'23
The court's analysis placed King (and other plaintiffs) in a Catch-22. The
concept of a hostile work environment was developed out of an awareness that
some actions by supervisors or coworkers can create an atmosphere that
undermines "'the right to participate in the work place on [an] equal
footing,"" 24 even though these actions may not affect any tangible job
benefit.' 25 Many of the nonsexual actions against King fell within this
category. Yet, because the court envisioned conduct driven by sexual desire to
be the quintessential harassment, it refused to consider the nonsexual actions
under a hostile work environment framework. Once it had relegated such
actions to a disparate treatment framework, the plaintiff was bound to lose:
The court assumed that incidents must affect a tangible job benefit in order for
a plaintiff to prevail under a disparate treatment framework, yet it had
consigned to that framework incidents that on their face failed to qualify. The
only basis the court had for consigning those incidents to a disparate treatment
framework was their lack of sexual content.
Had the court considered both the sexual and nonsexual conduct under an
integrated framework, it might have seen the truth through King's (and the
jury's) eyes. From King's perspective, the assistant dean's sexual advances and
his eventual retaliation against King were only some of the many
manifestations of the UWM occupational therapy department's failure to take
women seriously as scholars and equals. Through a variety of actions, both
subtle and obvious, King felt she was denied the research support, mentoring,
collegiality, and respect that signal a faculty's belief in an assistant professor's
promise. Taken together, Sonstein's and Stein's actions communicated to King
that she was "different" and not quite good enough. In the end, these actions
became a self-fulfilling prophecy: King claimed that they had "caused her to
be permanently psychologically disabled, thereby preventing her from fulfilling
120. Id.
121. Id. at 540.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 537 (quoting Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.. 798 F.2d 210. 213 (7th Cir. 1986)).
125. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57. 73 (1986); Rogers v. EEOC. 454 F.2d 234. 238
(5th Cir. 1971).
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the tenure requirements or obtaining another job elsewhere in academics."' 6
By undermining her ability to meet the tenure standards and driving her out
of the department, Sonstein's and Stein's actions reinforced the notion that
women are less capable intellects who do not belong in their department.
The Seventh Circuit's decision is characteristic of the way in which the
federal courts have handled claims like those made by King. Wittingly or
unwittingly, judicial embrace of the sexual desire-dominance paradigm has led
courts to envision sexual advances as the quintessential harassment. This view,
in turn, has led to doctrinal developments that have distorted the law and
limited its capacity to address very real forms of gender-based hostility
experienced by women at work. I discuss these developments in the next two
parts.
II. THE SEXUALIZATION OF THE HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
To a large extent, the courts have restricted the conception of hostile work
environment harassment to male-female sexual advances and other explicitly
sexualized actions perceived to be driven by sexual designs. In doing so, courts
have created a framework that is underinclusive. By defining the essence of
harassment as sexual advances, the paradigm has obscured-and excluded-
some of the most pervasive forms of gender hostility experienced on a
day-to-day basis by many women (and men) in the workplace. I begin with a
description of the influence of the paradigm at the Supreme Court level, and
then analyze its development within the lower federal courts. 12 7
A. The Supreme Court's Decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,2' the Supreme Court had an
opportunity to expand the legal understanding of hostile work environment
harassment. Theresa Harris was the rental manager in a company that sold,
leased, and repaired forklift equipment. She was one of only two female
managers; the other was the daughter of the company president, Charles Hardy.
During Harris's tenure, Hardy subjected her to various treatment undermining
her authority as a manager, such as denying her an individual office, a
company car, and a car allowance; paying her on a different basis from the
other managers; refusing to give her more than a cursory annual review; and
forcing her to bring coffee into meetings, which he never asked male managers
126. King, 898 F.2d at 540.
127. My review of lower federal court cases is comprehensive. I ran searches for all sex-based hostile
work environment cases decided since Vinson. I read all the relevant cases decided between Vinson and
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), and I read a random sample of all the cases decided
after Harris.
128. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
[Vol. 107: 16831710
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment
to do. Hardy made it plain that he considered women inadequate as managers.
He frequently denigrated the plaintiff in front of other employees with such
remarks as, "You're a woman, what do you know"; "You're a dumb ass
woman"; and "We need a man as the rental manager."'" Hardy made other
comments that demeaned Harris as a professional, suggesting that the two of
them go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate her raise and intimating that she must
have promised sex to a client in order to obtain an account. In addition, Hardy
denigrated Harris's managerial role by subjecting her to the same sort of
sophomoric, sexually oriented conduct that he directed at lower-level women
employees (but not male employees), such as asking her to retrieve coins from
his front pocket and making suggestive comments about her clothing. '
Despite Hardy's conduct, the district court adopted the magistrate's
conclusion that the harassment did not rise to the level of a hostile work
environment. 3 ' The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Harris's appeal to the Supreme
Court emphasized only one aspect of the case: Harris urged that the lower
court had erred in requiring her to prove that the harassment had seriously
affected her psychological well-being or otherwise caused her psychological
injury. The Supreme Court found for Harris, rejecting the lower court's narrow
subjective psychological harm requirement and holding that a plaintiff need
show only that a reasonable person would have perceived, as Harris did, that
the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile or
abusive work environment.
32
In focusing on the abstract standards, however, both the Supreme Court
and the lawyers failed to address the real problem in the case: the lower
court's application of those standards from an overly narrow, sexualized
perspective. The magistrate made the classic analytical move made by courts
that have adopted the sexual desire-dominance paradigm: disaggregation. He
began by parceling out the sexual and nonsexual conduct into separate claims.
The nonsexual conduct, such as denying Harris a car, car allowance, office,
and annual review, was not considered part of the harassment claim, but was
examined under a separate claim of disparate treatment.133 For purposes of
the hostile work environment claim, the magistrate concluded that only
129. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 42.070. at 74.247 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).
aff'd, 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992) (per curiam), rev'd. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
130. See id. This form of behavior--treating women alike even though some have jobs or roles of
much different or higher status--is referred to as "'status-levehng" in the relevant literature. See ROSABE-i
Moss KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 231-32 (rev. ed. 1993): cf. Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 343-44 & n.3 (1977) (Marshall, J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (objecting to
the majority's use of attacks by prison inmates on an untrained female clerical worker and a female student
touring a facility to support its proposition that trained female correctional officers would be vulnerable to
sexual assault by inmates).
131. See Harris, 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 74,249.
132. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
133. See Harris, 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 74.251. This, of course, is the same move made by
the Seventh Circuit in King v. Board of Regents of the University of Iisconsm System. 898 F2d 533 (7th
Cir. 1990). See supra Section I.C.
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Hardy's "sexually crude comments" met the EEOC guidelines' definition of
actionable harassment."3 After limiting his focus to these comments, the
magistrate then trivialized them by emphasizing that they did not sufficiently
resemble the sexual advances at the core of the sexual desire-dominance
paradigm. The Holiday Inn comment, for instance, was a bad joke, "but it was
not a sexual proposition."' 35 According to the magistrate, Harris's harassment
was similar to that of another Sixth Circuit plaintiff who had also been
subjected to harassment that was "vulgar and crude," but who lost because "the
sexual conduct was not in the form of sexual propositions or physical
touching."' 36 Winning cases "involved sexual harassment.., in the form of
requests for sexual relations or actual offensive touching."'' 37 Thus, it was
the comparison of Harris's mistreatment to an imagined case of sexual
advances that led the magistrate and the lower courts to conclude that the
mistreatment was not sufficiently injurious to be actionable.
Harris provided a clear opportunity to transcend this unduly restrictive
focus. The case presented a chance to expand the concept of hostile work
environment harassment to include all conduct that is rooted in gender-based
expectations about work roles and to recognize that harassment functions as
a way of undermining women's perceived competence as workers. From such
a perspective, Charles Hardy's conduct looks like the central sex discrimination
that Title VII was intended to dismantle. Taken together, Hardy's
conduct-from the "sexual" conduct that reduced Harris to a sexual object as
she struggled to fulfill her work role, to the nonsexual but gender-biased
conduct that denigrated her capacity to serve as a manager, to the facially
gender-neutral conduct that denied her the perks, privileges, and respect she
needed to do her job well-had the purpose and effect of undermining Harris's
status and authority as a manager on the basis of her sex. These actions fit a
classic pattern of harassment often directed at women who try to claim
male-dominated work as their own.'38 Yet, neither the Supreme Court, the
Sixth Circuit, the district court, Harris's counsel, 39 nor most amici
curiae 40 saw the case in these terms or even perceived the magistrate's
134. Harris, 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 74,249.
135. Id. at 74,250.
136. Id. (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986)).
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. See infra Sections IV.A-B.
139. Indeed, Harris's counsel argued from within the sexual desire-dominance paradigm, emphasizing
the sexually explicit nature of some of Hardy's conduct. See Petitioner's Brief at 33, Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (No. 92-1168). This strategy, of course, invited counsel for Forklift Systems to
stress that much of the conduct was not sexual in nature and that such nonsexual conduct rarely rises to
the level of affecting the terms and conditions of employment. See Respondent's Brief at 28. Only in the
reply brief, presumably after seeing the point raised by a couple of amici, see infra note 140, did Harris's
counsel argue that Hardy's denigration of Harris's competence was "especially demeaning to a person in
a managerial position," Petitioner's Reply Brief at 9.
140. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of the Employment Law Center et al. in Support of Petitioner; Brief
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner on Behalf of National Conference of Women's Bar Associations and
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narrow obsession with the lack of direct sexual advances on Harris as
problematic.
B. Disaggregation in the Lower Courts
The lower court's decision in Harris and the Seventh Circuit's decision in
King v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System exemplify the
most prominent feature of hostile work environment jurisprudence: the
disaggregation of sexual advances and other conduct that courts consider
"sexual" in nature from other gender-based mistreatment that judges consider
nonsexual. Although disaggregation of the sexual from the nonsexual occurs
in different doctrinal contexts, t4 typically it arises in connection with
allocating the challenged conduct to different claims for purposes of deciding
Women's Bar Association of the District of Columbia; Brief Amici Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc. and the National Council of Jewish Women in Support of Petitioner Brief
Amicus Curiae of the National Employment Lawyers Association in Support of Petitioner. Brief of Amici
Curiae NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al.; Brief of the Southern States Police Benevolent
Association and the North Carolina Police Benevolent Association, as Amici Curiae: Brief of the women's
Legal Defense Fund et al.
Two exceptions stand out. The brief filed by Feminists for Free Expression urged the Court to clarify
that the definition of hostile work environment harassment includes all gender-based conduct, not only
conduct of a "sexual" nature as suggested in the EEOC guidelines. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Feminists
for Free Expression in Support of Petitioner at *7, available in LEXIS, Genfed Library. Briefs File. The
group argued that the courts' current focus on sexuality perpetuates a harmful stereotype that women need
to be protected from sexual speech and risks prohibiting speech that is protected by the First Amendment.
See idU The brief filed by the United States and the EEOC urged the Court to reject a psychological injury
requirement in favor of a requirement of proof that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to
interfere with a reasonable person's job performance. See Brief for the United States and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae at *8, available in LEXIS. Genfed Library. Briefs
File. The brief pointed out that harassment could include nonsexual conduct and that even explicitly sexual
conduct can be understood to inhibit job performance by "hamperfing) (a woman's) opportunity to succeed
vis-A-vis her male peers or den[ying] her credit for her achievements." Id. at 112.
141. Sometimes the disaggregation of sexual and nonsexual conduct occurs in the context of a court's
ruling on whether the two types of conduct constitute a continuing violation that operates to toll the statute
of limitations. Courts often conclude that the sexual conduct considered in connection with the hostile work
environment claim is not part of a larger pattern of discriminatory practices, including the nonsexual
conduct, which is analyzed as disparate treatment; accordingly, they dismiss one set of claims or the other.
See, e.g., Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist., No. 94-C-3559. 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17318, at *12-15 (N.D. III. Dec. 6, 1994) (holding that, even though the plaintiff's harassment was
precipitated by her having the temerity to challenge her supervisor's failure to assist her in obtaining a
promotion, her promotion denial was not part of a continuing violation with the harassment it triggered and
thus was time-barred); Jensvold v. Shalala, 829 F. Supp. 131, 138 (D. Md. 1993) (holding that, although
the plaintiff's being told that her research was not valued and did not justify her continued presence on the
job constituted an act of disparate treatment that occurred during the relevant time period, the plaintiff's
hostile work environment claim was nonetheless time-barred because the two claims were "factually and
legally distinct"); Sandom v. Travelers Mortgage Servs., Inc., 752 F Supp. 1240, 1247-48 (D.NJ. 1990)
(holding similarly); see also Boarman v. Sullivan, 769 F. Supp. 904, 907-08 (D. Md. 1991) (concluding
that the plaintiff's allegation of a pattern or practice of discrimination in promotions was not reasonably
related to her hostile work environment harassment claim, and thus could not survive plaintiff's failure to
allege her promotion claim specifically in her EEOC charge): Bennett v. New York City Dep't of
Corrections, 705 F. Supp. 979, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that the plaintiff's allegation that the
department discriminatorily refused to provide her with the training she needed to advance was not
reasonably related to the sexual advances and touchings underlying her hostile work environment claim.
and thus could not survive her failure to allege specifically the denial of training in her EEOC charge).
The Yale Law Journal
whether the conduct violates Title VII. Courts decide, explicitly or implicitly,
that only overtly sexual conduct counts toward establishing hostile work
environment harassment and that nonsexual conduct must be considered-if at
all-as a separate form of disparate treatment.
1. Hostile Work Environment Versus Disparate Treatment
The disaggregation of sexual and nonsexual conduct was not inevitable, for
hostile work environment harassment emerged as a variant of disparate
treatment. 42 The essence of a hostile work environment claim is that actions
for which the defendant is responsible have made the work environment more
difficult for women (or men) because of their sex. Indeed, the original impetus
behind creating the cause of action was to ensure that the prohibition against
discrimination extended to actions that did not in and of themselves effect a
tangible job detriment. The first decision that articulated the concept of hostile
work environment harassment, Rogers v. EEOC, 43 demonstrates this point.
In Rogers, the Fifth Circuit held that a Hispanic worker's allegation that her
optometrist employers had discriminated against her on the basis of national
origin by segregating patients along ethnic lines stated a Title VII violation
sufficient to support an EEOC investigation. Although the optometrists' actions
toward their patients did not affect the complainant's or any other employee's
job in any tangible economic sense, the court recognized that working in a
place where members of one's group are subjected to discriminatory service
may create an atmosphere of inferiority and discrimination for minority
workers. In a passage that laid the conceptual foundation for the hostile work
environment harassment claim, the court concluded that
employees' psychological as well as economic fringes are statutorily
entitled to protection from employer abuse, and that the phrase "terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment" [in Title VII] is an
expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the
practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with
ethnic or racial discrimination.
The Supreme Court extended this reasoning to cover sex-based hostile work
environments in Meritor Savings Bank v. inson. 45
Despite the origin of hostile work environment harassment in the law of
disparate treatment, courts have developed analyses that distinguish the two
causes of action and endow each with a life of its own; to many courts, the
142. I am grateful to my former boss and mentor, David L. Rose, the former chief of the Employment
Litigation Section of the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, for helping me see this point.
143. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
144. Id. at 238 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)).
145. 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986).
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two claims have become "factually and legally distinct."'4 6 Although Rogers
was meant to clarify that Title VII's prohibition against discrimination in
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" covers any type of
employment-related action, regardless of whether the accompanying harm is
psychological, economic, or otherwise, some courts have held that disparate
treatment claims are confined to supervisor actions that effect a tangible job
detriment. t47 Other courts have gone even further to demand proof that the
alleged misconduct constituted an "ultimate employment decision, '  such
as hiring, firing, pay, or promotion denial. The cause of action for hostile work
environment harassment, however, was devised precisely to cover situations
that do not affect the plaintiffs' jobs in any tangible or ultimate sense. As a
result, there is no requirement that alleged hostile work environment
146. Jensvold, 829 F Supp. at 138.
147. See, e.g., King v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of NNis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 541 (7th Cr. 1990)
(concluding that an assistant professor could challenge the ultimate decision to deny her tenure as a form
of disparate treatment, but could not challenge allegedly discriminatory mistreatment by the director of her
program because "no term, condition or privilege of employment was affected as a result of these actions").
discussed supra Section I.C; Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (concluding that
a black postal service employee could challenge the ultimate decision to deny him a promotion as a form
of disparate treatment, but could not challenge the all-white composition of the review board as an
independent form of disparate treatment because the latter, as an "interlocutory or mediate decision[] having
no immediate effect upon employment conditions," was not an "-ultimate employment decision'- (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17)). But see Rimedio v. Revlon. Inc.. 528 F. Supp. 1380. 1389 (S.D. Ohio 1982)
(concluding that the plaintiffs were subjected to disparate treatment in terms and conditions of employment
where the defendant "did not give the women as much authority as the men or treat the women with as
much professional respect as their male counterparts... [and] did [not] treat them as fairly as he treated
the men with regard to setting goals or in the evaluation of their job performance"); EEOC v. Judson Steel
Co., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1286, 1295 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (concluding that the plaintiffs were
subjected to disparate treatment where they were "treated differently in the assignment of work, overtime.
breaks, and other day-to-day conditions of employment . . [and where] they were harassed by their
supervisor, and [one] was subjected to sexual advances").
148. Mattem v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707-08 (5th Cir. 1997) (construing Page to bar
a retaliation claim on the ground that no ultimate employment decision was involved where the alleged
retaliation consisted of an investigatory visit to the plaintiff's home by her supervisor, a reprimand for being
away from her desk, negative performance reviews that resulted in a missed pay increase, an intensification
of her work by her supervisors, and hostility and false reports of problems with her work from her
coworkers); accord Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995) (barring a retaliation claim on the
ground that no ultimate employment decision was involved where the plaintiff alleged that she was denied
a desk audit to determine her eligibility for a promotion, denied the opportunity to attend a training
conference, subjected to unusual scrutiny by her supervisor, and humiliated by her supervisor's act of
informing her client that she made an error); Raley v. Board of St. Mary's County Comm'rs. 752 F. Supp.
1272, 1278 (D. Md. 1990) (barring a disparate treatment claim on the ground that no ultimate employment
decision was involved where the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor subjected her to sexual touchings and
propositions, gave her an unsatisfactory performance evaluation that he later changed to satisfactory, and
gave her a reprimand that he later rescinded when she filed a gnevance against him): id. at 1280-81
(barring the plaintiff's retaliation claim on the ground that no ultimate employment decision was involved);
Lewis v. Glickman, No. 96-0358, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7382, at 13-17 (E.D. La. May 14, 1987) (barring
a disparate treatment claim on the ground that no ultimate employment decision was involved where the
plaintiff alleged that he was discriminatorily denied training on the basis of race). But see Negussey v.
Syracuse Univ., No. 95-CV-1827, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3853. at °18-37 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24. 1997)
(construing Page more narrowly to bar disparate treatment claims only where the plaintiff has sought to
challenge "merely the first or second step in the decisionmaking process." and hence the case was not yet
ripe for resolution because a final employment decision had not been made): Howze v. Virginia
Polytechnic, 901 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (W.D. Va. 1995) (same).
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harassment affect an ultimate employment decision. Instead, plaintiffs are
required to prove two alternative elements: First, they must show that the
harassment is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment"; 4 9 and
second, they must also prove that the employer is responsible legally for the
challenged misconduct.' 50
Judges have also created another distinction between hostile work
environment harassment and disparate treatment: They have sexualized the
hostile work environment claim by singling out sexual advances and other
sexually oriented conduct as the essence of harassment. To establish a hostile
work environment, most courts have required proof not only that the harassing
conduct occurred "because of sex"-the standard causation inquiry that is
essential to any Title VII discrimination claim including disparate
treatment151-but also that the conduct is sexual in nature.
2. "Sexual" Versus "Nonsexual" Conduct
Many courts have relied explicitly on the nonsexual character of the
alleged misconduct to dismiss altogether plaintiffs' hostile work environment
claims. In Turley v. Union Carbide Corp.,152 for example, a court granted
summary judgment against the hostile work environment claim of a woman
who complained that her foreman harassed her by "picking on [her] all the
time" and treating her differently from the male employees.' 53 According to
the judge, "[T]here [were] no facts which would support a finding of sexual
harassment as that term has come to be used in employment discrimination
149. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67, quoted in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). The
severity and pervasiveness element is a judge-made requirement for satisfying the "terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment" language of Title VII; there is nothing in the statutory language itself that
demands such proof. The courts might have construed the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"
phrase to cover any conduct that makes it more difficult for a worker or group of workers to do their jobs
because of their sex, so long as it is conduct for which the company is legally responsible.
150. In some circuits, plaintiffs must prove that the employer knew or should have known of the
alleged misconduct and failed to take prompt remedial action, regardless of whether that conduct occurred
at the hands of supervisors or it occurred at the hands of coworkers. See id. at 69-72; Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982). In some circuits, a plaintiff may also hold an employer
vicariously responsible for a supervisor's hostile work environment harassment by showing that the
supervisor acted within the scope of his employment, or was aided by the existence of an agency
relationship, or satisfied other agency principles. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, I I I F.3d 1530.
1534 (11 th Cir.) (discussing standards adopted by courts of appeals in the wake of Vinson), cert. granted,
118 S. Ct. 438 (1997).
151. In United States Postal Service v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,715 (1983) (citations omitted), the Court
wrote that "[tihe 'factual inquiry' in a Title VII case is '[whether] the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff.' In other words, is 'the employer... treating "some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' As this quotation suggests, in most disparate
treatment cases, the questions of intent and causation merge: The law presumes that an employer acted with
discriminatory intent when it or its agents treated an employee or group of employees differently on the
basis of a prohibited classification.
152. 618 F. Supp. 1438 (S.D. W. Va. 1985).
153. Id. at 1442.
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law."'5 The court rested this conclusion on the fact that the "[p]laintiff was
not subjected to harassment of a sexual naturr.. The foreman did not demand
sexual relations, he did not touch her or make sexual jokes."' 55 Although not
bound by them, the court cited the EEOC guidelines, which define harassment
as "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature." 5 6 According to the court:
[T]he guidelines provide insight into the nature of a sexual harassment
theory. The theory rests upon conduct which can be characterized as
sexual. "Sex" in this instance does not mean gender. Rather, it is used
pursuant to its more popular meaning. Thus, while the harassment
may be directed at a member of the female sex, it is a harassment
which plays upon the stereotypical role of the female as a sexual
object.8 7
To buttress its conclusion, the court appealed to the authority of Professor
MacKinnon: "Sexual harassment has been defined as 'the unwanted imposition
of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power."""
Turley exemplifies the sexual desire-dominance paradigm with exceptional
clarity. Other cases, however, have adopted similar reasoning. In Walker v.
Sullair Corp.,'59 for example, the court dismissed a hostile work environment
claim with this explanation:
Sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment exists where
there are sexual advances, fondling or a sexually suggestive workplace
atmosphere that the claimant finds unwelcome .... Walker has
offered no proof of an unwelcome touching or fondling .... Rather,
the conduct alleged included close monitoring of the attendance of the
plaintiff, monitoring of personal phone calls, public reprimands for
poor job performance and various other nonsexual harassment." °
Likewise, in Hosemann v. Technical Materials, InC., 161 the court dismissed
the plaintiff's allegations that one of her coworkers had sabotaged her work
and "always ... tried to make her do her work poorly,"' a that another had
"'embarrassed [her] every work day... by not talking very good about
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1983), quoted in
Turley, 618 F Supp. at 1441. The plaintiff's claim was brought under the state employment discrimination
statute, rather than under Title VII; "therefore, the Guidelines [were] not expressly applicable.- Turley. 618
F. Supp. at 1441.
157. Turley, 618 F. Supp. at 1441-42 (citations omitted).
158. Id. at 1441 (quoting MACKINNON, supra note 83. at l).
159. 736 F. Supp. 94 (W.D.N.C. 1990), rev'd in part and aff'd in part. 946 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1991).
160. ld. at 100.
161. 554 F Supp. 659 (D.R.I. 1982).
162. Id. at 663.
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females, '"1 63 and that her supervisors had badgered her with daily phone
calls about when she would return to work while she was recovering from an
injury, even though her male coworkers had been permitted reasonable
disability leaves.' 64 The court concluded that the plaintiff had not alleged
"sexual harassment as that term has come to be defined."' 65
Many other cases have held expressly that conduct that is not sexual in
nature does not-and cannot-constitute hostile work environment
harassment.'6 Indeed, in a number of circuits, an element of the cause of
action for hostile work environment harassment is proof of unwelcome sexual
advances or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.167 In other
cases, the emphasis on sexual conduct is less explicit. Instead of dismissing
plaintiffs' claims before trial, some courts have ruled against plaintiffs after
trial on the ground that the challenged conduct is not sufficiently sexual to
comprise a hostile work environment. 68 In these cases, plaintiffs lose on the
163. Id. at 663 n.I I (quoting the plaintiff's answers to the defendant's interrogatories).
164. See id. at 661-62.
165. Id. at 666.
166. See, e.g., Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 290 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("Sexual harassment is used herein
in the sense of offensive behavior of a sexual nature which is prohibited by Title VII."); Holmes v. Razo,
No. 94 C 50405, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10599, at *18 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 1995) (concluding that the
plaintiff's complaint does allege behavior of a "sexual nature" on the part of the defendant and thus "there
is no deficiency in the sexual content of the discriminatory actions" for purposes of a hostile work
environment claim); Sassaman v. Heart City Toyota, 879 F. Supp. 901, 908 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (stating that
the plaintiff must prove that she "suffered sexual misconduct having the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with her work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment");
Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention Ctr., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1852, 1856 (D.NJ. 1990)
(considering only sexually obscene gestures and words as "sexual harassment"), aff'd, 925 F.2d 419 (3d
Cir. 1991), discussed infra text accompanying notes 183-196.
167. See, e.g., Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1997) (requiring
the plaintiff to show that he was '"subjected to unwelcome ... sexual harassment in the form of sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature' (quoting
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611,619-20 (6th Cir. 1986))); Mattem v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104
F.3d 702, 706 (5th Cir. 1997) (imposing a similar requirement); Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522,
1527 (9th Cir. 1995) (requiring the plaintiff to show that "she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature"); see also Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1042 (2d Cir. 1993)
(requiring the plaintiff to show she was the subject of "unwelcome advances," though not explicitly stating
that such advances must be sexual).
168. See, e.g., Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc. 108 F.3d 429, 438, 440 (Ist Cir. 1997)
(upholding a jury's verdict of hostile work environment harassment of a mill floor person based on sexual
misconduct that occurred prior to November 21, 1991 on the ground that "there was ample evidence of
crude, demeaning, and sexually-oriented behavior by (the plaintiff's supervisor] and others directed at
Morrison," but affirming a grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the period thereafter, on the
ground that the nonsexual harassment of which the plaintiff complained did not subject her to "sexually
offensive, embarrassing or vulgar conduct or remarks, or other sex-based conduct or remarks, such as had
occurred prior to November 21, 1991"); Downes, 775 F.2d at 294 n.5 & 295 (reversing an agency finding
that a safety inspection supervisor had created a hostile work environment by referring to a female
employee as the "Dolly Parton" of the office, speculating about her sex life, and touching her hair, while
noting that hair touching "may or may not be a sexual gesture" and dismissing as irrelevant and "rambling"
the employee's allegations of nonsexual harassment); Quick v. Donaldson Co. Inc., 895 F. Supp. 1288,
1296 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (concluding that a heterosexual male press operator's treatment by male coworkers
who "bagged" his testicles by intentionally grabbing and squeezing them did not constitute actionable
harassment, because bagging "did not involve any sexual suggestions or interests" by the plaintiff's
coworkers); Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts Operations, No. 92 C 5987, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16902, at *7 (N.D. II1. Nov. 23, 1994) (concluding that a female auto worker's harassment by a male
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severity or pervasiveness element rather than on the sexual conduct element.
The underlying reasoning of these cases is that the conduct does not
sufficiently resemble sexual advances-or does not seem sufficiently motivated
by sexual interest-to be actionable. In Wimberly v. Shoney's, Inc.,"69 for
example, five former waitresses alleged that their manager, Zavonar, and some
of their male coworkers had subjected them to grossly abusive conduct because
of their sex. Concluding that "only shocking and pervasive sexually oriented
misconduct amount[s] to a Title VII violation," ' 70 the court did not consider
whether all the alleged misconduct together had created a hostile work
environment. Instead, the court analyzed each incident separately and ruled
against the plaintiffs on all but one of their claims. The plaintiffs claimed, for
example, that Zavonar had a habit of putting his arm around them and letting
his arm and hands fall close to their chests. The court dismissed such conduct
based on Zavonar's statement that "[i]f he did it, . . it was done without
sexual designs."'' One woman complained that she had been inadequately
trained and had therefore received a poor performance report. When she cried
about this in Zavonar's office, he allegedly pulled her close and said he
"would train her his way' '1 72 in a "tone of voice [that] was anything but
comforting."' 73 Although Zavonar conceded that he did "grasp [this plaintiff]
by the shoulders in an attempt to calm her down and stop her crying," the
court dismissed Zavonar's assault, ratifying his claim that "he never intended
it to be a sexual proposition."' 74 The plaintiffs also claimed that Zavonar
"had a 'filthy' mouth, . . . often calling waitresses 'bitches,' [and] telling them
to 'get off their lazy damn asses.""175 Although the plaintiffs clearly objected
to this conduct, the court dismissed their objections with the observation that
"none of the plaintiffs testified that Zavonar's profanity was sexually
abusive."'' 76 Finally, with respect to three of the plaintiffs, the court
emphasized that Zavonar had not committed quid pro quo harassment. As the
court explained in reference to one of these women, "Plaintiff admitted that
coworker with whom she had broken off a relationship was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create
a hostile work environment where the harasser's continually "calling plaintiff a 'sick bitch' was not overtly
sexual in nature"); see also Young v. Mariner Corp., 56 Empl. Prac. Dec. (BNA) '140.814. at 40.867 (N.D.
Ala. 1991) (refusing to credit a female hotel caterer's allegation that her general manager made sexual
advances toward her by noting that, "at the time of the alleged sexual advance. [the plaintiff] wore little
or no make-up and her hair was not colored in any way," and concluding that. "considenng the appearance
of [the general manager's] wife, it is obvious that [the plaintiff's) appearance at the time was not attractive
to [the general manager]").
169. 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 444 (S.D. Ga. 1985).
170. Id. at 453 (citing Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
171. Id at 448.
172. Id. at 447.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 448.
176. Id.
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Zavonar never demanded sex from her as a condition for keeping her job....
[He] neither propositioned her nor talked explicitly about sex to her.' 77
Other courts have been even more subtle. In perhaps the largest group of
cases, courts have simply taken for granted that nonsexual conduct cannot
contribute toward establishing a hostile work environment. These courts have
merely proceeded, without analysis, to examine only the sexually explicit
conduct for the hostile work environment claim and to consider the nonsexual
conduct, if at all, under a separate disparate treatment analysis-each in
isolation from the other.7' As I discuss more fully below, such approaches
drain harassment law of its ability to address the full range of gender-based
hostility at work.
C. The Harms of Disaggregation
The problem with disaggregation should be obvious by now. It weakens
the plaintiff's case and distorts the law's understanding of the hostile work
environment by obscuring a full view of the culture and conditions of the
workplace. Both the hostile work environment and the disparate treatment
177. Id. Consider also the court's similar statements about two of the other plaintiffs: "Plaintiff [Lee]
testified that Zavonar neither propositioned her nor demanded, either explicitly or implicitly, that she submit
to sexual advances in order to keep her job." Id. at 449. "Plaintiff [Boring] admitted on cross-examination
that Zavonar neither tried to fondle, pinch or proposition her, nor required sex in exchange for job
benefits." Id. at 450.
178. See, e.g., King v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1990),
discussed supra Section I.C; Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 624 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J..
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (considering in connection with a discriminatory discharge claim,
but not a hostile work environment claim, allegations that the sole female manager in an oil refinery was
denied perks and prerequisites needed to perform the job, was precluded from taking customers to lunch,
and was seated with female clerical employees at a company meeting), discussed infra text accompanying
notes 380-384; Davis v. Boeing Helicopter Co., No. 88-0281, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11990, at *13-18
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 1990) (considering in connection with a discriminatory demotion claim, but not a hostile
work environment claim, an aireraft electrician's allegations that she was told that women do not belong
in the job, her coworkers were told not to help her because of her sex, and her work progress was checked
every few minutes); Graham v. American Airlines, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 1494, 1499 (N.D. Okla. 1989)
(considering in connection with a disparate treatment claim, but not a hostile work environment claim, an
aircraft mechanic's allegations that she was disciplined for failure to tighten a bolt and was demoted unless
and until she passed a qualifying exam, and disregarding altogether plaintiff's allegation that her coworkers
altered a newspaper article to suggest that she had received notoriety for poor job performance); Anderson
v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 86-C-0449, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14454, at *18-25 (N.D. III. Dec. 20, 1988)
(considering in connection with a disparate treatment claim, but not a hostile work environmental claim,
an assistant maintenance superintendent's allegation that her supervisor refused to assign her any
supervisory duties and instructed her subordinates to give her orders, and considering for the hostile work
environment claim only her supervisor's sexual proposition and comment about the plaintiff's breasts);
Loftin-Boggs v. City of Meridian, 633 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (excluding from
consideration under a hostile work environment claim a chemist's allegation that she was excluded from
staff meetings, publicly reprimanded and wrongfully accused of misusing purchase orders, and considering
only her supervisor's cursing and sexual banter), aff'd, 824 F2d 971 (5th Cir. 1987); Altschuler v. Walters,
34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 522, 531 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (considering in connection with a discriminatory
denial of promotion claim, but not a hostile work environment claim, a speech pathologist's allegation that
her supervisor suggested that she should be home with her children and restricted her supervisory and other
duties).
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claims are trivialized. When removed from the larger discriminatory context,
the sexual conduct can appear insignificant. For this reason, courts often
conclude that the harassment was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of employment and create a hostile or abusive work
environment.'79
By the same token, when women are denied the training, information, and
support they need to succeed on the job, or when they are subjected to
threatening or alienating acts that undermine their confidence and sense of
belonging, they can easily be made to appear (or even become) less than fully
proficient at their jobs. This lack of proficiency then becomes the
nondiscriminatory reason that justifies the hostile treatment that has
undermined their competence. Furthermore, when separated from sexual
advances and other sexual conduct, the nonsexual actions may appear to be
gender-neutral forms of hazing with which the law should not interfere. For
these reasons, courts frequently rule against plaintiffs on the ground that acts
were not directed at them because of their sex.'8°
What is more, some nonsexual forms of hostility escape judicial scrutiny
altogether. They appear as insufficiently sexual to be analyzed as hostile work
environment harassment, and too remotely related to a tangible job benefit to
constitute disparate treatment.' Harmful acts of hazing and harassment
frequently fall between the cracks of legal analysis altogether.112
179. For recent examples, see Ramsey vt City of Denver. 907 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1990). discussed
infra text accompanying notes 259-268; Scott v. Sears. Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986).
discussed infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text; the lower court's decision in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,070, at 74,247 (M.D. Tenn. 1991). afftd. 976 F.2d 733 (6th
Cir. 1992) (per curiam), rev'd, 510 U.S. 17 (1993), discussed supra Section II.A; Reynolds v. Atlantic City
Convention Center, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1852 (D.NJ. 1990). aff'd, 925 F.2d 419 (3d Cir.
1991), discussed infra text accompanying notes 183-196; and Ross v. Double Diamond Inc.. 672 F. Supp.
261 (N.D. Tex. 1987), discussed infra text accompanying notes 212-225.
180. For recent examples, see Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co.. 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995).
discussed infra notes 271-285 and accompanying text; Ramsey. 907 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1990). discussed
infra text accompanying notes 259-268; Scott, 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1990). discussed infra notes 197-209
and accompanying text; Reynolds, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1852 (D.NJ. 1990). discussed infra text
accompanying notes 183-196; and additional sources discussed infra Part III.C.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 115-126.
182. See Scott, 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1990). discussed infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text-
Reynolds, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1852 (D.NJ. 1990). discussed infra text accompanying notes
183-196; see also Raley v. Board of St. Mary's Comm'rs, 752 F. Supp. 1272. 1280-81 (D. Md. 1990)
(refusing to consider under a hostile work environment claim the plaintiffs allegations that she was
assigned clerical work outside of her job description, given an unsatisfactory performance evaluation, and
had a letter of reprimand placed in her file, and concluding that such allegations were not adverse
employment actions sufficient to ground a disparate treatment or retaliation claim); Graham. 731 F. Supp.
at 1500-01 (declining to consider under a hostile work environment claim or discriminatory firing clm
plaintiffs allegations that she was subjected to discriminatory assignments and discipline, forced so take
a qualifying test to keep her job, and humiliated by a newspaper article that had been altered to suggest
that she had achieved notoriety for poor job performance); Sapp v. City of Warner Robins. 655 F Supp.
1043, 1049-50 (M.D. Ga. 1987) (declining to consider under a hostile work environment or promotion
discrimination claim the plaintiffs allegations that she was denied the opportunity to go home for lunch.
refused her request to post notice for a substitute when she was sick. and reprimanded for her attire);
Loftin-Boggs, 633 F. Supp. at 1326-27 (declining to consider under a hostile work environment or
constructive discharge claim the plaintiff's exclusion from staff meetings, public reprimands, and wrongful
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Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention Center'8 3 provides an illustration.
Margaret Reynolds, a female journeyman electrician, claimed that she had been
subjected to a campaign of constant harassment after she was named
subforeman for a construction job at Atlantic City's convention center. The
harassment did not take the form of sexual advances or other sexually oriented
conduct. Instead, it consisted of conduct that challenged Reynolds's authority
and right to be subforeman. The men refused to work for her and stood around
laughing while she unloaded heavy boxes. They engaged in a work
stoppage-some even quit their jobs-so as not to submit to the authority of
a woman. She not only was "harassed constantly with verbal abuse and
obscene gestures, ' 4 but also complained of "the tenseness of the job, looks
we were getting, people not talking to us, leaving the room, things of that
effect."' t85 Reynolds's shop steward was also part of the problem. He refused
to obtain locks for the shower she and her lone female coworker shared; and
when Reynolds and the other woman complained to the.shop steward about the
lack of disability benefits, he "told them the men had not complained to him
about benefits, and the women should quit if they did not like the lack of
benefits."' 86 Finally, when a client exhibitor demanded that Reynolds and the
other female electrician be removed from the floor during the Miss America
Pageant-apparently the incongruity between the images of the pageant
contestants and the tradeswomen was too much for the exhibitor-Reynolds
and her colleague were replaced by a male coworker. At the end of the
pageant, the convention center's director fired the whole crew and hired all but
the plaintiff and a few others back the next day, with a man as the new
subforeman. Reynolds alleged "that the entire crew was fired to enable the
Center to ... fire her because she was a woman and the Center wanted a male
subforeman."' 87
Although Reynolds herself considered all these actions to be forms of
harassment that established a hostile work environment,' the court relied
on the EEOC guidelines to conclude that only conduct of a "sexual nature"
could count. The court first bifurcated the "obscene gestures and words" it
considered "sexual harassment" from the incidents it characterized as "other
accusations of misuse of purchase orders).
183. 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1852 (D.NJ. 1990), aff'd, 925 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1991).
184. Id. at 1855.
185. Id. at 1856.
186. Id. at 1857.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 1856 (reporting the plaintiff's complaint that, in addition to conduct the court
characterized as sexual harassment, "a variety of other [nonsexual] events occurred which she alleges
amount to sexual harassment," events which the court described under the heading "other harassment"),
id. at 1867 (reporting the plaintiff's allegation that, in addition to conduct which the court referred to as
"Obscene Gestures and Words," other nonsexual incidents of harassment provided grounds for her hostile
work environment claim).
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harassment."'' 89 Because the "sexual harassment" included only one coworker
giving the plaintiff the finger, another shaking his crotch at her, and two others
calling her offensive names, the court concluded that it was not sufficiently
severe or pervasive to be actionable.' 90 The court next examined the "other
harassment," analyzing "each incident individually to determine first whether
it was sexual in nature."' 9 ' According to the court, none of the challenged
incidents provided evidence of a hostile work environment: ' z "While her
male co-workers may have refused to work for her because she was a woman,
such refusal is not 'verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature' and so does
not figure into the calculus of a sexually offensive working environment."' 93
The court examined each of Reynolds' allegations one by one and rejected
them all based on this line of reasoning.
Given the court's approach, it was a foregone conclusion that the court
would grant summary judgment against Reynolds on her hostile work
environment claim. Further, even though the court held that the nonsexual
incidents were not part of a hostile work environment claim, it did not address
any of these incidents, other than the plaintiff's firing, under a separate
disparate treatment analysis. The nonsexual mistreatment evaded legal analysis
and liability-despite a concession by the court that some of this conduct may
have been directed at Reynolds because of her sex.'"
The court also granted summary judgment against Reynolds on her
discriminatory discharge claim, holding that no reasonable jury could conclude
that the crew had been let go out of a desire to get rid of the plaintiff as
subforeman because of her sex.' 95 In light of the court's approach, this result
is not surprising: Only by considering the decision to fire Reynolds in the
context of the earlier actions to undermine her position as subforeman could
the firing have emerged as part of a gender-based pattern to drive her away
from the job. Yet, the court not only failed to link her discharge claim with
these earlier incidents of harassment, but it also deemed a previous statement
by the union business manager too remote to count as direct evidence of
discriminatory intent. Only a year earlier, when the foreman who eventually
named Reynolds as subforeman had proposed naming her to that position, the
business manager proclaimed: "[N]ow is not the time, the place or the year or
will it ever be the year for a woman foreman."' 96
189. Id. at 1856-57 (distinguishing "sexual harassment" from "other harassment"); td. at 1866-67
(distinguishing "obscene gestures and words" from "other harassment").
190. See id. at 1866-67.
191. Id. at 1867.
192. See id.
193. Id. (quoting EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 I(a) (1981)).
194. See id. (acknowledging that male coworkers may have refused to work for Reynolds because she
was a woman).
195. See id. at 1867.
196. Id. at 1863.
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Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.197 provides another example of this
disaggregation. Maxine Scott was hired as an auto mechanic trainee by Sears
as part of a program initiated by the Chicago Alliance of Business and
Employment Training to train women in nontraditional fields; her position was
subsidized by federal Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)
funds. After a brief twelve-week training course, she was placed under the
supervision of a senior mechanic, Eddie Gadberry, who was to give her
on-the-job training in repairing brakes. Gadberry treated her as his plaything
and did not train her: He "repeatedly propositioned her, would wink at her and
also suggested he give her a rub-down."' 98 Moreover, "when she asked for
advice or assistance, Gadberry would often reply, 'what will I get for it?"""
Other mechanics followed Gadberry's lead: One slapped her on the rear end,
and another speculated about her demeanor while having sex. When Scott's
CETA subsidy ended, she was dismissed (along with the only other female
mechanic). Sears argued that Scott was dismissed because she was less
productive than the men. Scott argued that, if so, her lower productivity
stemmed from her inadequate training for brake jobs (she had often been
assigned to do more menial tire and battery work instead).
The district court granted summary judgment against the plaintiff." ° In
an analysis that resembled the approach in Reynolds, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed. The court of appeals first considered Scott's hostile work
environment claim, and began by citing approvingly the EEOC guidelines'
definition of harassment as "conduct of a sexual nature., 2 0 1 More subtly, the
court trivialized Scott's experience by comparing it to a situation involving
sexual advances: "Scott admitted in her deposition [that] Gadberry never
explicitly asked her to have sex and never touched her.... Additionally, there
is no evidence of Gadberry becoming bitter due to Scott's refusal to entertain
his advances. ' 2 Measured against this standard, and severed from Scott's
allegation that the automotive department's failure to take her seriously had led
them to deprive her of appropriate training, the conduct of the male mechanics
appeared relatively inconsequential. The appellate court therefore had little
difficulty affirming the conclusion that the "sexual" harassment was not
sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish a hostile work environment. 23
Scott's complaint of inadequate training also escaped review under a
disparate treatment analysis. The court did not analyze Scott's training
allegation as a separate claim, but mentioned it only in connection with her
197. 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986).
198. Id. at 211.
199. Id.
200. See Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 605 F. Supp. 1047 (N.D. III. 1985), aff'd, 798 F.2d 210 (7th
Cir. 1986).
201. Scott, 798 F.2d at 213 (citing 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1985)).
202. Id. at 212-14.
203. See id. at 213-14.
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discriminatory discharge claim. 2°4 In response to Scott's contention that any
low productivity on her part was attributable to Sears's lack of training, the
court concluded simply that the "argument does not cut in her favor."' O The
court's attempted explanation was circular: Scott's claim of inadequate training
did not excuse her lower productivity, said the court, because Sears had "a
legitimate business purpose in terminating the underproductive ... Scott."2''
Yet Scott had alleged that her apparent underproductivity was the result of the
discriminatory training and harassment. The court's approach allowed it to
avoid inquiring into this allegation. For purposes of Scott's hostile work
environment claim, the court disregarded the alleged denial of training because
it was not sexual in nature. For purposes of the discriminatory firing claim, the
court disregarded the sexual overtures and what they may have signaled about
the seriousness with which Scott's coworkers took their responsibility to train
her.
In fact, the court disregarded evidence suggesting that the company's
motives may have been less than pure. Sears did not dispute that Scott's
department manager, in discharging her, had commented that "he didn't want
to pay a woman $7 an hour when he could get a man to do three brake jobs
for that.'' 207 This comment suggested that the manager held a stereotyped
preconception of Scott as inherently less competent-and hence worth less in
wages-than a man. What is more, the comment suggested that Sears was
willing to employ Scott (and her female coworker) only so long as CETA was
footing the bill; when that funding ended, the woman's worth was cast in a
different light. Despite these implications, the court dismissed the comment as
an "isolated statement" that was "insufficient in itself to indicate Scott was
wrongfully terminated due to her sex." ''
As in Reynolds, Scott's disaggregation worked to the plaintiff's
disadvantage by portraying each challenged event as an isolated and relatively
innocuous incident. Had the court put all the pieces together, Scott's story, like
Reynolds's, would have emerged as familiar examples of the problems
frequently experienced by women in the trades: They are rarely taken seriously
as workers, and they are harassed in myriad ways in order to remind them that
even though they are doing a "man's job," they are still "different" and less
competent.209
204. The court's opinion does not reveal whether Scott alleged Sears's failure to extend her adequate
training and opportunity to do brake work was a separate form of disparate treatment. See td. at 211.
205. Id. at 214.
206. Id. at 215.
207. Id. at 212.
208. Id. at 215. Indeed, the court went even further, suggesting that if Sears had r:tained Scott over
a more productive male mechanic, Sears would have opened itself up to a charge of reverm discrimination.
See id.
209. See MARY MARTIN, HARD-HATrED WOMEN: STORIES OF STRUGGLE AND SUCCESS IN THE
TRADES 10 (1988) ("[In addition to sexual advances, women in the trades] also face another pervasi-v and
sinister kind of harassment which is gender-based, but may have nothing to do with sex. It is harassment
1998] 1725
The Yale Law Journal
This dynamic also occurs in white-collar settings.21° In such settings,
courts may have even more difficulty comprehending the significance of
nonsexual harassment. We have already seen how the court in King v. Board
of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System failed to perceive the
importance of nonsexual actions taken against an assistant professor, even
though it easily found sexual advances against her to be actionable.2 ' Ross
v. Double Diamond, Inc.212  provides a second illustration. Sheila
Stoudenmire was hired as a salesperson for Double Diamond, a company that
developed and sold property in a Texas lakeside community. During
Stoudenmire's interview, the manager, Larry Womack, told her he was looking
for a part-time receptionist and secretary; Stoudenmire recommended her
younger sister, Beverly Ross. Womack hired Ross, and during her first hour
on the job, began to subject her to unwelcome sexual advances. He asked her
if she "fooled around," lined her up against a wall and told her to pull up her
dress so he could take her picture, and asked her to "pant" for him on the
telephone.213 Later that evening, in a meeting with a group of salespeople,
Womack stood by while one of the men took a picture up Ross's dress. The
next day, Womack pulled Ross onto his lap and refused to let her go until
someone else entered his office. Later, after she refused an order to "bend
over" and clean up some mustard on the wall, he trapped her against the
closed door of his office.1 4 The next day, Ross, Stoudenmire, and another
female salesperson complained about Womack's actions to the local sheriff.
The sheriff told them there was nothing he could do, but advised them that
they could complain to Womack's boss, to the district attorney, or to the
EEOC.
During this period, Stoudenmire was training as a salesperson. Before
Stoudenmire went to the sheriff, Womack had made only one unseemly
overture to her, commenting that "he bet she liked to wear black boots and
carry a whip in the bedroom. '21 5 After going to see the sheriff, Stoudenmire
approached Womack's boss, Robert Gray, to complain about Womack.216
Gray confronted Womack. Womack subsequently berated Stoudenmire for
going over his head and went after her by making it difficult for her to
aimed at us simply because we are women in a 'man's' job, and its function is to discourage us from
staying in our trades."); SCHROEDEL, supra note 16, at xiv-xv ("T]here is one theme which is so universal,
so pervasive, that it cuts across all accounts [from women in the trades]. That is the theme of sex
discrimination in its multitude of forms.").
210. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1750, 1835-36 (1990) (analyzing the core features of hostile work environments that confront women in
male-dominated work settings, including white-collar ones).
211. See supra Section I.C.
212. 672 F. Supp. 261 (N.D. Tex 1987).
213. Id. at 271.
214. Id. at 265.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 266.
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complete her training: "Womack required Stoudenmire to continue her studying
as a sales trainee in a separate room, away from the male trainees. In addition,
Stoudenmire could not take her training material home at the end of the day.
She had been allowed to take the material home in the past."2 "7 A few days
later, when Stoudenmire showed up for work, Womack told her that Ray
Wylie, the vice president of sales, wanted to speak to her on the telephone.
Wylie told her that she was "barking up the wrong tree" and that "we know
how to handle girls like you." 2"8 He threatened that if she pursued the matter
any further "she would lose her home and [her] husband would lose his
job.' 219 He also threatened to "say that she tore off her blouse ... and tried
to have Gray make love to her if she 'did anything about' the...
harassment." 0 Womack fired Stoudenmire and Ross later that day when,
after calling the sheriff about Wylie's threats, they left without permission.
The court's analysis of the two sisters' hostile work environment claims
reveals the influence of the sexual desire-dominance paradigm. The court's
discussion of the relevant precedent singled out sexual advances as the most
troubling type of harassment. -'- Against this backdrop, the court had no
difficulty finding that Ross's mistreatment constituted actionable harassment.
The court relied on the fact that Ross was an innocent, young woman who had
been subjected to sexual advances by an older, more powerful male
supervisor."' Indeed, the court's description of the harassment emphasizes
the extent to which a modest young woman like Ross would experience
humiliation and shame at the hands of experienced sexual predators like
Womack and the other men:
The Court is mindful that the sexual abuse began on Ross' very first
day on the job. Along with the general insecurity and awkwardness
that accompanies anyone's first day on the job, Ross was forced to
deal with the lewd comments and actions of her superiors .... Ross
did nothing to provoke or encourage such a comment. Womack had
just met Ross for the first time....
During the same morning, Womack forced Ross into another
uncomfortable situation by telling her to pull up her dress so that he
could take a picture of her. Ross stated that she was scared of
Womack ... and tried to pacify [him] while retaining her dignity by




220. Id. at 275 (quoting Ray Wylie).
221. See id. at 269-70 (reviewing Henson v. City of Dundee. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). and
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981), and emphasizing the fact that the plaintiffs' supcrvisors
pressured them to have sexual relations).
222. See id. at 271.
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... The torment which Ross experienced continued ....
Womack refused to give [this picture and the other picture taken up
Ross's dress by one of the salesmen] to Ross and refused to even
allow Ross to see the pictures. This caused Ross great torment. She
did not know how revealing the picture was that the salesman took up
her dress....
* . . In addition, many of [Womack's and the other harassers']
victims were young, between the ages of seventeen and twenty three.
The plaintiffs were twenty and twenty three years old. However, the
[men] who committed the acts were in their thirties or forties. This
type of situation lends itself to a finding that there was an abusive
work environment.'
In contrast to this extended analysis of Ross's horror and degradation, the
court refused even to speculate about how Stoudenmire felt about her
mistreatment. With notable lack of passion, the court dryly recounted the
incidents of which Stoudenmire complained and concluded in summary
fashion: "Title VII is not a shield which protects people from all sexual
discrimination. The type of conduct listed above does not rise to the level of
harassment which is actionable. It is not sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of employment or create an abusive work
environment."
From the tone of the opinion, it seems clear that a number of facts blinded
the court to the harm of the hostile and sexist gestures directed at Stoudenmire.
Stoudenmire's mistreatment did not consist of sexual advances and other
conduct the court could recognize as shame-inducing; Stoudenmire presented
herself with an assertiveness that prevented the court from seeing her as a
hapless victim of worldly predators; and she had attempted to join Double
Diamond as a competitor to the men in the salesforce, unlike Ross who had
taken a job as an underling to Womack and the other men. "From viewing the
witnesses on the stand," observed the court, "this Court finds that Stoudenmire
was much more assertive than Ross. Stoudenmire is Ross' older sister, and she
was resolved to protecting both herself and Ross."
Although Stoudenmire won on her retaliation claim, the court missed an
opportunity to understand her mistreatment as sex-based harassment. That
223. Id at 271-72.
224. Id. at 273 (citations omitted).
225. Id. at 276. There are many other cases in which the plaintiff's failure to conform to the court's
image of a proper victim hurt the plaintiff's case. See, e.g., Kirkland v. Brinias, 741 F. Supp. 692, 694
(E.D. Tenn. 1989) ("Both waitresses were married women with years of waitressing experience who were
quite able to take care of themselves."), aff'd, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1991); Perkins v. General Motors
Corp., 709 F Supp. 1487, 1496 (W.D. Mo. 1989) ("Perkins is not the downtrodden victim she attempted
to portray throughout the trial; Perkins is an intelligent, articulate, aggressive, ambitious, tough and friendly
person who has good people skills. She was and is a strong person, well able to fend for and defend
herself."), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1990),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 242-244.
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Stoudenmire's situation strayed too far from the sexual desire-dominance
paradigm prevented the court from perceiving that Womack's campaign to
undermine her ability to pursue her chosen career alongside her male
colleagues was as harmful to her aspirations-and to the larger aspiration of
integrating women into the workforce as full equals-as the more familiar
sexual abuse experienced by her sister.
D. Sexual Paternalism and the Unwelcomeness Requirement
Ross v. Double Diamond exemplifies another, related problem engendered
by the sexual desire-dominance paradigm. By focusing on sexual advances as
the quintessential harassment, the paradigm encourages courts to extend
protection to women for the wrong reasons. Rather than emphasizing the use
of harassment law to promote women's empowerment and equality as workers,
it subtly appeals to judges to protect women's sexual virtue or sensibilities.
This sexual paternalism is deeply conservative; its benefits are limited to
women imagined to possess the sexual purity that renders them deserving of
protection. Such protection historically has been reserved for white,
middle-class women who did not upset the settled gender order by abandoning
the domestic sphere for wage work or politics.? Contemporary case law
sometimes reproduces this legacy by requiring plaintiffs to conform to the
image of the "good victim" if they are to receive legal protection. Ross v.
Double Diamond suggests that, in the eyes of some judges, even being an
older, married woman who aspires to a male-dominated occupation is sufficient
to remove a woman from the court's protection.
The courts' application of the requirement that sexual harassment be
"unwelcome" provides an even clearer illustration of this exclusionary dynamic. 7
226. See DuBois & Gordon, supra note 46, at 39 (characterizing as conservative some aspects of 19th-
and early 20th-century feminism in the social purity tradition: "Social purity feminists not only accepted
a confining sexual morality for women, but they also excluded from their sisterhood women who did not
or could not go along"); Paula Giddings, The Last Taboo, in RACE-ING JUSTICE. EN-GeDERtNG Pow t:
ESSAYS ON ANrrA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND ThE CoNSTRuCnoN OF SOcIAL REALTy 441. 443-51
(Toni Morrison ed., 1992) (noting the value that 19th-century intellectuals placed on women who -did not
tempt" and their belief that lower-class women were immoral because they worked outside the home). As
Christine Stansell notes:
Within the propertied classes, women constituted themselves the moral guardians of their
families and their nation, offsetting some of the inherited liabilities of their sex. Laboring
women were less fortunate: The domestic ideals from which their prosperous sisters profited
did little to lighten the oppressions of sex and class they suffered. They were also more
troublesome, since their actions-indeed, their very existence as impoverished female
workers-violated some of the dearest held genteel precepts of"woman's nature" and "woman's
place."
CHRISTINE STANSELL, CmTY OF WOMEN: SEX AND CLASS IN NEw YORK. 1789-1860 at xi (Illini Books
1987) (1986).
227. Under the EEOC guidelines and the dominant legal paradigm, harassment is defined as
"[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature." EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1997) (emphasis
added).
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Reed v. Shepard,28 for example, involved a woman who worked as a civilian
jailer. Her position was created by the sheriff's department in 1976 as a step
down from the male-only deputy sheriff position, allegedly for the purpose of
conserving funds. In addition to alleging the "customary complaints concerning
discrimination in pay, promotion and benefits," Reed alleged that she was
discriminatorily denied locker and restroom facilities and that "she was
required to perform onerous duties in addition to ... tasks relating to the
management of the jail."229 These claims were consigned to a separate
disparate treatment analysis. For purposes of the hostile work environment
claim, the Seventh Circuit focused on the behavior of Reed's male coworkers:
"Plaintiff contends that she was handcuffed to the drunk tank and
sally port doors, that she was subjected to suggestive remarks ....
that conversations often centered around oral sex, that she was
physically hit and punched in the kidneys, that her head was grabbed
and forcefully placed in members' laps, and that she was the subject
of lewd jokes and remarks. She testified that she had chairs pulled out
from under her, a cattle prod with an electrical shock was placed
between her legs, and that they frequently tickled her. She was placed
in a laundry basket, handcuffed inside an elevator, handcuffed to the
toilet and her face pushed into the water, and maced. 230
The Seventh Circuit's analysis simultaneously professed its own horror at
Reed's coworkers' activities and placed Reed herself outside the community
of women deemed capable of being harmed by such horrific treatment: "By
any objective standard, the behavior of the male deputies and jailers toward
Reed ... was ... repulsive. But apparently not to Reed. ' 231 The court
reached this conclusion based on evidence that Reed used profanity, told
off-color jokes, engaged in sexual horseplay and flirting, and failed to wear a
bra underneath her T-shirt.232
Whether Reed participated in sexualizing the atmosphere because she felt
pressure to do so in order to be accepted, as she testified,233 or even because
she enjoyed contributing to the sexual ribaldry, the court could have concluded
that Reed's behavior justified her coworkers' conduct only by viewing the case
through the lens of sexual paternalism. For even if Reed displayed a sense of
bawdy sexuality-or, to go even further, even if she had "welcomed the sexual
hijinx [sic] of her co-workers" 2 -- this in no way implied that she had
invited nonsexual violent physical assaults, such as being hit and punched in
228. 939 F2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
229. Id. at 486.
230. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting from the district court's unpublished opinion).
231. Id.
232. See id. at 486-87.
233. See id. at 492.
234. Id.
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the kidneys, shocked with a cattle prod, or pushed facedown into the toilet.
Yet, in the court's eyes, Reed's own conduct had branded her as a bad girl
outside the bounds of legal protection. Indeed, the court stressed that "other
female employees testified that the male jail employees did not behave in this
manner around women who asked them not to." 5
Other courts have rejected the claims of women who appeared to them to
be too bawdy, too worldly, too old, or too strong to need sexual protection. In
Weinsheimer v. Rockwell International Corp.,2  for example, the court
concluded that a female thermal protection inspector, whose job involved
evaluating the work of plant technicians, had welcomed a series of abusive acts
by a male technician. The technician had held a knife to her throat, shoved her
into a file cabinet, threatened to bang her head into the ground, and grabbed
her pelvic area and breasts. Because the victim had engaged in sexual banter
and joking and had used "abusive and vulgar language" in speaking to her
boyfriend on the telephone at work, however, the court concluded that the
technician's treatment was not actionable harassment.27 In Kirkland v.
Brinias,238 the court ruled against two waitresses who had been repeatedly
abused by a fifty-year-old male busboy who warned that he would not take
orders from a woman. The busboy had sexually propositioned and groped the
waitresses, in addition to hitting, kicking, and threatening them. The court
found "that [although] some misconduct was of a sexually offensive nature,
that would create a hostile and intimidating working environment for a
reasonable person .... there is no hint that it had any harmful psychological
effect on the plaintiffs." 239 Apparently, the court based this finding on the
fact that the plaintiffs were "both capable, outspoken women," '' indeed,
"married women with years of waitressing experience who were quite able to
take care of themselves.
241
Similarly, in Perkins v. General Motors Corp.,242 the court rejected a
challenge of both nonsexual conduct and sexual misconduct (including rape)
with the observation: "Perkins is not the downtrodden victim she attempted to
portray throughout the trial; Perkins is an intelligent, articulate, aggressive,
ambitious, tough and friendly person who has good people skills. She was and
is a strong person, well able to fend for and defend herself. ' 2 3 As the court
bluntly stated, "The... conduct about which Perkins complains was
235. Id.
236. 754 F. Supp. 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1990), aff'd, 949 F2d 1162 (1lth Cir. 1991).
237. Id. at 1565.
238. 741 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Tenn. 1989). aff'd, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1991).
239. Id. at 698.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 694.
242. 709 F. Supp. 1487 (W.D. Mo. 1989). aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Perkins v. Spivcy,
911 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1990).
243. ld. at 1496.
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welcomed and encouraged by her. [She] was an active and encouraging
participant in sexually explicit conversation and actions."
4
To conform to the image of the proper victim, women must comport
themselves as sexually pure, even passive, beings who have been violated by
their coworkers' sexual predation. This requirement is not only sexist, but also
class-biased in nature, for working-class women are less likely than more
privileged women to be perceived as pure; and they may even be more likely
than other women to engage in the sexual give-and-take with their male
colleagues that courts deem to strip women of their virtue.24 5 Regardless of
their backgrounds or their underlying motivations, women who participate in
sexual joking and ribaldry become fallen women, no longer capable of finding
harassment unwelcome--even when that harassment consists of nonsexual
actions with the purpose of driving them away from the job or undermining
their competence or authority on the job. Within the sexual desire-dominance
paradigm, the focus on protecting women from sexual violation deflects
attention away from such nonsexual assaults on their capabilities as workers.
E. The McKinney Rule and Its Lack of Influence
At a formal level, the judicial emphasis on sexuality is surprising. Even
though the EEOC guidelines focus on sexual conduct, the EEOC has long
recognized that nonsexual, gender-based harassment may violate Title VII.26
Even more importantly, there is nothing in the language or purpose of the
statute itself that requires or intimates an emphasis on sexual conduct.
244. Id. at 1498.
245. I am grateful to the late Markie Rath for helping me see this point. For historical support, see,
for example, STANSELL, supra note 226, passim.
246. Early EEOC compliance manuals recognized that harassment need not be sexual in nature to
constitute sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. See EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 615.6, 3105, at
3217 (Jan. 1982) ("Sexual harassment is one type of harassment based on sex. However, it is not the only
type of unlawful harassment which is sex-based or which stems from sex discrimination."). Subsequent
statements of policy guidance confirmed the point. See EEOC Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual
Harassment, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 60, at E-1 (Mar. 28, 1990) ("Although the Guidelines specifically
address conduct that is sexual in nature, the Commission notes that sex-based harassment-that is,
harassment not involving sexual activity or language-may also give rise to Title VII liability (just as in
the case of harassment based on race, national origin or religion) if it is 'sufficiently patterned or pervasive'
and directed at employees because of their sex." (citations omitted)).
More recently, the EEOC issued proposed guidelines that would have, among other things, confirmed
and clarified the illegal nature of nonsexual, gender-based harassment. See Guidelines on Harassment Based
on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin, Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266, 51,267 n.2
(1993) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609) (proposed Oct. 1, 1993) ("Although the Commission has always
recognized that gender-based harassment is actionable, the Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex
describe only conduct of a sexual nature. These proposed guidelines simply state the applicable rule in
guideline form."). Due to political pressure from conservative religious groups who objected to the
proposed guidelines' treatment of religious harassment, the EEOC ultimately withdrew the proposed 1993
guidelines. See Withdrawal of the Proposed Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 51,396 (1994) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1609); see also Religious Harassment Rules Shelved, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1994, at A17.
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Some courts of appeals have recognized this point. In 1985, in McKinney
v. Dole,7 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
concluded that harassment need not take the form of "sexual advances or of
other incidents with clearly sexual overtones." 8 The court held that "any
harassment or other unequal treatment of an employee or group of employees
that would not occur but for the sex of the employee or employees may, if
sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal condition of
employment under Title VIl." 9  In the wake of McKinney's 1985
pronouncement, other appellate courts issued similar statements, some more
than a decade ago.250
But McKinney has had little influence on the law. Many courts of appeals
have simply ignored the case. In these circuits, courts continue to define
harassment as unwelcome "sexual advances, requests for sexual favors or other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature."' ' They continue to exclude
conduct they do not consider sexual from the hostile work environment claim
and to consider it, if at all, only under a separate disparate treatment claim.'
52
247. 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
248. Id. at 1138.
249. Id.
250. The First, Third, Seventh. Eighth. Tenth. Eleventh. and Federal Circuits have made such
pronouncements. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico. 864 F.2d 881. 905 (Ist Cir. 1988) (relying on
McKinney to conclude that a "constant verbal attack [on surgery residents], one whtch challenged their
capacity as women to be surgeons... although not explicitly sexual, was nonetheless charged with
anti-female animus, and therefore could be found to have contributed significantly to the hostile
environment"); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469. 1485 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that hostile
work environment harassment "is not necessarily required to include sexual overtones in every instance"
but may also include "pervasive use of derogatory and insulting terms relating to women generally and
addressed to female employees personally" as well as the "posting of [pornography) in common areas and
in the plaintiff's personal work spaces"); Doe v. City of Belleville. 119 F.3d 563, 575 (7th Cir. 1997)
(acknowledging that "harassment lacking in sexual overtones may nonetheless support a claim for sex
discrimination when it is visited upon workers of one gender but not the other"); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co..
842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (relying on McKinney to conclude that -[intimidation and hostility
toward women because they are women can ... result from conduct other than explicit sexual advances-)
Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987) (relying on McKinney to conclude that
threats of physical violence and verbal abuse should be considered for purposes of a hostile work
environment claim); Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497. 1503 (1Ith Cir. 1985) (holding that
sexual harassment need not involve "unwelcome sexual advances," but may also consist of "threatening.
bellicose, demeaning, hostile or offensive conduct by a supervisor in the workplace because of the sex of
the victim"); King v. Hillen, 21 F3d 1572, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that hostile work environment
harassment need not be of a sexual nature so long as the conduct is based on the victim's sex).
251. E.g., Yeary v. Goodwill lndus.-Knoxville, 107 F.3d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1997) (requiring the
plaintiff to show that she was "'subjected to unwelcome[] sexual harassment in the form of sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" (quoting
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611. 619-20 (6th Cir. 1986)) (alteration in original)); accord Mattern
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 706 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Fuller v. City of Oakland. 47 F.3d
1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995) (requiring the plaintiff to show that "she was subjected to verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature"); Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.. 9 F.3d 1033, 1042 (2d Cir. 1993)
(requiring the plaintiff to show she was the subject of "unwelcome advances," without explicitly stating
that they must be sexual).
252. See, e.g., Gleason v. Mesirow Fin.. Inc.. 118 F.3d 1134 (7th Cir. 1997): DeAngelis v. El Paso
Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 1995); Rabidue. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986):
Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist., No. 94-C-3559. 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17318.
at *4-5, *17-18 (N.D. II1. Dec. 6, 1994); Anderson v. Chicago Hous. Auth.. No. 86-C-0449. 1988 U.S. Dist.
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King v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, 253 Scott v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co.,254 Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc.,25 as well as the
lower court's decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,"56 were all decided
after McKinney.
Even in some of the circuits that have adopted the McKinney rule,
subsequent cases have ignored or undermined it. Without discussion, some
judges have simply considered only sexual conduct for purposes of the hostile
work environment claim and relegated any nonsexual misconduct to a separate
disparate treatment analysis or disregarded it altogether.257 Such an approach
subverts the spirit of the McKinney rule, as a pair of cases from the Tenth
Circuit illustrates.
In 1987, the Tenth Circuit adopted the McKinney rule in Hicks v. Gates
Rubber Co.258 Three years later, in Ramsey v. City of Denver,259 the court
undermined the McKinney and Hicks reasoning by affirming the lower court's
disregard of nonsexual harassment. Ramsey was a municipal engineer who was
subjected to a familiar pattern of sexual and nonsexual treatment to undermine
her professional status. James Brown, the director of the traffic division, who
hired Ramsey, "was known to believe that certain jobs were more suitable for
women than others.,,26' Ramsey claimed that upon being hired, she was
given inadequate supervisory assistance and inappropriate assignments. Her
most immediate supervisor Mitchell, for example, allegedly asked to be
relieved of supervising her, "due to his not getting along with her."261 She
was also assigned to supervise a man named Jurado, whom she characterized
as an "overt sexist. '262 After an argument with Jurado, she was stripped of
her supervisory duties over him. In addition, Ramsey charged that she was
subjected to "comments, drawings, sexually-charged physical conduct, and
publications found in the work area. 2 63 Eventually, the city extended her
probation rather than making her a permanent employee, and she resigned.
The analysis by the court of appeals embodied the typical disaggregation
approach. For purposes of Ramsey's hostile work environment claim, the court
LEXIS 14454 (N.D. III. Dec. 20, 1988); Keziah v. W.M. Brown & Son, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 542 (W.D.N.C.
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 888 F2d 322 (4th Cir. 1989); Loftin-Boggs v. City of Meridian, 633 F.
Supp. 1323 (S.D. Miss. 1986), aff'd, 824 F2d 971 (5th Cir. 1987).
253. 898 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1990), discussed supra Section I.C.
254. 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986), discussed supra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
255. 672 F. Supp. 261 (N.D. Tex 1987), discussed supra text accompanying notes 212-225.
256. 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,070 (M.D. Tenn. 1990), aff'd, 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam), rev'd, 510 U.S. 17 (1993), discussed supra Section II.A.
257. See, e.g., Ramsey v. City of Denver, 907 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1990); Graham v. American
Airlines, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 1494 (N.D. Okla. 1989); Sanchez v. City of Miami Beach, 720 F. Supp. 974
(S.D. Fla. 1989); Sapp v. City of Warner Robins, 655 F. Supp. 1043 (M.D. Ga. 1987).
258. 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987).
259. 907 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1990).
260. Id. at 1008.
261. Id. at 1009.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1006.
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considered only the comments, drawings, suggestive physical gestures, and
"publications."' 4 Having severed the few overtly sexual incidents of
harassment from the larger discriminatory context, the court of appeals held in
conclusory fashion that the sexual conduct was not sufficiently severe or
pervasive to constitute an actionable hostile work environment.' The court
analyzed the nonsexual actions as disparate treatment and ruled against Ramsey
on the ground that she failed to prove that they occurred because of her sex.
The court refused to consider as direct evidence of discrimination the director's
statement that her job was inappropriate for women-even though the director
confirmed at trial "his feelings about women being better suited to some jobs
than to others."' According to the court, Ramsey failed to show that the
director's attitude was connected to her supervisors' refusal to work with her
or her assignment to work with a sexist colleague. Instead, the court accepted
the traffic division's allegation that Ramsey brought all her problems on herself
because she lacked "interpersonal skills."2 '7 Thus, it was Ramsey's
personality, rather than her sex, that accounted for her mistreatment.
As a technical matter, it may be possible to square the Tenth Circuit's
analysis in Ramsey with its earlier adoption of the McKinney rule in Hicks.
The Ramsey opinion suggests that the plaintiff may have failed to plead the
nonsexual incidents as part of her harassment claim.m Thus, the court did
not expressly rule, contrary to Hicks and McKinney, that such incidents could
not count toward establishing a hostile work environment. Nonetheless, there
is nothing that would have prevented the court of appeals from considering the
nonsexual conduct for purposes of evaluating the hostile work environment
claim on appeal-or at least directing the trial court to do so on remand. At
a minimum, it seems obvious that the director's discriminatory comments
should have been considered evidence of a hostile work environment. The
court's failure to take such nonsexualized evidence of bias into account
violates the spirit, if not the letter, of Hicks and McKinney.
More recently, a number of other courts of appeals have begun to
undermine McKinney--while purporting to follow it-through a new route.
These courts of appeals (and district courts in these circuits) cite McKinney
approvingly for the proposition that nonsexual conduct may be included in a
hostile work environment claim. Informally, however, these courts continue to
single out sexual advances and other sexually explicit actions as the "real"
harassment, concluding that the nonsexual harassment did not occur because
of the plaintiff's sex.269 Thus, in addition to the severity or pervasiveness
264. Id. at 1006, 1011.
265. See id.at 1011.
266. Id. at 1008.
267. Id. at 1009.
268. See id. at 1006.
269. See, e.g., Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 439-41 (Ist Cir. 1997); Gross
v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1542-46 (10th Cir. 1995); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.. 928 F.2d 966.
1998] 1735
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 107: 1683
element, causation has become a key element on which plaintiffs lose hostile
work environment claims. Furthermore, some cases apply a heightened
causation standard: Rather than requiring plaintiffs to show simple but-for
causation-that the harassment occurred because of sex-some courts demand
a showing that the harassment was motivated by "gender animus."270
Although evidence of nonsexual misconduct sometimes meets the causation
hurdle-particularly, conduct that on its face reveals a derogatory attitude
toward women on the job--other nonsexual conduct of the type that is so
commonly directed at women by their male coworkers fails to register as
gender-based.
Another Tenth Circuit case provides an example of this trend. In Gross v.
Burggraf Construction Co.,27' the court affirmed the grant of summary
judgment against a female truck driver on her hostile work environment claim.
Patricia Gross worked for a road construction company under the supervision
of George Anderson, who had a poor track record working with women: Only
two of the forty women who worked under his supervision completed the 1990
construction season. Gross believed Anderson's treatment of her was part of
a larger pattern of discrimination. She claimed that Anderson had "subjected
[her] to a hostile work environment because she was a 'woman working at a
man's job.' 2 72 Anderson's conduct did not assume a sexual form. Instead,
he humiliated Gross, denigrated her ability, and forced her to submit to abusive
authority. In front of Gross's male coworkers, for instance, Anderson
repeatedly referred to her as "dumb. ' 273 He "embarrassed and humiliated her
972-73 (10th Cir. 1991); Cobbins v. School Bd., No. 90-1754, 1991 WL 1828, at *4 (4th Cir. Jan. 14,
1991); Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1564-65 (M.D. Fla. 1990), aff'd, 949 F.2d
1162 (1lth Cir. 1991); Payne v. Children's Home Soc'y, 892 P.2d 1102, 1106-07 (Wash. App. 1995).
270. See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 905 (Ist Cir. 1988) ("This attack,
although not explicitly sexual, was nonetheless charged with anti-female animus, and therefore can be found
to have contributed significantly to the hostile environment."); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,
760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that the plaintiff may prove causation through evidence
of "harassing behavior lacking a sexually explicit content but directed at women and motivated by animus
against women"); Morris v. American Nat'l Can Corp., 730 F Supp. 1489, 1496 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (holding
that nonsexual incidents were "generated by ... animus" and therefore cognizable in assessing a hostile
work environment claim), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 952 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1991).
Insofar as such cases require plaintiffs to prove gender animus, they are incorrect as a matter of law.
It is a long-established principle that Title VII does not require proof of such animosity. Title VII prohibits
all differential treatment, whether such treatment is motivated by animosity or by a desire to protect, or
even to favor, women. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 583 n. 19 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e
have expressly rejected the argument that proof of a gender-based animus is required to make a claim of
sex discrimination."); King v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 539 (7th Cir.
1990) ("All that is required is that the action taken be motivated by the gender of the plaintiff. No hatred,
no animus, and no dislike is required."); Lenihan v. City of New York, 636 F. Supp. 998, 1009 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (holding that Title VII does not require sex discrimination plaintiffs to prove animus toward women
(citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977))); cf. UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991) ("The beneficence of an employer's purpose does not
undermine the conclusion that an explicit gender-based policy is sex discrimination under § 703(a) [of Title
Vn].").
271. 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995).
272. Id. at 1546.
273. Id. at 1543.
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in the presence of other employees" by threatening to fire her if she ruined the
transmission on her truck.274 On one occasion, as Gross got out of her truck,
Anderson yelled: "What the hell are you doing? Get your ass back in the truck
and don't you get out of it until I tell you., 275 When Anderson could not
reach Gross on the company radio, he broadcast to one of her coworkers:
"Mark, sometimes, don't you just want to smash a woman in the face? ' 76
Ultimately, when Anderson heard rumors that Gross was thinking of filing an
EEOC charge, he threatened her that "if anyone" were to leave the company,
it would be her because of her "bad attitude.' 2n He told her that "he could
talk to her any way he wanted, regardless of whether it embarrassed or
humiliated her in front of her co-workers. 278
The Tenth Circuit's analysis began promisingly: The court's citation of its
earlier decision in Hicks acknowledged that harassment need not assume a
sexual character.279 Yet, even though Anderson's actions amounted to
precisely the sort of harassment typically directed at women in the construction
trades in an effort to drive them out of the job,2w the court of appeals
concluded that, as a matter of law, all but one of Anderson's actions were not
gender-based. The court considered each incident, one by one, each time
dismissing the gender dynamics involved. According to the court, the only
potential problem was Anderson's use of the word "ass," a word that, although
"vulgar," is "gender neutral" as it "refers to a portion of the anatomy of
persons of both sexes."' ' Gross also "failed to demonstrate that [Anderson's
threat to fire her if she damaged the transmission] was motivated by gender
discrimination. ' ' 2 Unlike other cases in which women had been called such
explicit epithets as "fucking cunt," "bitch," and "whore" and had been told that
they were going to be stripped naked to see if they were "real," Gross had not
"presented any evidence that [Anderson's] criticism of her driving was sexual
or gender-specific. '' 2s3 In the court's eyes, even Anderson's admission that
he hired Gross only because of federal affirmative action requirements and the
undisputed evidence that only two of the forty women who worked under
Anderson remained on the job at the end of the season failed to cast a
gendered light on Anderson's actions.&
274. Id. at 1545.
275. Id. at 1543.
276. Id. at 1536.
277. Id. at 1546.
278. Id.
279. See id. at 1537 (citing Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.. 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987)).
280. See, e.g., Peggy Crull, Are Sexual Harassment in Nontraditional and Traditional Workplaccs the
Same?: Lessons from the Construction Industry (unpublished manuscript presented at the Sex and Power
Issues in the Workplace Conference, Bellevue, Washington. Mar. 20-21. 1992) (on file with author).
281. Gross, 53 F.3d at 1537.
282. Id. at 1545.
283. Id. (distinguishing Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994); Huddleston
v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900 (11th Cir. 1988)).
284. See id. at 1543-44.
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In the absence of sexual advances or other core conduct defined as
harassment within the sexual desire-dominance model, the Tenth Circuit could
not perceive the hostile gender dynamics of Gross's workplace.285 Other
courts similarly have failed to perceive nonsexual forms of hostility against
women as gender-based. The invisibility of the gender-based character of such
harms is apparent in judicial decisions on causation, as the next part
demonstrates more fully.
III. THE INVISIBILITY OF GENDER AT WORK
From the beginning, the question of causation-whether the alleged
misconduct occurred "because of sex"-has been a central issue in harassment
law. As we have seen, early quid pro quo decisions concluded that sexual
overtures occurred because of sex by presuming that such advances were
driven by sexual desire.28 6 A male supervisor's heterosexuality supplied an
inference that he would not have made such advances toward a man (or a
female supervisor toward a woman); a supervisor's homosexuality would
supply a corresponding inference that he would not have made advances
toward a person of the opposite sex.
Before harassment emerged as a recognizable cause of action, however,
there was little or no recognition that sexuality could form the basis for
sex-based discrimination. The Title VII inquiry was always: Did the alleged
misconduct occur because of sex (or gender)? Outside the realm of harassment,
Title VII's traditional focus has been to prohibit employer policies and
practices that treat workers differently based on gender-based expectations of
who men and women are supposed to be. The Supreme Court's decision in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,87 which construed Title VII to forbid
employers from incorporating into the criteria for successful job performance
preconceived notions of suitable feminine or masculine behavior,288 provides
clear support for this proposition. Price Waterhouse was the logical
culmination of earlier law; the thrust of most major developments in Title VII
sex discrimination jurisprudence has been toward dismantling employers'
settled understandings of appropriate work roles for men and women.289
285. Indeed, in the court's eyes, only Gross's statement about "want[ing] to smash a woman in the
face" was gender-based because it reflected "hostility toward women." Id. at 1547. This suggests that the
court had silently converted the McKinney and Hicks burden of proving that gender was the but-for cause
into a higher hurdle of showing that the harassment was motivated by animus or hatred toward women.
286. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
287. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
288. See id. at 250-51.
289. For present purposes, a few examples suffice. By construing Title VII to prohibit employers'
attempts to bar women from traditionally male-dominated jobs, for instance, courts prevent managers from
imposing on workers gender-based expectations of what types of work men and women are supposed to
do. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,333 & n.17, 335 & n.21 (1977); Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971). By interpreting Title VII to prohibit employers' attempts
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With harassment law, this traditional focus has shifted. Over time, and
ironically, the courts have cast sexuality to the foreground and consigned
gender to the background. Harassment cases have highlighted the harm of
conduct considered sexual, while the larger gender-based processes once
deemed the principal focus of Title VII have faded from view. As a result, this
part shows, judges often fail to perceive the gender-based quality of the actions
through which male workers create environments that sustain their definition
of masculine competence-to the detriment of women, who are defined as
incapable of such competence.
A. The Two-Tiered Structure of Causation
Even though the McKinney v. Dole line of cases acknowledged that
conduct need not be sexual in content to constitute a hostile work environment,
it did not provide a serious break with the assumptions of the sexual desire-
dominance paradigm. Indeed, even courts that approved McKinney have
continued to treat sexual advances as the quintessential sex-based conduct:
Borrowing from the quid pro quo harassment model, the courts have presumed
that sexual advances (at least when made by a man upon a woman) are based
on sex. Yet, when presented with evidence of nonsexual misconduct, judges
have tended to miss any harmful gender dynamics involved. This trend has
served to accentuate the analytical separation of sexual hostile work
environment harassment from nonsexualized disparate treatment that McKinney
promised to dissolve.
In Henson v. City of Dundee,29 an influential early case, the Eleventh
Circuit discussed the different standard of proof needed to establish causation
in a hostile work environment harassment case as opposed to an ordinary
disparate treatment case. In disparate treatment litigation, the focus is on "the
elusive factual question of intentional discrimination"''1-whether the
adverse treatment occurred because of the plaintiff's sex or instead because of
some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. "In contrast, the case of sexual
harassment that creates an offensive environment does not present a factual
to bar fertile women from holding jobs that may threaten the health of their potential fetuses. courts prevent
companies from imposing on women the gender-based expectation that future motherhood outweighs the
value of their chosen work. See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls. Inc.. 499 U.S. 187 (1991). In fact, by
construing Title VII to protect pregnant women's right to hold jobs at all. courts prevent companies from
imposing on women the gender-based expectation that being a mother takes precedence over and precludes
being a committed worker. See, e.g., California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
Similarly, by construing Title VII to require employers to justify the use of criteria such as minimum height
and weight requirements that have a disparate impact on women, courts impose burdens on managers to
defend gender-based expectations that only women who are sufficiently tall and heavy to meet the criteria
are competent to perform male-dominated jobs such as law enforcement or corrections work. See, e.g..
Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329-32.
290. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
291. Id. at 905 n.11 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248. 253-54
n.8 (1981)).
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question of intentional discrimination which is at all elusive. Except in the
exceedingly atypical case of a bisexual supervisor, it should be clear that
sexual harassment is discrimination based upon sex.''292 Indeed, in a hostile
work environment case, causation may be presumed: "In the typical case in
which a male supervisor makes sexual overtures to a female worker, it is
obvious that the supervisor did not treat male employees in a similar
fashion." 293 Thus, following Barnes v. Costle2" and other quid pro quo
harassment cases, the Henson court's assumption that hostile work environment
harassment consists of sexual advances driven by sexual attraction enabled it
to presume the existence of causation, which had to be proven in other
discrimination cases. This reasoning, which introduced a subtle distinction
between hostile work environment harassment and disparate treatment, was
endorsed rapidly by other courts.295
In fact, the D.C. Circuit accepted such a distinction in McKinney itself.
The case was brought by a female budget analyst for the Federal Aviation
Administration, who alleged a combination of sexual and nonsexual harassment
by her second-line supervisor. After McKinney's boss exposed himself to her,
rubbed up against her, and asked her for sexual favors, he forced her to sign
a letter agreeing to be laid off without pay. She signed the letter, then dropped
it, and he ordered her to pick it up. Instead, she fled into her office, where he
followed her. When she tried to escape, her boss "forcefully prevented her
from doing so by grabbing her arm and twisting it. 296
The D.C. Circuit held that McKinney's timely complaint about this
physical assault sufficed to sustain her hostile work environment claim, even
if the assault was not driven by sexual motivations. In emphasizing that
harassing conduct need not be sexual in character, the court's language stressed
that hostile work environment harassment is coterminous with disparate
treatment: "[A]ny harassment or other unequal treatment of an employee or
group of employees that would not occur but for the sex of the employee or
employees may, if sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal
condition of employment under Title VII.... Clearly, then," concluded the
court, "if a supervisor consistently uses physical force toward an employee
because of that employee's sex, the use of such force may, if pervasive
292. Id.
293. Id. at 904.
294. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977), discussed supra text accompanying notes 89-93.
295. In Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983), another widely cited hostile work
environment case, for example, the Fourth Circuit stated that "[i]n the usual case involving allegations of
disparate treatment .... the crux of the matter is ... [whether there was] an intent to discriminate along
legally impermissible lines such as race or gender." By contrast, in a hostile work environment case, "the
sexual advance or insult" will almost always establish such intent or causation. Id. In the case at hand,
concluded the court, the causation "burden was satisfied ... by the showing that Katz was subjected to
sustained verbal sexual abuse." Id. at 256 n.7; see also Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 720 n.5 (5th
Cir. 1986) (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 905 n.l ).
296. McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
1740 [Vol. 107: 1683
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment
enough, form an illegal 'condition of employment.' . .. In fact, any disparate
treatment, even if not facially objectionable, may violate Title VII."'9
Although this logic tended to break down the distinctions between hostile
work environment harassment and disparate treatment and between sexual and
nonsexual conduct, other language in the court's opinion tended to resurrect
these distinctions. "It is true," conceded the court, "that proving that a pattern
of physical force is illegally discriminatory might be significantly more
difficult than proving that a pattern of explicitly sexual advances is illegally
discriminatory because the latter are more obviously caused by the sex of the
employee." 298 The court did not elaborate on why explicitly sexual advances
are "more obviously" based on sex. Given a legal landscape that included
Barnes and Henson, however, it seems clear that the court was assuming that
sexual overtures are gender-related because they are rooted in sexual desire,
while other forms of mistreatment directed at women workers-even at the
hands of their male supervisors-are less likely to be rooted in gender. Indeed,
one may wonder whether the D.C. Circuit would have had the foresight to
extend the concept of hostile work environment harassment to nonsexual
conduct if the supervisor's physical assault on the plaintiff had not been the
culmination of an earlier pattern of harassment that included sexual overtures.
Subsequent cases have accepted a two-tier structure of causation in which
sexually explicit advances are presumed to be sex-based while other problems
must be proven to be so. In Andrews v. City of Philadelphia,'" for example,
the Third Circuit held that conduct other than sexual advances may form the
basis for a hostile work environment. "To constitute impermissible
discrimination," the court stated, "offensive conduct is not necessarily required
to include sexual overtones in every instance .... "3 So long as the conduct
meets the other criteria for a hostile work environment, an employee need only
have "suffered intentional discrimination because of [her] sex."3'0
Nonetheless, the court distinguished the probative quality of sexual and
nonsexual forms of conduct, just as the courts had in Henson and McKinney:
The intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving
sexual propositions, innuendo, pornographic materials, or sexual
derogatory language is implicit, and thus should be recognized as a
matter of course. A more fact intensive analysis will be necessary
where the actions are not sexual by their very nature.3 "
297. Id. at 1138-39.
298. Id. at 1139 n.21 (emphasis added).
299. 895 F2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990).
300. Id. at 1485.
301. Id. at 1482.
302. Id. at 1482 n.3. Other cases hold to this effect. See. e.g.. Cline v. General Ele. Credit Auto
Lease, 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 419, 423 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("Implied within the analyses of hostile
environment sexual harassment ... is a requirement that the harassment be 'sexual' in nature.... If the
harassment is unrelated to sexual activity, the question of discriminatory intent reappears.").
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A more recent Third Circuit case, Spain v. Gallegos,30 a demonstrates
how this two-tiered system of causation can lead right back to pre-McKinney
reasoning requiring explicitly sexual conduct to establish a hostile work
environment. Ellen Spain, a white, female investigator in the Pittsburgh office
of the EEOC, claimed that the director of that office, Eugene Nelson, had "a
history of passing over her for promotions ... in favor of allegedly lesser
qualified male African-American applicants. '3 °4 After she filed an internal
EEOC complaint alleging that the failure to promote her amounted to sex and
race discrimination, Nelson "induced her not to proceed with the EEOC
complaint by promising that she would receive the next available promotion,
so long as she agreed to lend him money periodically." 305 Nelson continued
to extort loans from Spain over the next several years, even though internal
EEOC regulations prohibited officials from soliciting or accepting loans from
their subordinates. Because these exchanges between Nelson and Spain
required private meetings, rumors began to circulate around the office that the
two were involved sexually. As a result of these rumors, Spain was ostracized
by her coworkers and evaluated negatively by her more immediate supervisors.
On the basis of these evaluations, Nelson refused to promote her further. He
also refused to try to stop the rumors.
The district court dismissed Spain's hostile work environment claim, and
the Third Circuit reversed. The appellate court's analysis began with the
statement that "an employee can demonstrate that there is a sexually hostile
work environment without proving blatant sexual misconduct. '' 3°6 Under this
principle, the court might have concluded that Nelson's extortion of loans from
Spain--even without the resulting rumors-provided sufficient evidence of a
hostile work environment to survive a motion for summary judgment. The
extortion appeared to be gender-based, for Nelson extorted the money by
promising to give Spain a deserved promotion that he had withheld because of
her sex (and race). Surely it is as discriminatory for a male supervisor to extort
money from a female subordinate by withholding a promotion on the basis of
her sex as it is for the supervisor to extort sexual favors from a subordinate by
threatening to withhold a promotion or other job benefit, as is the case with
quid pro quo harassment. In each case, the supervisor uses his power to grant
a job benefit in a discriminatory way; he attempts to gain something he would
not be able to obtain in the absence of sex discrimination.
Despite the simplicity of such an analysis, the Third Circuit did not adopt
it. Instead, the court identified the crux of the hostile work environment
harassment claim as Nelson's failure to stop the rumors that he and Spain were
having an affair, and strained to characterize the problem as "sexual" as a basis
303. 26 F.3d 439 (3d Cir. 1994).
304. Id. at 442.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 447 (citing Andrews, 895 E2d 1469 (3rd Cir. 1990)).
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for concluding that the alleged misconduct was based on Spain's sex.
Concluding that "the [causation) element is satisfied because the crux of the
rumors and their impact upon Spain is that Spain, a female, subordinate
employee, had a sexual relationship with her male superior,"0 the court
ignored the fact that the focus of the claim was on Nelson's failure to stop
those rumors, which itself was not sexual in content. Apart from that problem,
the court's approach required stretching the meaning of the term "sexual" to
a breaking point by extending it to cover rumors that two people were having
an affair. This necessitated a lengthy defense of why evidence of Nelson's
extortion of money from Spain was even relevant for the purpose of shedding
light on the resulting rumors.
Why did the court take such a complicated approach to establishing the
sex-based nature of the challenged conduct when basing the harassment claim
on the extortion itself would have provided a simpler route to this end? The
court conceded that the impetus for its approach lay in the two-tier structure
of causation established in Andrews:
In reaching our conclusion ... we have paid particular attention to
the distinction we drew in Andrews between sexual misconduct in
which the intent to discriminate "is implicit, and thus should be
recognized as a matter of course" and "actions [which] are not sexual
by their very nature."..... Accordingly, where an employee claims sex
discrimination predicated on sexually neutral conduct it may be
necessary for the employee to establish that the employer's motives
for its actions were sexual. If the discrimination of which Spain
complained was predicated merely on the demands for loans, her case
might be of that nature. However, Spain's allegations are not
predicated on sexually neutral conduct. Rather, she alleges that the
harassment resulted from the rumors that she was having an affair
with Nelson. Thus, the harassment directed against her as a woman
had a sexual orientation by its very nature.30
In this passage, the court returned to the pre-McKinney reasoning it purported
to reject. Where a worker seeks to ground a hostile work environment claim
on "sexually neutral conduct"-such as her supervisor's extortion of loans in
exchange for ceasing discriminatory promotion practices-she must not only
prove that the conduct occurred because of her womanhood; she must also
prove that the motives for the conduct were "sexual."' Thus, sexuality
remained the specter haunting the case. The power of the sexual desire-
dominance paradigm drove the court to look for deep-seated sexual
307. Id. at 448.
308. Id. at 449 (citation omitted).
309. Id.
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motivations, even as it looked right past gender-based considerations that were
closer to the surface.
B. Sexuality as a Bright-Line Test for Gender-Based Conduct?
Why have the courts struggled to define harassment as sexual, as opposed
to sex- or gender-based? One possible explanation is that judges believe
sexuality provides a bright-line test for delineating when harassment is
gender-based. In the absence of clear criteria for determining whether
harassment is directed at workers because of their identities as men or women,
judges may look to sexual conduct as a proxy.
Although some judges may be seeking such clarity, the emphasis on sexual
conduct has not provided a bright-line test for determining whether harassing
conduct is based on sex. To begin with, there is no consensus on what counts
as sufficiently "sexual." Even Judge Posner, who has thought a great deal
about sexuality,3"' has expressed some uncertainty. "Drawing the line is not
always easy," acknowledged the judge:
On one side lie sexual assaults; other physical contact, whether
amorous or hostile, for which there is no consent express or implied;
uninvited sexual solicitations; intimidating words or acts; obscene
language or gestures; pornographic pictures. On the other side lies the
occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or
boorish workers.31
Nor has Judge Posner escaped controversy in applying such concepts.
According to Posner, a boss who referred to his secretary as a "pretty girl,"
made grunting sounds when she wore a leather skirt, commented on how "hot"
the office was once she entered, and related that his wife had told him he had
"better clean up [his] act" and "think of [his secretary] as Ms. Anita Hill" had
not crossed the line to become a "sexual harasser. '312 "He never touched the
plaintiff," stressed Posner. "He did not invite her ... to have sex with him, or
to go out on a date with him. He made no threats. He did not expose himself,
or show her dirty pictures. He never said anything to her that could not be
repeated on primetime television. 3 t3
As this passage suggests, even though the courts have envisioned sexual
advances as the core "sexual" conduct prohibited as sex-based harassment,
judges have not been able to agree on what counts as a sexual advance. Like
310. See RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).
311. Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
312. Id. at 430.
313. Id. at 431; see also Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1010




some other judges,3 t4 Posner has mentioned nonconsensual physical
touchings. Yet the cases are full of conflict over when such touchings
constitute sexual harassment. In one case, for example, a court concluded that
a man's seemingly sexual acts of placing his hands on a female coworker's
hips, touching her breasts, and "playfully" choking her when she
complained31 5 were "not as aggressive or coercive as that underlying a
number of hostile sexual environment claims that have been unsuccessful in
court. ' 316 To this court, the problem lay in the fact that the conduct was not
sufficiently threatening. Yet, in another case, a man's plainly menacing actions
of grabbing a woman's crotch and breast, forcing a penis into her hand,
holding a knife to her throat, shoving her into a file cabinet, and threatening
to "bang her head into the ground' 31 7 were also found insufficient to ground
a hostile work environment claim.
311
In another case, Wimberly v. Shoney's, Inc.,3t 9 the fact of physical
touching was deemed less important than whether such touching reflected
sexual intent. The court found that a restaurant manager's acts in shaking a
waitress by the shoulders and letting his arms and hands fall over her breasts
were insignificant because they were "done without sexual designs upon
her.''320 Discerning when sexual designs underlay physical touchings,
however, has proven to be a daunting task to which the courts have brought
little consistency. To one court, the isolated act of slapping a woman on the
rear end was a sexual act: "[A) slap on the buttocks in the office setting has
yet to replace the hand shake. ' 32' To another, however, the act of "bagging,"
unexpectedly grabbing a male worker's genitals, was not a sexual activity."
And to a third court, the act of stroking a woman's hair, even in the context
of admiring her body and speculating about her sex life, was not a sexual
gesture.3 3
314. See, e.g., Gillum v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 970 F. Supp. 843. 852 (D. Kan. 1997) (-None of
[the defendant's] conduct was physically threatening and Gillum does not allege any unwelcome sexual
advances. Nor does Gillum allege that [the defendant] engaged in any sexually suggestive touching or
groping."); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) '142.070. at 74.250 (M.D. Tenn. 1990)
(finding that the sexual conduct "was not in the form of sexual propositions or physical touching" and was
therefore insufficiently severe and pervasive to be actionable), aff'd. 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam), rev'd on other grounds, 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Ross v. Double Diamond. Inc.. 672 F. Supp. 261,
270 (N.D. Tex. 1987) ("Generally, unwelcome physical touching is more offensive than unwelcome verbal
abuse.").
315. Domhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307, 308 (5th Cir. 1987).
316. Id. at 309.
317. Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1561 (M.D. Fla. 1990). aff'd. 949 F.2d
1162 (11th Cir. 1991).
318. See id. at 1567.
319. 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 444 (S.D. Ga. 1985).
320. Id. at 448-49.
321. Campbell v. Board of Regents, 770 F. Supp. 1479. 1486 (D. Kan. 1991).
322. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (-he only thing sexual
about 'bagging' is that the aggressor aims his non-sexual aggression at genitals.-).
323. See Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 295 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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If delineating when physical touchings are actionable has proven to be an
uncertain endeavor, determining when other types of conduct amount to
prohibited sexual advances has proven to be an equally ambiguous
undertaking. One court, for example, was willing to characterize a supervisor's
comment that his "penis stretches from here to District 1''3' as a "sexual
advance, ' ' 325 but held that the advance was too insignificant to constitute
sexual harassment because it did not include any "offensive touching or
threats.'3 26 Other courts have been less willing to characterize similar sorts
of verbal conduct as sexual advances. In one case, for instance, a recruiting
official claimed that her boss subjected her to "outright sexual propositions,"
"a lewd practice of fondling his genitals in her presence," and the use of
"vulgar language and innuendo"; 327 he also "'gawked' at [her]" and crawled
under a table where she was seated "in a public display of sexual
behavior. '328 The court, however, found that none of this behavior was
sexually motivated. The boss had not leered at the plaintiff; instead, he had a
"wander[ing]" eye.329 He had not fondled himself; he "had a bad habit of
itching himself in the groin," which, "though perhaps unbecoming of a
gentleman," was not "sexually offensive., 33' His act of crawling under the
table in an "effort to look up [the plaintiff's] dress" had nothing to do with
sexuality, but instead had been done "as a playful event. 31 According to the
court, "no incidents of physical or verbal conduct of a sexual nature ever
occurred in any degree whatsoever. '332 In another case, the court found
absurd the plaintiff's perception of her boss's conduct as a sexual advance. In
the court's eyes, the older man's lavishing attention on his female subordinate,
having dinner alone with her numerous times, assuming physical intimacies
toward her (such as caressing her hands and placing his hands on her knee),
and conferring gifts on her, were in no way sexually or romantically
motivated.333 According to the court, the plaintiff was a naive woman,
hypersensitive to men, who had fantasized her boss's attentions.3
Once the facts move beyond the realm of alleged sexual advances, courts
have had even greater difficulty agreeing on whether the behavior amounts to
forbidden conduct of a sexual nature. Verbal taunts and suggestive or crude
comments .(sometimes accompanied by acts of physical hazing) have proven
324. Cohen v. Litt, 906 . Supp. 957, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
325. Id. at 965.
326. Id.
327. Jackson-Colley v. Department of the Army Corps of Eng'rs, 655 F Supp. 122, 126 (E.D. Mich.
1987).
328. Id. at 127.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 128.
332. Id.
333. See Sand v. Johnson Co., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 716, 725-26 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
334. See id. at 725.
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to be particularly divisive in the courts. In one case, for example, a court held
that a collection manager's calling a female employee "Syphilis," telling her
she looked like a "streetwalker," and monitoring her bathroom breaks were not
"harassment of a sexual nature," even when accompanied by crude
speculations about the plaintiff's sex life at home.335 In another case,
however, a court held that an assistant manager's inviting a car saleswoman
to join his sexual exploits with his wife, flicking his tongue at the saleswoman
in the showroom, and bragging about having looked up another saleswoman's
dress constituted "sexual humiliation and degradation"-indeed, they amounted
to "severe and pervasive sexual misconduct.
' 336
Courts also have embraced capricious and contradictory characterizations
of derogatory epithets aimed at women workers. To one court, a police
lieutenant's reference to a female police officer as "that broad" constituted the
use of a "sexually-oriented epithet." 337 To another court, however, a male
coworker's "statement calling [a female auto worker] a 'sick bitch' was not
overtly sexual in nature. ' 33' A third court had no difficulty concluding that
a casino blackjack dealer's reference to a female floorperson as a "cunt" and
"dumb fucking broad ' 339 were "sexually explicit and offensive terms."
'
To this court, the dealer's use of such terms was "fundamentally different"
from his calling men "asshole[s]" and "jerk[s]."'' 4 Although the dealer may
have denigrated both men and women, concluded the court, his abuse of
women was distinctive because it "relied on sexual epithets, offensive, explicit
reference to women's bodies and sexual conduct. ' ,3 2 In the court's analysis,
"It is one thing to call a woman 'worthless,' and another to call her a
'worthless broad.' ''313
Far from providing a bright-line test, the courts' focus on conduct that is
sexual in nature has proven to be an indeterminate proxy for whether harassing
conduct is based on sex within the meaning of Title VII. Instead, the focus on
sexual conduct has opened up as many questions as it has answered,
embroiling judges in tension-filled rulings that create a patchwork of justice.
335. Cline v. General Elec. Credit Auto Lease, 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 419, 423 (N-D. I1.
1990); cf. Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010. 1013-14 (8th Cir. 1988) (discussing, but not clearly
rejecting, a company's argument that a male coworker's use of the name "Herpes" to refer to the plaintiff
was nonsexual in nature).
336. Sassaman v. Heart City Toyota, 879 F. Supp. 901. 910 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
337. Woemer v. Brzeczek, 519 F. Supp. 517, 520 (N.D. 111. 1981).
338. Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts Operations, No. 92-C-5987, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16902, at *8-9 (N.D. Ii. Nov. 23, 1994), aff'd, 78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1996). Interestingly, in this case.
the court noted that it was "using the term 'sexual' to denote both alleged actions that were intended to
indicate sexual desire as well as actions that were intended to degrade plaintiff because of her sex." Id. at
*9 n.5.
339. Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994).
340. Id. at 1463.
341. Id at 1464.
342. Id. at 1463.
343. Id. at 1464.
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Although judges may long for a clear standard, it seems unlikely that most are
unaware of the lack of precision offered by the current paradigm. Thus, there
must be another reason why courts have focused on sexual conduct as the
foundation for hostile work environment harassment.
C. The Courts' Failure To Understand the Role of Work in Producing Gender
Inequality
There is a deeper explanation for the courts' emphasis on sexual conduct
as the core of sex-based harassment. Highlighting sexual abuse has allowed
judges to feel enlightened about protecting women from sexual violation while
relieving them of the responsibility to redress broader gender-based forms of
disadvantage at work. Even though a sexuality-based standard has not yielded
predictable results, singling out sexual abuse may permit judges the illusion
that they are addressing a problem that can be isolated from other workplace
conditions. Indeed, the disaggregation of sexual harassment from other forms
of sex discrimination presumes precisely such a separation. To confront the
fact that sexual misconduct may be only one-indeed, perhaps only a relatively
minor-manifestation of a larger pattern of nonsexual harassment and
discrimination raises the disquieting prospect that the world of work is
systematically gender-biased. Judges may understandably wish to avoid
confronting such a problem.
The larger political and cultural environment has placed little pressure on
judges to do so. The courts' focus on protecting women from sexual abuse was
inspired by a cultural-radical feminist tradition that characterized heterosexual
sexual relations as a central force creating gender inequality.' That feminist
tradition may have resonated with more conservative political tendencies to
create a climate that enabled judges to perceive that women, more than men,
are routinely subjected to sexual advances and assaults that may endanger and
harm them.
Courts have not understood, however, that the gender stratification of
work-who does what type of work, under what conditions, and for what
reward-is at least as influential as sexual relations in producing women's
disadvantage. Although judges understand that women are victimized as sexual
objects, they have not been able to see that women are also systematically
harassed, discriminated against, and marginalized as workers in ways that
render them unequal on the job and, as a result, in many other realms of life.
The assumptions underlying the two-tier structure of causation may seem
natural, but they are the product of larger political currents. To most judges,
sexual advances seem intuitively gender-based because cultural-radical
feminists, and the sexual desire-dominance paradigm they inspired, have
344. See supra Subsection I.B. I.
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articulated how women are harmed through sexual relations. Yet, in part
because no political tradition has expressed with the same force the ways in
which women are rendered unequal through workplace relations, judges have
difficulty perceiving the characteristic problems that confront working women
as gender-based.
In case after case in which nonsexual harassment predominates, in both
hostile work environment claims and the disparate treatment claims from which
they are disaggregated, the courts have rendered decisions on causation that
reveal a fundamental lack of understanding of the gender-based quality of
harassing and harmful actions directed at women in the workplace. In the most
egregious group of cases, courts seem to be engaged in outright denial: They
refuse to characterize conduct as sex-based even when it is accompanied by
expressions of resentment or unease directed at women workers who try to
make it in traditionally male occupations or jobs.
Recall that in Ramsey v. City of Denver, 5 the court failed to designate
as sex-based the mistreatment of a female engineer, even though her boss had
stated openly that he believed the plaintiff's job was unsuitable for women.
According to the court, the engineer had brought her troubles upon herself
through her lack of "interpersonal skills," including being "overbearing" and
"over-demanding." 346 Or recall Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention
Center,34 7 in which the court rejected a claim that a female electrical
subforeman's dismissal and other mistreatment were sex-based, even though
the record included a number of gender-based comments-including an earlier
remark by the union business agent that there would never be an appropriate
time to have a woman in her position." Or consider a third case, in which
a female construction technician alleged that her supervisor had
discriminatorily denied her the opportunity to obtain experience in a
construction position; she claimed that the inability to do so had hindered her
from advancing or earning overtime.3 9 The court found that the plaintiff had
failed to make a prima facie case of sex discrimination, even though her
supervisor had denied her a sought-after temporary assignment shortly after
exclaiming, "Fucking women, I hate having fucking women in the office!""M
According to the court, the supervisor's statement did not evince
discriminatory intent. It showed only that he "unprofessionally offered his
private negative view of women during a display of bad temper at work."'5
345. 907 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1990). discussed supra text accompanying notes 259-268.
346. Id. at 1010.
347. 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1852 (D.N.J. 1990). aff'd. 925 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1991).
discussed supra text accompanying notes 183-196.
348. See id. at 1863.
349. See Heim v. Utah, 8 .3d 1541 (10th Cir. 1993).
350. Id. at 1546.
351. Id. at 1547.
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In other cases, courts have found that women workers' mistreatment was
prompted by their own shortcomings rather than by their sex-even as judges
disregard signs that the evaluation of the plaintiffs' competence may not have
been free from gender stereotyping. In a case with facts eerily reminiscent of
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,352 for example, a female executive director
who had dramatically increased the receipts of a nonprofit organization was
replaced by a man.353 Her troubles began when she fired a male staff
member liked by members of the Board of Directors; the troubles were
exacerbated when she filed a sexual harassment charge against a Board
member, who then placed her on probation. Even though Board members had
told her that the best kind of woman is a "Honey-Do" and "suggested that she
take a Dale Carnegie course" to learn how to deal with the Board,35 and
even though one member of the Board had ripped a feminist poster off her
wall and told her "it's thinking like this that got you fired, 355 the court
rejected the plaintiff's claims that the Board had mistreated and eventually
fired her because of her sex. Instead, the court accepted the Board's
explanation that the director was too "abrasive" to do her job well, without
inquiring into whether gender stereotyping had affected the Board's
perception.356 As the Supreme Court has recognized, however, strong women
managers are often perceived to be unduly abrasive.357
Indeed, in numerous cases in which women work in male-dominated
settings, courts have overlooked evidence that the denigration of women's
competence, authority, or entitlement to the job is itself a core component of
what makes the work environment sexist and hostile. Recall Gross v. Burggraf
Construction Co.,358 in which the court failed to characterize as gender-based
discrimination a female construction worker's deprecation at the hands of an
authoritarian supervisor who conceded that he had hired the plaintiff only to
comply with perceived affirmative action requirements and who had a record
of driving women away from the job. In another case, a female firefighter
alleged that she was subjected to many forms of differential treatment, much
of which was designed to undermine her competence. 359 Her superiors made
remarks about her lack of professional ability, denied her the opportunity to
attend training seminars, disciplined her for accompanying the deputy fire chief
352. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), discussed supra text accompanying notes 287-289.
353. See Petrosky v. Washington-Greene County Branch Pa. Ass'n for the Blind, 663 F. Supp. 821
(W.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd, 845 F2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1988).
354. Id. at 822.
355. Id. at 824.
356. Id. at 825.
357. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 255-56. By taking on the role of the competent executive, they
assume a prerogative traditionally reserved for men and trigger gender-based anxieties. See KANTEiR, supra
note 130, at 201-05; Martha Chamallas, Listening to Dr Fiske: The Easy Case of Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 15 VT. L. REv. 89, 105-06 (1990).
358. 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995), discussed supra notes 271-285 and accompanying text.
359. See Halasi-Schmick v. City of Shawnee, 759 F. Supp. 747 (D. Kan. 1991).
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on an investigation, and even required her to do secretarial work when the
secretary was out. In addition, her fire chief called her a "dumb blonde," and
her supervisor accused her of having an affair with a coworker.6 Despite
the plaintiff's allegation that this conduct "affected her attitude toward work
and made her feel that she wasn't respected and wasn't going to get anywhere
while these people were her superiors, ' ' 6' as well as her offer to prove that
nine other women had experienced the same types of harassment, the court
dismissed her hostile work environment claim on summary judgment for
insufficient proof that the harassment occurred because of her sex.36 2
As part of this overall pattern, courts have also failed to comprehend the
opportunity for discrimination in the provision of training. Denying women the
training or learning opportunities they need to master the work is a problem
that is particularly prevalent in male-dominated settings, where much of the
learning is acquired informally on the job. Women's complaints about
inadequate training are legion, in both the literature and the case law.36 For
example, recall Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,6' in which an auto mechanic
trainee at Sears alleged that she was denied the opportunity to perform brake
jobs and, as a result, never learned how to do them as quickly as the more
senior male mechanics. The court ignored this aspect of her claim, concluding
that she was fired because of her lack of productivity at brake work, without
examining whether the training process was itself discriminatory.30 In
another case, the first female firefighter in Wichita, Kansas received demeaning
remarks from her fellow recruits.36 One man predicted that the plaintiff
would last only a month; several said that she was not strong enough to do the
job; another refused to take orders from a "damn bitch"; and another said that
she should join the men in the shower since she was "doing a man's job."3 7
As part of the general pattern of discrimination, the plaintiff claimed that she
was given inadequate hands-on experience on fire engines and their equipment,
and that when she was transferred to a dispatcher position, she was "rushed
through the training and put on the.., dispatch board before she felt...
ready for that responsibility. 3 68 After severing plaintiff's training claims
from the recruits' derogatory remarks and holding that the remarks alone did
360. Id. at 751-52.
361. Ild.
362. See id. at 752.
363. For examples of women's complaints about inadequatc training, sce WALSHOK. supra note I. at
188, which reports that the most common complaint of women in male-dominated jobs is inadequate
training; and Brigid O'Farrell & Sharon L. Harlan, Craftvorkers and Clerks: The Effect of Male Co-Worker
Hostility on Women's Satisfaction with Non-Traditional Jobs. 29 Soc. PROBS. 252. 259 (1982). which
reports that women in male-dominated jobs are excluded from critical on-the-job training.
364. 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986), discussed supra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
365. See id. at 214.
366. See Downum v. City of Wichita, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 162 (D. Kan. 1986).
367. Id. at 166.
368. Id. at 165.
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not create a hostile work environment, the court concluded that the plaintiff
had not shown that any training deficiencies were based on her sex. According
to the court, the "[p]laintiff's subjective feelings of being rushed through her
training and of not being ready to handle the position in which she was placed
do not constitute even circumstantial evidence of . . . discriminatory
gender-based acts., 369
Courts have also neglected the potential gender dynamics underlying acts
of work sabotage, including physical attacks. In one case, for example, a
woman who moved up from a job as a brusher to become a laboratory trainee
alleged that her new male colleagues greeted her with efforts to destroy her
work.370 One male coworker left a note telling her there were no problems
with her equipment; upon inspection, however, she found two serious problems
that, if left unattended, would have shut down the mill and caused her to be
fired. According to the plaintiff, this man "always complained and tried to
make her do her work poorly."37' Another "embarrassed [her] every work
day ... by not talking very good about females., 372 After ruling that these
incidents were insufficiently sexual to be actionable, the court concluded that
the plaintiff failed to show that she was fired because of her sex. Not only did
the facts fail to reflect "discriminatory animus," said the court, but it was
"impossible to conclude that plaintiff was 'harassed' at all. 373 In the court's
eyes, the alleged acts of work sabotage showed only that the plaintiff "was a
more careful employee than [her coworker], not that [he] was purposefully
harassing her. 374
In addition, recall Weinsheimer v. Rockwell International Corp., in
which the court rejected a female thermal protection inspector's challenge to
her coworker's crude sexual demands and physical violence. The court
concluded that the man's behavior was not traceable to the plaintiff's sex, but
"to general causes that were not sexually motivated," including the plaintiff's
"confrontational and abusive personality., 376 According to the court, the
plaintiff and her assailant "engaged in frequent and heated fights," and "these
altercations usually grew out of work or personal issues, rather than having a
sexual animus. 37 7 As an example of a fight that was "based not upon sex,
but rather upon work or personal disputes, 378 however, the court cited an
incident in which the plaintiff's coworker shoved her into a file cabinet after
369. Id.
370. See Hosemann v. Technical Materials, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 659 (D.R.I. 1982).
371. Id. at 663.
372. Id. at 663 n.l1.
373. Id. at 666.
374. Id.
375. 754 F Supp. 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1990), aff'd, 949 F.2d 1162 (1ith Cir. 1991), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 236-237, 317-318.
376. Id. at 1565.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 1565 n.15.
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she reprimanded him for handling tiles with his bare hands. Even though the
court conceded that the reprimand "was a proper exercise of her duties as an
inspector,' 37 9 it did not occur to the judge that the coworker's animosity may
have stemmed from his difficulty in submitting to the authority of a woman.
Instead, the court concluded that the plaintiff's problems with this man and the
other technicians stemmed from the fact that she was argumentative and
slothful on the job.
In a similar vein, courts sometimes fail to see that the withholding of perks
and privileges needed to succeed on the job can be part of a gender-based
campaign to discredit women workers' competence. In Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co.,380 for example, Vivien Rabidue, the sole female manager in an
oil refinery, was excluded from activities she needed to perform her duties and
progress in her career:
[U]nlike male salaried employees, she did not receive free lunches,
free gasoline, a telephone credit card or entertainment privileges. Nor
was she invited to the weekly golf matches .... After plaintiff
became credit manager defendant prevented plaintiff from visiting or
taking customers to lunch as all previous male credit managers had
done .... Plaintiff's... supervisor... stated to another female
worker ... that "Vivienne ... is doing a good job as credit manager,
but we really need a man on that job," adding "She can't take
customers out to lunch." Aside from this Catch-22, [the supervisor]
also remarked plaintiff was not forceful enough to collect slow-paying
jobs. 381
As this case shows, the denial of perks and privileges can be difficult to
distinguish from other conduct designed to undermine a woman's authority and
undercut her performance on the job. Indeed, as the dissenting judge observed,
[P]laintiff was [also] frequently told to tone down and discouraged
from executing procedures she felt were needed to correct waste and
improve efficiency as her job required. Not only did plaintiff receive
minimal support, but she was repeatedly undermined. For example,
[one male supervisor] once directed his employees to ignore plaintiff's
procedures for logging time and invoices, a particularly damaging
directive given plaintiff's responsibility of coordinating the work of
[that supervisor's] staff. In another example, plaintiff returned from
her vacation to find that none of the check depositing procedures
agreed upon had been implemented and that some of her duties had
been permanently transferred to the male who filled in during her
vacation."'
379. Id.
380. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
381. Id. at 624 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in pail).
382. Id. at 624-25.
1998] 1753
The Yale Law Journal
In spite of the blatant nature of these actions, and in spite of the fact that
Rabidue was also subjected to denigrating obscenities and surrounded by
pornographic displays, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings
against the plaintiff. After disaggregating the sexual and nonsexual behavior,
the court of appeals upheld the finding that the plaintiff was not subjected to
a hostile work environment or disparate treatment.31 3 According to the court,
Rabidue was not fired because of her sex, but because of her "irascible and
opinionated personality and her inability to work harmoniously with
co-workers and customers. '3 4
Courts also frequently fail to comprehend that forcing women to perform
stereotypically female tasks that are not part of their regular job duties signals
a derogation of their work competence that is rooted in gendered expectations
of what types of work are suitable for women to perform. In one case, a civil
service secretary who took a pay cut to move into a technical engineering aide
position specifically sought assurance, before transferring, that she would not
be required to perform secretarial duties in the new job.385 Notwithstanding
assurances to the contrary, the executive director of the agency demanded that
she substitute for his secretary, twice a day, on a permanent basis. Even though
the director had ordered only two people-the plaintiff and another woman
who possessed no secretarial skills whatsoever-to relieve his secretary, and
had never asked a male worker to do so, the court failed to perceive the
assignment (and the plaintiff's subsequent firing for failing to carry it out) as
sex-based.386
The facts of these cases are not unique. They are representative of the
types of harassment and discrimination experienced by many women at work.
Every day, in workplaces all over the country, women are pressured to
conform to their employers' and coworkers' images of who and what type of
workers "women" are supposed to be. Yet, as the results and reasoning of such
cases show, the courts have not understood the magnitude of gender
discrimination and marginalization experienced by women in the work world.
Nor have they understood the extent to which hostile workplace relations
contribute to shaping jobs and people along gendered lines. As these cases
suggest, and as I explain more fully below, characterizing women as
incompetent at certain types of work is a central component of the harassment
383. See id. at 618, 622.
384. Id. at 615.
385. See Smith v. Texas Dep't of Water Resources, 818 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1987).
386. See id. at 364-67; see also Cobbins v. School Bd., No. 90-1754, 1991 WL 1828, at *3 (4th Cir.
Jan. 14, 1991) (rejecting a female teacher's allegation that her male principal's request that she perform
secretarial-type tasks helped create a sex-based hostile work environment); Halasi-Schmick v. City of
Shawnee, 759 F. Supp. 747, 751 (D. Kan. 1991) (rejecting a claim by a female firefighter who was made
to relieve a secretary when the secretary was out); see also Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 624 (rejecting a claim by
a female salaried manager in an oil refinery who was seated with female clerical employees at meetings
while male salaried employees were permitted to stand at the front of the room).
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that contributes to stratifying work along gender-based lines. We need a new
account of hostile work environment harassment that places such gender-based,
competence-undermining conduct at its center, one that does not reduce all
harassment to sexual objectification or desire.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE AccouNT OF HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
HARASSMENT: A COMPETENCE-CENTERED PARADIGM
To begin constructing a more accurate account of hostile work
environment harassment means recognizing the importance of the realm of paid
work in creating women's second-class status. Contrary to the assumption of
the cultural-radical feminist tradition that inspired the development of
harassment law, men's desire to exploit or dominate women sexually may not
be the exclusive, or even the primary, motivation for harassing women at
work. Instead, a drive to maintain the most highly rewarded forms of work as
domains of masculine competence underlies many, if not most, forms of
sex-based harassment on the job. Harassment has the form and function of
denigrating women's competence for the purpose of keeping them away from
male-dominated jobs or incorporating them as inferior, less capable workers.
This part develops an alternative account of hostile work environment
harassment that is rooted in these realities. I refer to the new account as a
"competence-centered" paradigm, for it understands harassment as a means to
reclaim favored lines of work and work competence as masculine-identified
turf-in the face of a threat posed by the presence of women (or lesser men)
who seek to claim these prerogatives as their own. 3" This account provides
a more comprehensive understanding of the customary cases of male-female
harassment by supervisors and coworkers and also allows us to understand
some less conventional forms of harassment, such as harassment of female
supervisors by their male subordinates.
387. This competence-centered account is meant to evoke the image of dominant male workers
defending their occupational terrain-while women (and other men) seek to lay claim to it-in the way that
people historically have struggled over real property. This description suggests that. consciously or
unconsciously, many male workers may view not only their jobs, but also the male-dominated composition
and masculine identification of their work, as forms of property to which they are entitled. I am indebted
to Carol Rose for helping me see this point. See Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing
Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 421,436 & n.42 (1992). Cf. DAVID ROEDIGER. THE WAGES OF wtin'ENEss: RACE
AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 13 (1991) (arguing that "the pleasures of whiteness
could function as a 'wage' for white workers," as 19th-century white workers came to "define and accept
their class positions by fashioning identities as 'not slaves' and 'not blacks'): Cheryl Hams. Whiteness
as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 passim (1993).
The competence-centered approach is not intended to portray all men as "naturally" possessing a
unified gender interest in protecting the male-dominated composition or image of their jobs. Men do not
automatically perceive themselves as having a unified gender interest, nor do they have a monolithic view
about the meaning of manhood. Indeed, as the account emphasizes, harassment is a medium through which
some men seek to defend their view of masculine interests and identity against contesting visions proposed
by other men.
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A. The Link Between Job Segregation and Hostile Work Environments
Both scholarly research and everyday experience reveal that the world of
work plays a pivotal role in producing gender inequality between men and
women. This is not surprising. In advanced industrial societies, wage work is
a primary source of material security and psychological well-being: A job
provides both the means to meet life's concrete needs and a position that
confers a sense of place in the world. 388 As scholars have begun to
recognize, work not only bestows a livelihood and sense of community, but
also provides the basis for full citizenship, 389 and even for personal identity.
Like it or not, we are what we do.
If the job makes the person, experience in the job world molds people
along gendered lines.3 91 As numerous researchers have documented, one of
the most striking features of the world of work is the extent to which it is
stratified by sex. 3' Almost universally, men and women work at different
jobs.393 At each level of the occupational and educational ladder, the jobs
388. For an eloquent statement of this position, see KANTER, supra note 130, at 3. Kanter writes:
The most distinguished advocate and the most distinguished critic of modem capitalism were
in agreement on one essential point: the job makes the person. Adam Smith and Karl Marx both
recognized the extent to which people's attitudes and behaviors take shape out of the
experiences they have in their work.
Id.; see also STUDS TERKEL, WORKING at xiii (Ballantine 1985) (1972) ("[Work] is about a search, too,
for daily meaning as well as daily bread, for recognition as well as cash, for astonishment rather than
torpor, in short, for a sort of life rather than a Monday through Friday sort of dying."); WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 73 (1996) ("[W]ork is not
simply a way to make a living and support one's family. It also constitutes a framework for daily behavior
and pattems of interaction .... In the absence of regular employment, life, including family life, becomes
less coherent.").
389. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 8-10, 11-18 (1995); Carol Pateman, The Patriarchal Welfare State, in
DEMOCRACY AND THE WELFARE STATE 231, 238-40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1988).
390. Cf. I HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 34 (1977) (describing
work as "the most significant source of identity for western men and women"); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 252 (N.Y. Times ed., 1968) ('The principal measure of
progress toward equality [is] that of employment. It is the primary source of individual or group identity.
In America, what you do is what you are: to do nothing is to be nothing; to do little is to be little."'
(quoting Daniel Patrick Moynihan)).
391. See KANTER, supra note 130, passim; Schultz, supra note 210, passim.
392. Numerous sources document the extent of occupational and job segregation by sex. See, e.g.,
JERRY A. JACOBS, REVOLVING DOORS: SEX SEGREGATION AND WOMEN'S CAREERS 23 (1989) (showing
that, throughout the 1980s, just under 60% of female workers would have been required to switch to
predominantly male occupations to achieve sex-integrated occupations); Jerry A. Jacobs, Long-Term Trends
in Occupational Segregation by Sex, 95 AM. J. SOC. 160, 160 (1989) (showing that, as recently as 1985,
over two-thirds of working women were employed in occupations in which at least 70% of the workers
were female).
393. Measuring sex segregation with data on occupations understates the degree of segregation
because, even within apparently integrated occupations, men and women tend to work at different jobs.
Indeed, one famous study of segregation at the firm level found that men and women almost always work
in jobs that are completely segregated. See William T. Bielby & James N. Baron, A Woman's Place Is with
Other Women: Sex Segregation Within Organizations, in SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE: TRENDS,
EXPLANATIONS, REMEDIES 27, 35 (Barbara F. Reskin ed., 1984) (finding that, in a random sample of 393
California firms, fully 90% of workers were in job titles held by workers of only one sex). Sex segregation
is an entrenched feature of workforces around the world. See Jerry A. Jacobs & Suet T. Lim, Trends in
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women do tend to pay less and to offer lower status and less opportunity for
advancement than those that men do.3" Especially at the lower ends of the
economic spectrum, women work at jobs that offer fewer prospects for
challenge, creativity, and physical mobility. Jobs traditionally occupied by
women are more likely to be governed by petty, paternalistic forms of
authority.395 Women's inferior position in the world of work confers
disadvantages that burden women throughout other realms of life.
The linkages between work and gender are deep-so deep that we tend to
think of most types of work as essentially "masculine" or "feminine. '3
These linkages may run especially deep for men. At least since the onset of
industrialization, paid work has provided a main source of authority and
identity for men. Not only have they struggled to earn a wage that would allow
them to head families,397 but they have also sought to defend their work from
deskilling and the encroachment of women (and less powerful men) by
defining their work competence in idealized masculine terms. Work
competence has been contested terrain, one on which male jobholders have
formed and fought for their interests-both as workers and as men-against
perceived threats from women and less privileged men (and often too against
threats from their employers, whom they have viewed as trying to use these
other groups to undercut them).398
Occupational and Industrial Sex Segregation in 56 Countries 1960-1980. in GENDER INEQUALITY AT
WORK 259 (Jerry A. Jacobs ed., 1995).
394. The most significant factor contributing to the male-femalc wage gap, at least among workers
without college degrees, is women's concentration in lower-paying, femalc-dominated occupations and jobs.
See, e.g., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE. CURREh7T POPULATION REPORTS.
HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES, SERIES P-70. No. 10. MALE-FEMALE DIFFERENCES IN WORK
EXPERIENCE, OCCUPATION, AND EARNINGS: 1984, at 9-10 (1987) (finding that approximately 30% of the
male-female earnings differential among those without college degrees is accounted for by the percentage
of persons in an occupation who are female and that there is "'a strong negative relationship between wage
rates and the relative number of females in the occupation"): WOMEN. WORK AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY
FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE 35 (Donald J. Treiman & Heidi I. Hartmann eds.. 1981) (finding that.
depending on the method of computation, between 35% and 39% of the male-female wage gap in the
workforce as a whole is attributable to occupational segregation when detailed occupational classifications
are used). Entry-level female jobs tend to be on short mobility ladders that offer little or no opportunity
for advancement, see BERGMANN. supra note 52, at 106-11. and female jobs tend to have less prestige than
male jobs. Even when women work in male-dominated jobs. segregation creates a context in which they
are perceived to have less prestige than their male counterparts. See Brian Powell & Jerry A. Jacobs.
Gender Differences in the Evaluation of Prestige, 25 SOC. Q. 173 (1984). For a discussion of these and
other negative consequences of sex segregation for women workers, see WOMEN'S WORK. MEN'S WORK:
SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB 9-17 (Barbara F. Reskin & Heidi 1. Hartmann eds.. 1986).
395. See RUTH CAVENDISH, WOMEN ON THE LINE 81-97 (1982); STANSELL. supra note 226. at 122-
23; see also Wendy C. Wolf & Neil D. Fligstein. Sex and Authority in the Workplace. 44 Ast. SOC. REv.
235, 250 (1979) ("Men are more likely to hire and fire, determine pay and supervise than women....
[M]en get more authority for similar levels of occupational status and sex labeling of job held than women.
at least in the access to higher levels of supervision.").
396. See Schultz, supra note 210. at 1800-05.
397. See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN'S WAGE: HISTORIES. MEANINGS AND SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES 19-20, 67-71 (1990); Martha May. The Historical Problem of the Family Wage: The Ford
Motor Company and the Five Dollar Day, 8 FEMINIST STUD. 399, 401 (1982).
398. For an illuminating analysis of the centrality of work competence to masculine identity among
printers in the 19th century, see Ava Baron, An "Other" Side of Gender Antagonism at Work. Men. Boys.
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Today, as in times past, men can retain some measure of economic
superiority over women by holding on to the most prestigious, highly paid
jobs. Economic superiority, in turn, ensures men's head-of-household status,
which confers the ability to attract women who will clothe, feed, house, and
nurture them and their children. Economic power also breeds greater political
power, which assures men's continued edge in controlling most public
institutions. Mastery over the most challenging work ensures the means to
create the dominant forms of knowledge and culture. In addition, economic
superiority and monopolization of the most challenging work assures men a
sense of identity as men. Breadwinning, mastery, and mobility are central to
mainstream masculinity. 99 Without them, it is difficult to see what
"separate[s] ... the 'men' from the 'girls." '400
It is not surprising, therefore, that numerous studies have shown that men
tend to define their manhood in terms of their status as breadwinners and as
masters of uniquely masculine skills.4" Nor is it surprising that incumbent
male workers have sought to defend their occupational turf from incursion by
women by branding them as incompetent.4' The long history of entrenched
sex segregation of work has encouraged male workers to adopt proprietary
attitudes toward their jobs. The major purpose of Title VII was to dismantle
sex segregation by integrating women into work formerly reserved for
men.4 3 Yet, desegregating the workforce has proved to be a daunting task,
and the Remasculinization of Printers' Work. 1830-1920, in WORK ENGENDERED: TOWARD A NEW
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 47 (Ava Baron ed., 1991). See also Mary H. Blewett, Manhood and the
Market: The Politics of Gender and Class Among the Textile Workers of Fall River Massachusetts, 1870-
1880, in WORK ENGENDERED: TOWARD A NEW HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR, supra, at 92, 100 (showing
how immigrant male spinners defended their manly competence by portraying spinning as exhausting work,
"not a fitting employment for females," in the face of mill agents' attempts to "denigrate spinning as a
manly trade by insisting that 'girls run mules easily and successfully' in other Massachusetts mills").
399. For historical examples of the importance of work to masculine identity, see ARTHUR BRITrAN,
MASCULINITY AND POWER (1989); Baron, supra note 398; and Michael Grossberg, Institutionalizing
Masculinity: The Law as a Masculine Profession, in MEANINGS FOR MANHOOD: CONSTRUCTIONS OF
MASCULINITY IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 133 (Mark C. Canes & Clyde Griffen eds., 1990).
400. Michelle M. Benecke & Kristin S. Dodge, Military Women in Nontraditional Fields: Casualities
of the Armed Forces' War on Homosexuals, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 215, 236 n.144 (1990) (quoting Mary
Ann Tetreault, Gender Belief Systems and the Integration of Women in the U.S. Military, MINERVA, Spring
1988, at 61, 61-62).
401. See, for example, the studies cited in BRrrrAN, supra note 399; and SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH:
THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 65 (1991).
402. Heidi Hartmann's early article on occupational segregation by sex reveals that in both England
and the United States in the 1800s and early 1900s, the efforts of male workers and their unions to exclude
women from male-dominated occupations frequently involved efforts to deprive the women of necessary
training or skills. See Hartmann, supra note 49, at 155-65. As Hartmann notes, even the unions' demands
for equal pay for equal work for women-a centerpiece of modem feminist reform-was "a way to protect
the men's wage scale, not to encourage women." Id. at 164. The unions had helped to prevent women from
obtaining the requisite skills, and "[w]omen who had fewer skills could not demand, and expect to receive,
equal wages." Id.
403. Those who spoke in favor of the amendment adding the prohibition against sex discrimination
to the original 1964 Civil Rights Act focused primarily on the injustice of sex segregation of work. See.
e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 2579-80, 2580-81 (1964) (statement of Rep. Griffith); id. at 2580-81 (statement of
Rep. St. George). Moreover, when Congress amended Title VII in 1972, see Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)
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for men can create hostile and sexist work environments as a way to retain the
better types of work for themselves. Indeed, research shows that women who
work in male-dominated settings are more likely than other women to
experience hostility and harassment at work." Not all the men in a work
setting-nor even the majority-need to participate in the harassment. It takes
only a few, particularly if they are able to secure the acquiescence of
supervisors, to make the job environment hostile and alienating to any woman
who dares to upset the "natural" order of segregation.
Research also confirms what the earlier analyses of the hostile work
environment harassment cases suggest: For many, if not most, women workers,
neither sexual desire nor sexual advances are the core of the problem."
Where sexual misconduct occurs, it is typically part of a broader pattern of
harassment designed to reinforce gender difference and to claim work
competence and authority as masculine preserves. Whatever men's motivations
or sources of insecurity, harassment is a central process through which the
image of (certain) work as masculine is sustained. If there are no women in the
job, then the work's content can be described exclusively in terms of the
manly personal characteristics of those who do it. If, on the other hand, women
are actually succeeding at the work, it becomes far more difficult to define the
job with reference to stereotypically masculine images. As one female
pipefitter explained:
Some of the men would take the tools out of my hands. You see it is
just very hard for them to work with me because they're really into
(1994)), both the House and the Senate made clear that they considered such sex segregation to be the
primary evil for the statute to address. See H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 4-5 (1971) ("[WV]omen are placed in
the less challenging, the less responsible and the less remunerative positions on the basis of their sex alone.
Such blatantly disparate treatment is particularly objectionable in view of the fact that Title VII has
specifically prohibited sex discrimination since its enactment in 1964."), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137, 2140; S. REP. No. 92-415, 1st Sess., at 7 (1971) (including similar statements).
404. See, e.g., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, supra note 13. at 51-52 (reporting
an increased likelihood of harassment for women in male-dominated jobs); SEXUAL HARASS.'E T IN ThiE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 13, at 20 (reporting similar results from a 1987 survey); Barbara A.
Gutek & Bruce Morash, Sex Ratios, Sex-Role Spillover and Sexual Harassment of Women at Work. J, Soc.
IssuEs, Winter 1982, at 67, 67-68 (reporting that women in male-dominated work environments were more
likely to report harassment and accompanying negative consequences than women in other work settings):
Susan Martin, Sexual Harassment: The Link Joining Gender Stratification. Sexuahty and Wamen's
Economic Status, in WOMEN: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 57, 61 (J. Freeman ed., 4th ed. 1989) (citing studies
showing that the greater the proportion of men in a work group, the more likely women are to be harassed).
405. See, e.g., Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual Harassment in
Academia and the Workplace, 32 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 152, 160 tbl.I. 166 tbl.2 (1988) (revealing that.
in a large sample of university students and employees, women in both groups were much more likely to
experience forms of nonsexual gender harassment-including being "treated differently due to gender" or
being subjected to "sexist remarks about career options"--than sexual forms of harassment); see also
MARTIN, supra note 209, at 10 ("[W]e also face another pervasive and sinister kind of harassment which
is gender-based, but may have nothing to do with sex. It is harassment aimed at us simply because we are
women in a 'man's' job, and its function is to discourage us from staying in our trades."); cf. Schultz.
supra note 210, at 1832-33 (discussing the importance of recognizing nonsexual forms of hostility against
women workers).
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proving their masculinity and being tough. And when a woman comes
on a job that can work, get something done as fast and efficiently, as
well, as they can, it really affects them. Somehow if a woman can do
it, it ain't that masculine, not that tough.4°6
By driving women out of nontraditional jobs, harassment reinforces the
idea that women are inferior workers who cannot meet the demands of ar
"man's job." More subtly, for women who stay in nontraditional jobs,
harassment exaggerates gender differences to remind them that they are "out
of place" in a "man's world." By simultaneously labeling the women "freaks"
or "deviants" and pressuring them to conform to the dominant culture, men
preserve the image of their jobs as masculine work that no real woman would
do. By marking nontraditionally employed women workers as exceptions to
their gender-yet still women and therefore never quite as competent or as
committed as the men-harassment enables men to continue to define their
work (and themselves) in masculine terms.
In this analysis, hostile work environment harassment is an endemic
feature of the workplace that is both engendered by, and further entrenches, the
sex segregation of work.4t 7 In Carroll Brodsky's terms, harassment provides
male workers "a mechanism for achieving exclusion and protection of
privilege" in connection with work.408 Motivated by both material
considerations and equally powerful psychological ones, harassment provides
a means for men to mark their jobs as male territory and to discourage any
women who seek to enter. By keeping women in their place in the workplace,
men secure superior status in the home, in the polity, and in the larger culture
as well.
Contrary to many prevailing assumptions, workplace harassment is not a
mere reflection of unequal gender relations that have already been created
406. SCHROEDEL, supra note 16, at 20-21.
407. There is, by now, a voluminous literature on the link between a group's numerical
underrepresentation (or "token" status) in an occupation or job and the incidence of stereotyping,
discrimination, and harassment that the token group experiences from the dominant group. Rosabeth Moss
Kanter's 1977 study was one of the first to theorize this link in the context of gender. See KANTER, supra
note 130, at 206-42. Since then, numerous scholars have examined this link and explored its ramifications.
See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of Respondent at 4, Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167) (summarizing psychological research finding
that women who work in settings in which they comprise 15% or less of the population are more likely
than others to experience sex discrimination, that the discrimination is more intense, and that such "women
are likely to be penalized [in work performance evaluations], especially when they act in ways perceived
as violating sex-related expectations"); Madeline Heilman, The Impact of Situational Factors on Personnel
Decisions Concerning Women: Varying the Sex Composition of the Applicant Pool, 26 ORO. BEIIAV. &
HUM. PERF. 386, 393 (1980) (describing a study showing that personnel decisions concerning women will
be less favorable when women represent 25% or less of the total pool). But cf Janice Yoder, Rethinking
Tokenism: Looking Beyond Numbers, 5 GENDER & SOc'y 178, 180-83 (1991) (suggesting that this literature
does not imply, in gender-neutral fashion, that men who occupy token status in female-dominated jobs will
experience comparable levels of harassment and discrimination).
408. BRODSKY, supra note 70, at 4.
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elsewhere, such as in the domestic sphere."°9 The problem is not that men
are not yet accustomed to working alongside women as equals and therefore
revert to hierarchical and abusive relations learned in other settings.41 1 It is,
instead, that by portraying women as less than equal at work, men can secure
superior jobs, resources, and influence-all of which afford men leverage over
women at home and everyplace else. Work and workplace relations are active
shapers of gender difference and identity, and harassment is a central
mechanism through which men preserve their work and skill as domains of
masculine mastery.
41n
409. One of the most prominent theoretical models for sex-based harassment in the social science
literature is called "sex-role spillover theory." Like sexual desire-dominance theory, which is its close
cousin, sex-role spillover theory defines sex-based harassment in terms of sexual objectification. According
to this theory, sexual harassment occurs because male workers improperly carry with them into the
workplace gendered role expectations for women-most notably, sexual ones--that have already been
formed in other realms of existence, such as domestic life. As Barbara Gutek. the inventor of this theory.
explained:
Sex-role spillover denotes the carryover of gender-based expectations into the workplace.
Among the characteristics assumed by many to be associated with femaleness (such as passivity.
loyalty, emotionality, nurturance) is being a sex object.... This aspect of sex-role spillover.
the sex-object aspect, is most relevant to the study of sex at work.
Sex-role spillover occurs when women, more than men in the same work roles, are
expected to be sex objects .... What is equally important is the fact that there is no strongly
held comparable belief about men .... Mhe cluster of characteristics that are usually associated
with the male personality do not include a sexual component. Rather the stereotype of men
revolves around the dimension of competence and activity .... Sex-role spillover. thus.
introduces the view of women as sexual beings in the workplace, but it simply reinforces the
view of men as organizational beings---"active, work-oriented."
Barbara A. Gutek, Understanding Sexual Harassment at Work, 6 NOTRE DAmE J.L. ETics & PUB. POL'Y
335, 352-53 (1992) (footnotes omitted). In my view, sex-role spillover theory is correct insofar as it
emphasizes that workplace harassment seeks to portray women in terms that conflict with the image of a
competent, committed worker. Nonetheless, I believe sex-role spillover theory is fundamentally flawed, for
it posits that harassment occurs because male workers innocently transport into the workplace
gender-stereotyped attitudes toward women that they have learned elsewhere. In earlier work. I criticized
the notion that the workplace is a passive reflector of gender inequalities already created in prior realms
of life. See Schultz, supra note 210, at 1816-39. In addition, as this Article emphasizes, to the extent that
sex-role spillover theory joins the sexual desire-dominance paradigm in emphasizing the way harassment
portrays women as sexual objects, the theory is too limited. In the alternative account that I depict, men's
advantage in numerous spheres of life depends on their superior status in the workplace: men's status as
superior wage earners and possessors of masculine work competence is also central to mainstream
definitions of masculinity. Thus, it serves men's interests to monopolize the most highly rewarded forms
of work for themselves, and hostile work environment harassment provides a mechanism for doing so. In
this analysis, wage work and work relations are not mere reflectors of gendered roles created elsewhere;
they are important institutions for reproducing both gender inequality and gender identity.
410. Indeed, in at least one study, the women workers interviewed noted that the harassment they
experienced at the hands of their male coworkers was different--and worse-than the treatment men direct
at women in other contexts. See Nancy DiTomaso, Sexuality in the Workplace: Discrimination and
Harassment, in THE SEXUALITY OF ORGANIZATION 71 (Jeff Heam et al. eds.. 1989). As DiTomaso writes:
[The harassment observed in a manufacturing firm] was not "'normal" behaviour between men
and women. In fact, the women who commented on their experiences in this regard were quite
clear that the men in the plant acted differently than they would if they interacted with these
women in any other context. Their behaviour, in other words, was very much related to the
work context itself.
Id. at 81.
411. For sources discussing hostile work environment harassment along these lines, see Peggy Crull.
Searching for the Causes of Sexual Harassment: An Eramination of Two Prototypes, in HIDDEN AspEcTS
OF WOMEN'S WORK 225 (Christine Bose et al. eds., 1987); Irene Padavic, The Re-Creation of Gender in
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B. The Competence-Undermining Function of Hostile Work Environment
Harassment
We should reconceptualize hostile work environment harassment to
acknowledge its crucial connection to job segregation by sex. We should
recognize that the central function of such harassment is to preserve the
masculine image and male-dominated composition of favored types of work.
The definition of a hostile work environment should be broadened to cover all
conduct that is rooted in gender-based expectations-not simply conduct that
is sexual in nature. Experience teaches, however, that we should go further: To
render visible many of the nonsexual forms of harassment that remain hidden,
we should also recognize that much of the behavior that creates a hostile work
environment is conduct that has the purpose or effect of undermining the
perceived or actual competence of women (and some men) who threaten the
idealized masculinity of those who do the work.412 By engaging in hostile
work environment harassment, incumbent male workers lay claim to certain
forms of work and the competence entailed as specifically masculine forms of
labor.
Such a competence-centered account creates a more complete
understanding of the kinds of hostility experienced by women at work,
particularly in nontraditional settings. Cases brought by such women, including
many of the cases already examined in this Article, reveal that a core element
of their harassment is conduct having the aim or effect of undermining their
work competence. Sometimes this conduct assumes a blatant form. As we have
seen, many supervisors or coworkers openly question a woman's right to hold
the job at all: They tell her she is not cut out for the work,413 inform her that
a Male Workplace, 14 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 279 (1991); Barbara Reskin, Bringing Men Back In: Sex
Differentiation and the Devaluation of Women's Work, 2 GENDER & Soc'Y 58 (1988); Yoder, supra note
407; and Kristen R. Young, Ladies, Flirts, and Tomboys: Strategies for Managing Sexual Harassment in
an Underground Coal Mine, 19 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 396 (1991).
412. Although it is conceivable that, in some settings, women might seek to protect the perceived
femininity of their work from incursion by men, such a reaction is unlikely to be widespread-not because
women are more virtuous than men, but because men and women's structural incentives with respect to
their work are not symmetrical. Whereas men's work and work competence are highly valued, women's
are not. Thus it is not surprising that numerous studies have found that men who occupy token status in
female-dominated work settings do not experience hostile work environment harassment comparable to that
encountered by their female counterparts working in male-dominated settings. See, e.g., Yoder, supra note
407, and studies cited therein; see also ROSEMARY PRINGLE, SECRETARIES TALK 78-82 (Verso 1989) (1988)
(discussing the experience of male secretaries working for female supervisors); CHRISTINE L. WILLIAMS,
GENDER DIFFERENCES AT WORK: WOMEN AND MEN IN NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS 88-130 (1989)
(discussing the experience of male nurses). Some exceptions no doubt exist. See, e.g., Jane Gross, Now
Look Who's Taunting, Now Look Who's Suing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1995, § U, at I (describing a hostile
work environment case brought by male employees of a Jenny Craig weight-loss center, who claimed that
their female supervisor forced them to perform traditionally male activities, like changing tires, as pan of
a general campaign of gender harassment).
413. See, e.g., Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1318 (8th Cir. 1994)
(reporting statements by a supervisor such as, "[There isn't a woman alive that can make it with Yellow
Pages"); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 905 (Ist Cir. 1988) (reporting that the head
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she should be at home with her children," 4 or greet her with a "Men only"
sign" 5 or equally graphic announcement that she is unwelcome. 1 6 More
typically, the men verbally demean a woman's competence or ability to do the
job, the content of the denigration varying with the type of work. Sometimes,
it takes the form of belittling a woman's physical prowess, as in firefighting
and corrections. 1 7 Sometimes, it takes the form of disparaging her technical
competence, as in the trades, sciences, or medicine.'" Sometimes, it takes
the form of denigrating her intellectual achievement, as in the academy." 9
Sometimes, it takes the form of questioning her capacity for adequate
aggressiveness, as in police work or sales.4'2 Sometimes, it takes the form
of characterizing her as overly aggressive or abrasive, as in law, management,
or other elite professions.42 Sometimes, it takes the form of simply
pronouncing her generally incompetent or unproductive.4' 2 And, all too often,
of a surgery program and male surgery residents harassed female surgery residents by questioning women's
capacity to be surgeons at all); Sassaman v. Heart City Toyota, 879 F. Supp. 901. 909 (N.D. Ind. 1994)
(noting that a car saleswoman was told women are not cut out to be car salesmen).
414. See, e.g., Sassaman, 879 F. Supp. at 909 (reporting that a car saleswoman was told that she
should be home with her children); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 139 F.RD 657. 663 (D. Minn. 1991)
(reporting the same with respect to female iron miners); Altschuler v. Valters, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 522, 524 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (reporting the same with respect to a female speech pathologist); cf.
Morgan v. Hertz Corp., 542 F. Supp. 123, 126 (W.D. Tenn. 1981) (reporting that a female car rental
manager was told "a woman's place [is] in the kitchen"). aff'd sub nor. Sones-Morgan v. Hertz Corp.. 725
F.2d 1070 (6th Cir. 1984).
415. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.. 760 F. Supp. 1486. 1498 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
416. See, e.g., Ward v. City of Streetsboro, No. 95-3838, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 19085. at 12 (6th
Cir. June 24, 1996) (reporting that a woman found a dead rat in her mailbox); Valtman v. International
Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 471 (5th Cir. 1989) (reporting that used tampons were hung on female
employees' lockers); Hansel v. Public Serv. Co., 778 F Supp. 1126, 1129 (D. Colo. 1991) (reporting that
the plaintiff was confronted in the restroom by a coworker holding a hangman's noose).
417. See, e.g., Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n. 766 F. Supp. 1052. 1066 (M.D. Ala. 1990)
(corrections); Downum v. City of Wichita, 675 F. Supp. 1566, 1570 (D. Kan. 1986) (firefighting); Berkman
v. City of New York, 580 F. Supp. 226, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (firefighting), aff'd, 755 F2d 913 (2d Cir.
1985).
418. See, e.g., Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 905 (surgery residency); Jensvold v. Shalala. 829 F. Supp. 131. 134
(D. Md. 1993) (medical research); Davis v. Boeing Helicopter Co.. No. 88-0281. 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11990, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 1990) (aircraft repair); Hallquist v. Max Fish Plumbing & Heating Co..
No. 85-1965-C, 1987 WL 15878, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 14. 1987) (plumbing), aff'd sub non.. Hallquist v.
Local 276, Plumbers & Pipefitters Union, 843 F.2d 18 (Ist Cir. 1988).
419. See, e.g., King v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys.. 898 F.2d 533. 536 (7th Cir. 1990)
(assistant professorship); Jensvold, 829 F. Supp. at 135 (research fellowship); Garvey v. Dickinson College.
775 F. Supp. 788, 793 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (assistant professorship).
420. See, e.g., Lenihan v. City of New York, 636 F. Supp. 998. 1002-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (police
work); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1308 (N.D. 111. 1986) (commission sales). aff'd.
839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988); cf. Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc.. 27 F3d 1316. 1318 (8th
Cir. 1994) (quoting a sales supervisor as stating "IT]here isn't a woman alive who can make it with Yellow
Pages").
421. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1989) (accounting partnership):
Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 544 (3d Cir. 1993) (law firm partnership):
Ramsey v. City of Denver, 907 F.2d 1004, 1010 (10th Cir. 1990) (engineering); Seligson v. Massachusetts
Inst. of Tech., 677 F. Supp. 648, 651 (D. Mass. 1987) (university alumni association director); Petrosky
v. Washington-Greene County Branch Pa. Ass'n for the Blind. 663 F Supp. 821. 823 (W.D. Pa. 1987)
(nonprofit management), aff'd, 845 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1988).
422. See, e.g., Heim v. Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1546 (10th Cir. 1993); Scott v. Sears. Roebuck & Co.. 798
F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1986); Davis, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11990. at *7-8; Graham v. American Airlines
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it takes the form of calling her dumb, stupid, or worthless:42 3 "You're a
woman, what do you know?
4 24
Perhaps even more dangerous than such verbal denigration of women's
competence, men can take actions that convert those statements into
self-fulfilling prophesies. As the cases already analyzed in this Article reveal,
there are diverse methods of subverting a woman's perceived or actual
competence; the form of the conduct again varies with the occupational setting.
Sometimes, it takes the form of deliberate sabotage of a woman's work
performance, such as stealing a policewoman's case files,425 informing a lab
worker that faulty equipment is sound,426 falsifying medical records to make
it appear as though a female surgery resident made an error,427 or simply
assigning her tasks that are impossible to accomplish.428 Sometimes, it takes
the form of denying a woman adequate training, assignments, or other
opportunities to learn a job fully,4 29 refusing to mentor her, or ostracizing her
Inc., 731 F Supp. 1494, 1497 (N.D. Okla. 1989).
423. See, e.g., Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1543 (10th Cir. 1995) (female truck driver
referred to as "dumb"); Cross v. Alabama Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 49 F.3d 1490,
1497 (l1th Cir. 1995) (psychiatric facility employees referred to as "rather dumb," "stupid," or "just a
woman"); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994) (female blackjack dealer
referred to as "dumbass woman"); Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922, 925 (M.D. Ala.
1992) (female convenience store manager referred to as a "dumb, old stupid woman"); Halasi-Schmick v.
City of Shawnee, 759 F. Supp. 747, 750 (D. Kan. 1991) (female firefighter referred to as a "dumb
blonde"); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,070, at 74,249 (M.D. Tenn. 1990)
(rental manager referred to as a "dumb ass woman"), aff'd, 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992) (per curiam),
rev'd, 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Delgado v. Lehman, 665 F. Supp. 460, 464 (E.D. Va. 1987) (EEOC specialist
subjected to denigrating comments by a naval official about "dumb females working for him who couldn't
read or write").
424. Harris, 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 74,245 (quoting a rental manager).
425. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1473 (3d Cir. 1990).
426. See, e.g., Hosemann v. Technical Materials, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 659, 663 (D.R.I. 1982).
427. See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F2d 881, 910 (1st Cir. 1988).
428. See, e.g., Holmes v. Razo, No. 94C50405, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10599, at *5 (N.D. III. July
18, 1995) (reporting the plaintiff's allegation that her supervisor "doubled [her] workload to an impossible
level"); Beeman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 674, 675 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (reporting an allegation
by a female grocery store manager that her boss harassed her by "making daily checks upon her work....
belittling her performance .... reprimanding her in meetings that lasted up to three hours .... making long
lists of things for her to do .... [and] asking her to accomplish work tasks that were impossible to
accomplish within the allotted time"); Accardi v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 292, 297 (Ct. App. 1993)
(reporting a female police officer's allegation that her department undercut her performance by "deliberately
overburdening her with double work assignments; denying assistance when she requested it- [and]
deliberately circumventing established procedures when she was assigned to duty as a court officer in order
to make her work more difficult").
429. See, e.g., Heim v. Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1543 (10th Cir. 1993) (involving a construction technician
who claimed that she was denied the opportunity to obtain construction experience in the field); Ezold v.
Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 540-41 (3d Cir. 1993) (involving a law firm associate
who claimed that she was denied the opportunity to work on large complex cases and was subsequently
denied partnership on the ground that she lacked the capacity to handle such matters); Scott v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 1986) (involving an auto mechanic trainee who claimed that
she was denied the ability to learn to do brake repair and was subsequently fired on the ground that she
was not productive at such work); Danna v. New York Tel. Co., 752 F. Supp. 594, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(involving a telephone operator who was promoted to repair service technician and assigned to train with
a technician who would not let her do any of the work herself, and was later downgraded to a clerical job);
Downum v. City of Wichita, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 162, 165 (D. Kan. 1986) (involving a female
firefighter who claimed she was rushed through training to be a dispatcher and made to do the job before
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from the informal networks through which crucial job skills are passed on.4' 3
Sometimes, it takes the form of evaluating a woman's performance by sexist
and differential standards,4 3t or requiring her to perform service-oriented
tasks that are outside her job description, such as cleaning, 32 serving
coffee,433 or providing secretarial support.4" Sometimes, it takes the form
of denying a woman the privileges and perks needed to succeed on the job, as,
for example, withholding from saleswomen or managers the right to deal with
clients or the use of a company car, credit card, or office.435 Sometimes, it
takes the form of assigning a woman duties below her skill level or extending
her forms of "help" that signal she is incompetent to perform the simplest of
tasks.4 36 Sometimes, it takes the form of gender-neutral acts of physical
assault, verbal taunts, or other hazing in order to demoralize a woman
psychologically or to threaten or intimidate her physically. 37 And, far too
she was ready); Berkman v. City of New York, 580 F. Supp. 226, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (involving female
firefighters who were inadequately trained by officers who instead set out deliberately to undermine their
physical capacity to do the job, and then terminated them at the end of their probation period), aff'd. 755
F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985); see also supra notes 363-369 and accompanying text.
430. See, e.g., Jensvold v. Shalala, 925 F. Supp. 1109. 1117 (D. Md. 1996).
431. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 490 U.S. 228. 235 (1989) (involving a woman denied
an accounting partnership on the ground that she was too "macho" and who was advised to -walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled., and wear
jewelry"); Petrosky v. Washington-Greene County Branch Pa. Ass'n for the Blind. 663 F Supp. 821. 82
(W.D. Pa. 1987) (involving a nonprofit manager who was fired on the ground that she was overly abrasive
and who was advised to take a "Dale Carnegie course"), aff'd. 845 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1988).
432. See, e.g., Sassaman v. Heart City Toyota, 879 F. Supp. 901, 908 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (involving a
car saleswoman who was required to clean a popcorn machine).
433. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.. 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) '1 42,070, at 74.247 (M.D.
Tenn. 1990) (involving a rental manager who was made to serve coffee during meetings with clients). aff'&d
976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992) (per curiarm), rev'd, 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
434. See, e.g., Smith v. Texas Dep't of Water Resources. 818 F.2d 363. 365 (5th Cir. 1987) (involving
a female topographer who was required to relieve her boss's secretary, twice a day. when the secretary was
out on break); Halasi-Schmick v. City of Shawnee. 759 F. Supp. 747, 751 (D. Kan. 1991) (involving a
female firefighter who was made to relieve a department secretary when the secretary was out).
435. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611. 624 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith. I.. concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (involving a female sales manager at a refining company who was not
permitted to take customers to lunch or to have use of a company credit card); Sassaman. 879 F. Supp. at
908-09 (involving a car saleswoman who was not permitted to take customers on demonstration rides or
to use the computer system for locating cars); Kulp v. Dick Horrigan VW. Inc.. 63 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1185 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (involving a car saleswoman who was denied perks and pnvilcges granted
salesmen); Harris, 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 74.246-47 (involving a rental manager who was denied
her own office as well as the use of a company car); see also King v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 535 (7th Cir. 1990) (involving an assistant professor who claimed that the director
of her program limited her research time, assigned her a burdensome teaching load, and subjected her to
excessive teaching evaluations).
436. See, e.g., Davis v. Boeing Helicopter Co.. No. 88-0281, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11990. at *10
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 1990) (involving a female aircraft assembler who was promoted to electncian and who
claimed that her supervisor "harassed her and made it impossible for her to complete her work by checking
her progress every few minutes"); Egger v. Local 276, Plumbers & Pipefitters Union. 644 F. Supp. 795,
798 (D. Mass. 1986) (involving a journeyman plumber assigned "low-level. demeaning" work below her
skill level), aff'd sub nom. Hallquist v. Local 276. Plumbers & Pipefitters Union. 843 F.2d 18 (Ist Cir.
1988).
437. See, e.g., Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1995) (involving a policewoman
who was ostracized by her fellow officers, thereby threatening her safety because visible isolation on the
beat subjects an officer to more danger); Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484. 486 (7th Cir. 1991) (involving
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frequently, it even takes the form of discrediting her mental stability or
sanity.43
s
Of course, these nonsexual forms of harassment frequently are
accompanied by more sexual ones, such as crude sexual overtures, or sexual
taunting and mockery. Such overtly sexual harassment, like its less sexual
counterpart, often is designed to undermine a woman's outward image of
competence and sense of self-confidence as a worker. Sometimes, such conduct
takes the form of singling out a woman as the object of sexual attention, as in
work roles in which a woman's heightened attractiveness would be inconsistent
with the image of competent professionalism (such as in medicine or
academia).439 Other times, men may use sexual overtures or taunting as a
way of branding a woman as inferior by brandishing their superior masculine
strength, as in settings in which physical virility is a central part of the
masculine image of the job (such as in police or construction work).40 In
such settings, male workers use sexuality as "a technology of sexism '""'
a civilian jailer who was punched and kicked, handcuffed and maced, and whose head was shoved into a
toilet); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1474 (3d Cir. 1990) (involving policewomen who
had lime placed in their uniforms, severely burning their skin); Hansel v. Public Serv. Co., 778 F. Supp.
1126, 1128-29 (D. Colo. 1991) (involving a lone female auxiliary tender at a power plant who was "hit...
over the head with a crescent wrench with such force that [her hard hat] was dented," had a large bolt
dropped on her that nearly hit her head, had her arms held by one coworker while another sexually
assaulted her, had her work gloves filled with bathroom cleaner and lime powder, and was confronted with
a hangman's noose and told "it would be better if she just killed herself"); Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1561 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (involving a female thermal protection inspector who was
shoved into a file cabinet, had a knife held to her throat, and was threatened with other physical violence),
aff'd, 949 F.2d 1162 (l1th Cir. 1991); Egger, 644 . Supp. at 798 (involving a plumber who had
cockroaches placed in her hair and pants and was confronted with a decapitated cat).
438. See, e.g., Jensvold v. Shalala, 829 F. Supp. 131, 134 (D. Md. 1993) (involving a postdoctoral
fellow at the National Institute of Mental Health who was ordered into psychotherapy by a supervising
researcher); Vermett v. Hough, 627 F. Supp. 587, 593 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (involving a state policewoman
who was subjected to repeated counseling sessions as a condition for keeping her job); Kyriazi v. Western
Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 899 (D.N.J. 1978) (involving an engineer who was fired when she complained
of discrimination instead of complying with her supervisor's ultimatum to seek psychiatric help), aff'd, 647
F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1981).
439. See, e.g., King, 898 F.2d at 534-35 (reporting that an assistant dean leered at the plaintiff assistant
professor and made remarks about her body that were blatant enough for other faculty to comment upon);
Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F2d 881, 888 (1st Cir. 1988) (reporting that male surgery
residents posted sexual nicknames for the plaintiff surgery resident and explicit drawings of her body on
the bulletin board); Jew v. University of Iowa, 749 . Supp. 946, 949 (S.D. Iowa 1990) (reporting that a
faculty member publicly speculated about the plaintiff doctor's alleged affair with a fellow doctor and
referred to her as a "slut").
440. See, e.g., Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep't, 888 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1989) (reporting that
a policewoman was sexually assaulted by a fellow officer, who took her service revolver, aimed it at her
head, and sodomized her after firing a bullet through her mattress); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010,
1012 (8th Cir. 1988) (involving female flagpersons on a construction site who were subjected to numerous
types of physical assault, including an act in which "[m]ale crew members would comer the women
between two trucks, reach out of the windows and rub their hands down the women's thighs"); see also
Hansel, 778 F. Supp. at 1128 (involving a power plant worker who had her arms held by one coworker
while another sexually assaulted her).
441. Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691, 762 (1997).
Unlike my account, Franke's analysis does not directly highlight the competence-undermining function of
sexual forms of hostile work environment harassment. Instead, she focuses on the fact that such sexualized
conduct enforces gender-based stereotypes. See id. at 747, 763. As her examples reveal, however, sexuality
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aimed at undermining a woman's work competence.
Contrary to the image of harassment as a top-down phenomenon, it is not
only women subordinates who experience such efforts to undermine their
competence. As the earlier discussions of Reynolds v. Atlantic City
Construction Center42 and Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.4 3 illustrate,
women higher-ups also confront challenges to their power and efforts to
subvert their performance by male subordinates." Indeed, many men may
have particular difficulty submitting to the authority of a female boss. A
competence-centered theory, in addition to explaining the harassment directed
at women who work in male-dominated jobs, also helps clarify some of the
forms of harassment experienced by women in predominantly female jobs.
Like their nontraditionally employed counterparts, women in more traditional
settings also experience nonsexualized forms of harassment that are geared
toward undermining their competence or intelligence as workers. Often, they
are subjected to demeaning forms of authority, humiliation, and
abuse-objectified, not necessarily as sexual objects, but as fools, children, or
is an effective tool for reinforcing prescribed gender roles in some work settings precisely because male
workers can use sexual conduct to undermine womcn's competence and, hence, mark them as inferior
workers not fit to hold more highly rewarded jobs.
Franke's discussion of Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994). illustrates
this point. In Steiner, the male supervisor of a Las Vegas casino harassed the first female floor person by
calling her such things as "dumb fucking broad," "cunt." and "fucking cunt" and yelling at her in front of
customers and coworkers, "You are not a fucking floor man (her job).... You are a fucking casino
host.... Why don't you go in the restaurant and suck their dicks... [?" Id. at 1461. Franke concludes
that
what made [this conduct] sex discrimination, was not, as the court found, the sexual content of
the conduct, but that [the supervisor] used sexual harassment to put Steiner in her "proper
place," thereby diminishing her authority and role as a floor person. In this sense, the sexual
harassment feminized Steiner, rendering her less competent and more sexual.
Franke, supra, at 764. Although Franke stresses that the case shows how sexual conduct may reinforce
prescribed notions of masculinity and femininity, her own analysis of the case suggests that it does so by
associating male sexuality with the required work competence and female sexuality with a lack of such
competence.
442. 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1852 (D.NJ. 1990). afftd, 925 F.2d 419 (3d Citr. 1991).
discussed supra text accompanying notes 183-196.
443. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), discussed supra text accompanying notes 380-384.
444. Nicole Gu~ron has referred to such harassment of superiors by their subordinates as "bottom-up
harassment." See Nicole L. Gu6ron, Strengthening "The Weakest Case of All": Expanding Title VII Sexual
Harassment Doctrine To Include "Bottom-Up" Harassment (May 16, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author). There are many additional examples of such bottom-up harassment. See. e.g.. Beardsley
v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 528 (4th Cir. 1994) (involving a female police lieutenant whose squad became
insubordinate, "bypassing the chain of command and reporting only to [the first lieutenant]." who, in turn.
bypassed the plaintiff "to give orders directly to her deputies, hampering her efforts to run her shift"); Hill
v. K-Mart Corp., 699 F.2d 776, 777-78 (5th Cir. 1983) (involving a male employce who refused to obey
orders from a female retail manager, and whose company failed to support the manager's authority); Ott
v. Perk Dev. Corp., 846 F Supp. 266, 270 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (involving an employee who placed a
Penthouse magazine in his female supervisor's notebook): Kirkland v. Brinias, 741 F. Supp. 692. 694 (E.D.
Tenn. 1989) (involving a 50-year-old busboy who threatened to kill one waitress and physically fought with
another when she asked him to clear tables, proclaiming that he refused to take orders from a woman),
aff'd, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1991); Anderson v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 86-.C-0449, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14454, at *3-4 (N.D. III. Dec. 20, 1988) (involving a supervisor who instructed the plaintiff's
subordinates to give her orders).
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creatures to be exploited and controlled." 5 Furthermore, when such women
step out of place by refusing to provide sexual favors or otherwise challenging
male authority and control, they are often punished through nonsexual
measures to subvert their performance or get them fired." 6  A
competence-centered model focuses on the gendered nature of this process of
punishment, rather than on the advances or abuses of authority that preceded
it.
To the extent that hostile work environment harassment is motivated by
a clear and conscious purpose, that goal is not always clear. Sometimes, the
harassment seems clearly calculated to drive women away from the job.447
445. See, e.g., EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1507-08 (9th Cir. 1989) (involving hotel
housekeepers who were subjected to demeaning remarks on account of their pregnancies, including
comments that they were "too fat to clean rooms" and that the supervisor did not like "stupid women who
have kids"); Cronin v. United States Serv. Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922, 925 (M.D. Ala. 1992)
(involving a female convenience store manager who was belittled as a "dumb, old stupid woman"); Cline
v. General Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 757 F Supp. 923, 925-26 (N.D. I11. 1991) (involving female
collections agents whose boss belittled their dress and appearance, slapped and hit them, and confiscated
personal credit cards); Delgado v. Lehman, 665 F. Supp. 460,464 (E.D. Va. 1987) (involving women office
workers who were subjected to a naval official's pronouncement that he had "dumb females working for
him who couldn't read or write").
446. See, e.g., McKinney v. Dole, 765 F2d 1129, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (describing the grievances
of an analyst who alleged that she was passed over for promotions as retaliation for filing sexual
harassment complaints); Garvey v. Dickinson College, 775 F. Supp. 788, 792 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (involving
a female professor who alleged that she was denied tenure as retaliation for reporting sexual harassment);
Laughinghouse v. Risser, 754 F. Supp. 836, 843 (D. Kan. 1990) (involving a female branch manager who
was subjected to an abrasive campaign to inhibit her job performance after she declined to spend the night
with her district manager).
447. Numerous commentators have posited such a motive for harassment. See, e.g., MARTIN, supra
note 209, at 10 (arguing that harassment experienced by women in male-dominated trades is "aimed at us
simply because we are women in a 'man's job,' and its function is to discourage us from staying in our
trades"); Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARV.
WOMEN'S LJ. 35, 37-38 (1990) (making a similar argument). In some of the legal cases, this motivation
seems clear. In one case, for example, a waitress who was promoted by a restaurant owner to be the maitre
d' was subjected to a campaign of harassment to drive her away, including false accusations that she stole
and drank on the job. Her tormentors went so far as to place wine bottles in her locker to substantiate the
accusations. See Levendos v. Stem Entertainment, Inc., 909 F.2d 747, 749 (3d Cir. 1990). The general
manager of the restaurant stated openly that she did not fit the mold for a maitre d' because she was a
woman and boasted that she would not hold the job for long; a coworker stated that the chef admitted that
"there was a plan to get rid of her, and replace her with a male friend of the chef." Id. at 749-50. Another
case involved a conspiracy by supervisors and a coworker to drive away the lone woman on a 15-member
building maintenance crew at a meat processing plant. See Olmer v. Iowa Beef Processors, 66 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 843 (D. Neb. 1994). A high-level supervisor told the woman's immediate supervisor to
give her the worst jobs in an effort to force her to quit, and the latter complied by, among other things,
forcing her to perform high-up jobs even though he knew she was terrified of heights. Eventually, a
coworker got her fired by yelling obscenities such as "fucking bitch," "slut," and "whore" directly in her
face and physically thrusting his body against hers as she was working. Id. at 844.45. When she reached
out with her open right hand to defend herself, he threw a temper tantrum and told her, "I just got your
fucking job. You ain't going to be working here no more." Id. True to his prediction, the company fired
the plaintiff on the ground that, in the case of an altercation, its policy was to fire the employee who
initiated physical contact. See id. at 846; see also Thompson v. Arkansas Transp. Dep't, 691 F. Supp. 1201,
1203 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (involving a vendetta against the first female enforcement officer by the department
heads, who openly admitted that they did not want more females employed as officers, assigned a roving
commission to investigate her, and held an investigation resulting in findings of misconduct against her,
findings that the court found demonstrably inaccurate and unworthy of belief); EEOC v. Protek of
Albuquerque, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) I110, 1111 (D.N.M. 1988) (involving a general manager
of a car detailing company who told a pregnant female shop foreman that "it would be embarrassing to
1768
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment
At other times, it may serve to reconcile male workers to women's presence
by marking the women as different and inferior workers who are less
threatening competitors." 8 At yet other times, it seems designed simply to
punish a woman who has dared to transgress prescribed gender boundaries.
Whatever the goal, what unites all these experiences is that women work in
occupational environments that define their very womanhood as the opposite
of what it takes to be a good worker.
C. Reconceptualizing the Harassment of Women Workers
The competence-centered account of harassment would return Title VII to
its original and primary focus on dismantling job segregation by sex.
Experience with opening traditionally male jobs has clarified the role of hostile
work environment harassment in marking and maintaining certain work as
appropriate for men only. As we have seen, a core component of such
harassment is conduct designed to undermine a woman's competence; the
harassment does not always consist of sexual advances or other sexually
oriented conduct.
To reconceptualize harassment law, courts must recognize the linkages
between job segregation by sex, hostile work environments, and not-
necessarily-sexual, competence-undermining harassment. Berkman v. City of
New York"19 provides an inspiring example. Brenda Berkman and Zaida
Gonzalez were members of a class of plaintiffs who had won a suit against the
New York City to open firefighting positions to women. The court in this
earlier case had invalidated the required physical exam under Title VII and had
ordered the city to devise a nondiscriminatory exam. Berkman and Gonzalez
passed the new exam and completed the training academy with flying colors,
but they were fired at the end of their probationary period. When the plaintiffs
brought a second lawsuit to challenge their firing, the city argued that their
performances were substandard. Judge Sifton found, instead, that the two
have a fat woman meet our customers," then switched her to work in an area where caustic chemical fumes
accumulated, threatening the health of her fetus).
448. While some commentators have emphasized how harassment serves to warn or drive women
away from male-dominated jobs, others have emphasized its role in permitting men to reconcile themselves
to the presence of women by incorporating them on inferior terms. See. e.g., Marian Swerdlow. Afen's
Accommodations to Women Entering a Nontraditional Occupation: A Case of Rapid Transit Operatives.
3 GENDER & Soc'Y 373, 374 (1989). Swerdlow concluded the following, on the basis of a four-year.
participant-observation study of transit operators:
[Mien as well as women developed accommodative practices when -new women" amvd.
Although the men's job security was not threatened, their deeply held belief in male supenonty
was challenged by the increasing evidence that women could perform their jobs competently.
They responded not by attempting to oust women through harassment, but by adapting
collective interpretations of experience and practices that allowed them to preserve the ideology
of male supremacy while accepting the entrance of women.
Il
449. 580 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). aff'd, 755 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985).
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women were subjected to retaliatory discrimination because of their sex and
that a core component of the discrimination was a campaign to discredit their
competence, which culminated in their termination. Indeed, the judge
concluded that "the officers of the Department responsible for their training
and evaluation ... deliberately set out to re-examine Berkman's and Gonzalez'
physical capacities to be firefighters. 450
Judge Sifton correctly perceived the origins of such discriminatory
conditions in the desire to preserve firefighting as an all-male preserve. The
judge began the analysis, powerfully, by recognizing how predictable it was
that the first female firefighters to enter the department would experience
harassment and discrimination:
What is first of all apparent ... is that the Fire Department failed
lamentably to prepare its officers and members for the extraordinary
task of integrating women into its previously all-male ranks....
Nothing was done to assure that the extraordinarily lax and
generalized system of evaluating the progress of probationary
firefighters was administered rigorously and concretely in the case of
women probationers so as to avoid the introduction of prohibited
discrimination in the evaluation and training to the women
firefighters .... [T]he Department did next to nothing to foresee and
prevent retaliation and sexual harassment which was one obviously
foreseeable response to the disruptions of everyday life in the
workplace caused by women joining the fire force.45'
Understanding that harassment was a predictable aftermath of attempting
to integrate women into the fire department permitted the court to recognize,
equally perceptively, hbw central the nonsexual forms of harassment-
particularly, differential training and evaluation-were to the campaign to drum
Berkman and Gonzalez out of firefighting. In the true spirit of McKinney v.
Dole,452 the judge forcefully conveyed the notion that the nonsexual conduct
was as important as the sexual misconduct to sabotaging the women's
ambitions. This analysis in no way trivialized the more sexual harassment.
Indeed, Judge Sifton began by acknowledging that "both Berkman and
Gonzalez were subjected ... to extensive sexual abuse in the form of
unimpeded hazing., 453 The judge then went on to describe how Berkman was
subjected to "crude sexual comments" in the form of graffiti and cartoons, and
how Gonzalez had "prophylactic devices and a wet vibrator ... placed in her
450. Id. at 230.
451. Id. at 230-31.
452. 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985), discussed supra text accompanying notes 247-249, 296-298.
453. Berlanan, 580 F. Supp. at 231.
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bed."45 Gonzalez even experienced "physical sexual molestation" that was
tolerated by the department.4"
Yet the court's analysis did not end with these sexual overtures. Judge
Sifton made clear that "the same discrimination that permitted these practices
to occur and continue itself entered into the other more important matters at
hand, namely the training of the applicants and their evaluations."4''  The
judge first detailed how the male firefighters isolated the women from "the
unique forms of communal living that are characteristic of the firefighters'
workplace." 457 For example,
Berkman's bed was not made by the firefighters assigned this task as
part of their regular duties. She received little help on cooperative
tasks in the firehouse. A meal prepared by Gonzalez was thrown into
the garbage by the men in her firehouse. Both were . . . "put out of
the meal," meaning that they were denied the opportunity to share in
the traditional communal effort to use the cooking facilities of the
firehouse to enjoy a common repast.45
Having recounted the exclusionary quality of day-to-day life in the
firehouse, the court concluded that the inadequate training and evaluations that
Berkman and Gonzalez had received were part of this same hostile work
environment, stating, "[I]t is clear that this intentional discrimination went
beyond a failure to integrate the women into the workplace and, in fact,
infected as well their evaluation and training to be firefighters." 459 Judge
Sifton understood that the department's judgment that the women's
performances were substandard was not only the product of a sex-biased
evaluation process, but also the predictable (if not sought after) result of the
department's own discriminatory failure to train women properly. According
to the judge, "both women were faulted for performances easily corrected by
training which they were denied."'46 Indeed, such opportunities were
"deliberately withheld from them by company officers intentionally pursuing
an effort to prove that the women lacked the basic capacity to be
firefighters." 46'
Although the content of the competence-undermining campaign was subtle,
the court's frame of reference enabled it to discern the gender-based quality of
the conduct involved. The judge's discussion is eye-opening. In one incident,
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operating a power saw to insufficient upper-body strength. "[A]fter initial
difficulties in operating the device relying only on the laconic explanation
given her by the supervisor who later evaluated her," noted the court,
"Berkman learned of a recognized technique approved at the Training
Academy... Once advised of this technique, Berkman thereafter employed
it successfully and, according to the uncontradicted evidence, has never
encountered difficulties in starting the saw or operating it since.1
462
Similarly, Berkman was accused of being unable to remove a hose nozzle that
her male counterpart was able to remove. "Despite having performed this
simple task numerous times before without difficulty (the nozzles are required
by the Department to be only hand tight)," Berkman could not remove the
nozzle by hand on this occasion and required a spanner to accomplish the
task. 3 She later discovered that, in violation of department regulations,
someone had tightened the nozzle to such a degree that there was no way to
unfasten it without a spanner. The court understood this act of work sabotage
for what it was: part of the men's larger campaign to transform their
pronouncement of Berkman and the other women's lack of competence to be
firefighters into a self-fulfilling prophecy 6
4
The court also comprehended that, in Gonzalez's case, sexual assault and
accusations of emotional instability were part of the men's plan to subvert her
competence and drive her out of the ranks of firefighting: "Not only was
Gonzalez subjected to the same litany of sexual harassment through comment,
hazing, exclusion from the meals, and denial of the ordinary amenities of
cooperative firehouse living as Berkman, Gonzalez was physically abused in
a sexual manner and, in response to her complaints, vilified and
defamed ... 465 The physical advances, rather than signaling genuine
sexual interest, served as a way of marking Gonzalez as too weak and
defenseless to be a firefighter. Indeed, Judge Sifton noted that "[w]hen, in
response to [her] systematic mistreatment, she on one occasion lost control of
her emotions [and cried], even that fact was recorded against her as evidence
of [her unsuitability] for the job., 466 Her captain purportedly wrote her up
for physical cowardice and emotional instability.467 To his credit, the judge
refused to accept the department's characterization of Gonzalez as incompetent.
Instead, in a moving passage, he commended her courage and commitment to
her chosen calling:
462. Id. at 234.
463. Id. at 235.
464. See id.
465. Id. at 239-40.
466. Id. at 240.
467. See id. at 240 n. 18.
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Given the credible testimony at trial with respect to sexual
harassment and discrimination to which she was subjected, what is
surprising is not that Ms. Gonzalez was rated unsatisfactory on the
few evaluations on which she received that rating on her re-evaluation
at the Training Academy, but rather that she has had the courage to
continue to pursue her goal of becoming a firefighter and learn as
much as she plainly has about her chosen career.... If any good can
come of this sad history of mistreatment, it arises from Ms. Gonzalez'
courageous refusal to back down and the assurance that such conduct,
now brought to light, need never again be repeated in the history of
the City's Fire Department6s
Berkman exemplifies the kind of approach courts would bring to cases
under a competence-centered paradigm. As we have seen, the court's
evaluation of the evidence was framed from the outset by the judge's
understanding of the difficulties that women who enter occupational turf long
reserved for men are likely to encounter. Such an understanding was facilitated
by the unique posture and claims of the case: Berkman was not a hostile work
environment case, but rather a challenge to the plaintiffs' terminations in
violation of an earlier court order. The court's involvement in the earlier
pattern or practice case gave the judge an intimate understanding of the
structural context of the women's firings; the judge had extensive knowledge
about the fire department, its history, its culture, its image, and the attitudes
of its leadership and its rank and file. The judge therefore understood the depth
of the resistance to integrating women into the ranks of firefighting. From this
frame of reference, the court perceived the campaign of harassment, not as an
expression of the male firefighters' sexual needs, but rather as an attempt to
police the gender boundaries of their calling against incursion from creatures
considered too physically inept to uphold the image of the heroic firefighter.
This perspective cast the nonsexual forms of harassment in as suspicious a
light as the more sexually abusive forms and revealed the biases inherent in
the plaintiff's training and evaluations. The court was able to perceive that all
the harassment directed at the women was designed to challenge their
capacity-and their entitlement-to become firefighters. This competence-
centered understanding of harassment, in turn, revealed that any problems in
the women's performance were a product of the discriminatory training and
harassment the women had experienced because of their sex.
As Berkman illustrates, a competence-undermining account of hostile work
environment harassment would help rectify the problems of underinclusiveness
created by the prevailing sexual desire-dominance paradigm. By redirecting the
courts' attention away from whether harassing conduct is sexual in nature and
restoring Title VII's principal emphasis on whether such conduct makes it
468. Id. at 239-40.
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more difficult for women to develop and express their capability as workers,
the new account would aid many women who have been excluded from the
protection of harassment law.
V. ADDMONAL ADVANTAGES OF THE COMPETENCE-CENTERED ACCOUNT
The sexual desire-dominance paradigm has obscured more than women's
gender troubles at work: It has also led the courts to overlook the problems
faced by some men who suffer from harassment by male supervisors or
coworkers. As this part shows, the competence-centered account creates a
coherent framework for addressing claims of same-sex harassment. Rather than
inquiring into whether the content or motivation underlying such harassment
is sexual, the new account would investigate whether the harassment creates
pressure to conform to the harassers' image of suitable manly competence for
those who do the job. If so, the conduct is based on gender within the meaning
of Title VII.
Just as the competence-centered account helps reveal the actionable
features of male-on-male harassment, it also reduces the risks of prohibiting
benign sexual expression that are present under the prevailing paradigm. The
new account cautions against confusing gender-based harassment with mere
talk about sex. Some forms of sexual expression in the workplace remain
properly outside Title VII's purview because they do not involve the
conscription of gendered work roles that is the statute's central concern.
A. Revealing the Actionable Features of Male-on-Male Harassment
Just as the heterosexual desire-dominance paradigm has rendered invisible
some of the most debilitating forms of gender-based harassment and hostility
experienced by women, it has also obscured some pernicious forms of such
harassment experienced by men. If the published cases provide any
indication,469 the most common form of harassment experienced by men may
not involve, as the film Disclosure40 would suggest, female supervisors
trying to extract sexual favors from their male subordinates. Instead, the most
prevalent form of harassment experienced by men may be harassment directed
at them by their male coworkers or supervisors in an attempt to force
conformity to the dominant group's image of suitable masculinity for particular
jobs.47
469. I have written elsewhere about the difficulty of drawing conclusions from published judicial
decisions. See Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study
of the Lack of Interest Defense in Tile VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1073,
1091 (1992).
470. DiSCLOSURE (Warner Bros. 1994).
471. Glenngarry, Glen Ross might provide a better vehicle than Disclosure for understanding tho type
of hostile work environments experienced by some men. In the film version of David Mamet's play, see
1774 [Vol. 107: 1683
1998] Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment 1775
The competence-centered paradigm provides a helpful framework for
analyzing such male-on-male harassment. As the account illuminates, men have
a lot at stake in assuring a tight linkage between their work and their
masculinity. It is crucial for many men to maintain control over the
masculinized image of their work.472 If a job is to confer masculinity, it must
be held by those who project the desired manliness. Thus, in these men's eyes,
it is important to affirm that any woman who would be found in a "man's job"
is neither as competent as a man, nor even a "real" woman. Indeed,
nontraditionally employed women are often branded as lesbians, without regard
to the accuracy of the label. 73 Crossing the gender divide in an occupational
sense is associated with crossing it in a sexual sense as well.
But women are not the only ones who can disrupt the link between work
competence and masculinity. As historian Ava Baron has shown, for example,
boys can do so also.474 The expression "Don't send a boy when you need to
GLENNGARRY, GLEN Ross (New Line Cinema 1992). Alec Baldwin plays the manager of a group of real
estate salesmen. He tries to pressure his all-male salesforce into high performance by setting up a
competition in which the top performer wins a Cadillac while the lowest performer is fired. Although such
a competition is not inherently gender-based, the manager uses deeply gendered language that links sales
capability to an aggressive masculinity. The manager describes top performers as real men. stating, "Do
you know what it takes to sell real estate? It takes brass balls to sell real estate" Id. In contrast, the
manager berates low performers as "fucking faggots" who "can't play the man's game." Id. Jack Lmmon
plays an older man whose sales performance has been slipping. Desperate to close a sale so he can finance
needed medical care for his daughter, he has lost his former status as the possessor of masculine sales
prowess, which a younger salesman played by Al Pacino now holds. Advancing age is thus depicted as a
sign of declining masculine competence.
Managerial status is also associated with lacking the wits and initiative needed to make it as a
salesperson. When the manager inadvertently disrupts a deal that the salesman played by Al Pacino is
attempting to close through fraudulent means, the Pacino character turns the manager's use of gender-based
epithets against his boss by emphasizing that he is not man enough to succeed at sales:
You stupid fucking cunt .... You just cost me six thousand dollars. and one Cadillac...
Anyone in this office lives on their wits. What you're hired for is to help us-docs that seem
clear to you? To help us. Not to fuck us up .... To help men who are going out there to try
to earn a living, you fairy.
Id
472. For analyses of occupations in which male workers have characterized the content of what it takes
to do a good job with qualities they appropriated as masculine, see CYN"'nIA COCKBURN, MACHINERY OF
DOMINANCE: WOMEN, MEN, AND TECHNICAL KNow-HOW 171-76 (Northwestern Umv. Press 1988) (1985).
which discusses how male engineers see themselves as having a natural aptitude for technological work
that they characterize as naturally masculine; ROBERT CONNELL. GENDER AND POWER: SOCIETY. THE
PERSON AND SEXUAL POLITICS 180 (1987). which describes how male workers in blue-collar jobs define
their competence in terms of physical prowess and express sexual contempt for men in managerial or office
positions; and JENNIFER L. PIERCE, GENDER TRIALS: EMOTIONAL LivEs IN CONTEMPORARY LAW FIRMS
50-82 (1995), which analyzes how male trial lawyers characterize themselves as "Rambo Litigators" who
excel through a hyper-aggressiveness that they define in masculine terms.
473. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Miami Beach. 720 F. Supp. 974, 977 n.9 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (discussing a
female police officer who was subjected to graffiti suggesting she was a lesbian and had male genitalia);
Berkman, 580 F. Supp. at 231 (discussing a female firefighter who was subjected to "crude graffiti
questioning her sexual preferences"); see also Benecke & Dodge, supra note 400: Pollack. supra note 447.
at 78 n.178, and cases cited therein.
474. See Baron, supra note 398 (documenting how male printers were threatened by the admission
of boys to apprenticeships); see also Doe v. City of Belleville. 119 F.3d 563, 566-67 (7th Cir. 1997)
(involving two male plaintiffs, 16-year-old twin brothers, who were hired to work for the summer as
landscapers and who were harassed by their adult male coworkers).
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send a man" ceases to have meaning if there is no difference in capability
between the men and the boys. In a similar way, the work-gender link can be
disrupted by the presence of other males who fail to conform to the definition
of masculine mastery that the dominant group has projected onto the work (to
be reflected back onto themselves). The desired masculine persona varies with
the type of work involved: Professional boxers, no doubt, see the manly
qualities of their calling differently from research scientists, for example.
Contradictions abound: Whereas some male workers define the masculine
character of their work in terms of a capacity for "hard" physical labor, others
see masculine competence in the performance of mental or intellectual activity
that other men would see as "soft. '475 In other occupations, the desired
image of masculine mastery is defined in terms of a conventional,
head-of-the-household status, which is seen as befitting a member of the trade.
Thus, in many male-dominated work settings, the dominant group is not only
threatened by the presence of any man perceived to be homosexual-for
homosexuality is viewed as an expression of gender deviance-but the group
may also be threatened by the presence of men who are not married, men who
have trouble with women, men whose wives or girlfriends earn more money
than they do, men who perform significant childcare or housework, men who
are "overly" emotional, men who are openly supportive of women's
causes-or any other men whom the dominant group believes convey an image
of masculine weakness or gender nonconformity.
Just as dominant male workers may harass women who threaten their
idealized image of masculinity on the job, they may also harass such
nonconforming men. This form of harassment, like harassment of women
workers, perpetuates job segregation by sex. As we have seen, one important
way in which male workers reproduce such segregation is by perpetuating the
belief that only those who possess certain idealized masculine qualities are
competent to perform traditionally segregated jobs. We have seen how men
can sustain this impression by harassing women workers. They can also sustain
it by engaging in harassment that drives away men who fail to conform to the
desired image of masculinity or that incorporates them as weak and inferior
workers.
Because many heterosexual men regard any failure to conform to their
own preconceived notion of masculinity as a sign of homosexuality-and
homosexuality as a failure to conform to their preconceived notion of
475. Masculinity is, of course, not monolithic. Sometimes, the contradictions within a group of male
workers' images of themselves are exposed as the men's careers unfold. When they do hands-on machine
work early in their careers, for example, male engineers tend to defend the masculinity of their jobs in
terms of a hard-soft dichotomy that defines "hard," physical work as masculine and "soft," intellectual work
as feminine. In middle age, however, many of these same men move on to managerial desk jobs that they
once denigrated as unmanly. See COCKBURN, supra note 472, at 195. These men then adopt an intellectual-
nonintellectual dichotomy that, ironically, associates masculinity with the intellectual and femininity with
the physical. See id. at 195-97.
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masculinity-such harassment frequently includes antigay sentiments. Indeed,
sexual orientation and gender are often linked symbolically around the issue
of work competence. Just as many women are labeled lesbians simply because
their proclivity for male-dominated work threatens the projected masculine
competence of the men who do that work, so too men whose actions or
personae jeopardize that competence may be presumed to be or taunted as gay.
Simply because hostile work environment harassment may include some
antigay expression, however, does not mean that it is not based on gender.
Regardless of whether the harassee's sexuality is placed at issue, such
harassment is gender-based if it denigrates the harassee's manhood or
otherwise prescribes how the harassee should be or should behave on the job.
As the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 76 instructs,
imposing pressure to conform to preconceived notions of appropriate manhood
or womanhood at work is the essence of differential treatment "because of sex"
within the meaning of Title VII.
4n
The lower courts, however, have not viewed male-on-male harassment
from this perspective. Instead, they have analyzed these cases from the vantage
point of the sexual desire-dominance paradigm. Within that framework, the
gendered character of male-on-male harassment remains imperceptible because
it does not conform to the contemplated male-female, dominant-subordinate
configuration. Several cases illustrate this problem.
In Goluszek v. Smith,478 the plaintiff was an electronic maintenance
mechanic who worked in a plant that treated paper with polyethylene coating
for freezer wrap and the like. His job was to maintain and repair the machines
used in production. Goluszek lived with his mother and had never married.
There was no evidence that he had homosexual inclinations. An expert testified
that he came from an "unsophisticated background" and had led an "isolated
existence" with "little or no sexual experience.4 79 He "blushe[d] easily" at
the mention of sexual matters. 80
Almost as soon as Goluszek began work, a group of machinists began to
harass him. They did not accuse him of being gay, but acted on gender-based
expectations to assault his masculinity, for he did not fit their image of the
type of man who should be a mechanic and member of the Teamster's union.
They taunted him about not having a wife or girlfriend, telling him a man had
to be married to work in the plant. They told him he should get married and
should go out with a female coworker named Carla Drucker, because she
"fucks., '48 1 They used other gender-stereotyped images to assault his work
476. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), discussed supra text accompanying notes 287-289.
477. See id. at 251.
478. 697 F Supp. 1452 (N.D. III. 1988).
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competence, telling him that if he could not fix a machine, they would send
in his "daddy"-the supervisor-to do it. They made other comments that
linked their assaults on his work competence to attacks on his sexual virility.
They told him that if he could not fix a machine, they would get "Carla
Drucker to fix" him.482 Eventually, Goluszek's coworkers resorted to work
sabotage in an attempt to drive him out of his job. They drove jeeps at him
and threatened to knock him off his ladder. When he filed a grievance, his
supervisor punished him instead of his coworkers by writing him up for
alleged carelessness in his work. Subsequently, he was transferred to a
different shift where the machinists accused him of being gay or bisexual and
made crude sexual overtures.483 Goluszek continued to be taunted and to
receive warnings about his performance. Eventually, he was fired.
In an analysis that illustrates the logic of the sexual desire-dominance
paradigm, the court granted summary judgment against the plaintiff on his
hostile work environment claim. The court acknowledged that "Goluszek may
have been harassed 'because' he is a male"4 a-the very definition of
sex-based conduct that violates Title VII. Nonetheless, the court concluded that
Goluszek had not stated an actionable claim: 'Title VII does not make all
forms of harassment actionable, nor does it even make all forms of verbal
harassment with sexual overtones actionable. 4 5 In a classic statement of the
sexual desire-dominance model, the court pronounced: "The 'sexual
harassment' that is actionable under Title VII 'is the exploitation of a powerful
position to impose sexual demands or pressures on an unwilling but less
powerful person.' Actionable sexual-harassment fosters a sense of degradation
in the victim by attacking their sexuality.' 486
The court emphasized that the harasser-harassee configuration did not fit
the typical male-female pattern: "Goluszek was a male in a male-dominated
environment .... [E]ach and every one of [his harassers] was a male. 487
According to the court, these facts alone proved that the harassment could not
be "anti-male. '"488 At least in the absence of evidence that the harassers
desired sexual relations with Goluszek, the court could not conceive how
harassment of a male coworker might violate Title VII. The fact that an
incumbent group of male workers might oppress a man because he failed to
482. Id.
483. This group of machinists "asked [Goluszek] if he had gotten any 'pussy' or had oral sex, showed
him pictures of nude women, told him they would get him 'fucked,' accused him of being gay or bisexual,
and made other sex-related comments. The operators also poked him in the buttocks with a stick." Id. at
1454. Goluszek also complained that he was being harassed by employees "out there talking to me about
butt fucking in the ass." Id.
484. Id. at 1456.
485. Id.
486. Id. (quoting Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under 7tle VII, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1451-52 (1984)) (citations omitted).
487. Id.
488. Id.
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satisfy their image of the married, sexually robust tradesman was lost on the
court. Viewed through the lens of the sexual desire-dominance paradigm,
masculinity is monolithic and workplace harassment always comes in the form
of sexual exploitation.
Martin v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.4 9 provides a second illustration.
Edwin Martin was a mechanical supervisor in a diesel shop at a railroad yard.
His immediate supervisor, a fellow mechanical supervisor, and one of his
subordinates subjected him to a pattem of sexual overtures and taunts
sufficiently extreme that the court concluded they stated a claim for the tort of
outrage. 490 Although the harassment was sexual in content, the court
concluded that it was not motivated by a desire for actual sexual relations.
Instead, the harassment functioned to impugn Martin's manliness. Some of the
harassment insulted Martin's girlfriend (who soon became his wife): The
harassers called her "ugly," "made improper and inappropriate remarks" about
her, and asked Martin where he was getting sex.49' Other incidents took on
the flavor of gay-bashing: The men told Martin he looked like he had AIDS
and called him and two other employees the "Three Muskequeers."9 The
majority of the incidents were ambiguous; they could be interpreted as marking
Martin with homosexual affinities or as accusing him of "feminine"
attractiveness (or both). His harassers called him "pretty" and "cute," fashioned
a piece of computer paper around his head as a scarf, and told him they would
like to "bend him over a chair and have sex with him." 93 They also offered
to show him their penises and asked to see his; grabbed at his legs, rear end,
and genitals; placed him in a headlock, pinched him, and tried to kiss him.1
4
Regardless of the precise form of the harassment, however, it was clear that
all the attacks were gender-based: Whether they were reducible to gay-bashing
or were a reaction to Martin's perceived gender-nonconformity (or both), the
content and the context of the incidents suggested that Martin's harassers
meant to malign his masculinity by implying that it was different-and
inferior-to their own.495
The court's analysis began auspiciously. The court observed that, "[ulnder
the plain language of the statute, employment discrimination based on gender
489. 926 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ala. 1996).
490. See id. at 1052 (concluding that the conduct at issue was sufficient to survive a motion for
summary judgment on the tort of outrage, where the tort was reserved for -'conduct so outrageous in
character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society"' (quoting American Road Serv. v. Inmon. 394 So.
2d 361, 365 (Ala. 1980))).
491. Id. at 1046-47.
492. Id. at 1047.
493. Id.
494. See id.
495. In blue-collar occupations, male workers frequently define their manly competence in terms of
a virile physical prowess and express sexual contempt for men they perceive as weak and unmanly. See
CONNELL, supra note 472, at 180.
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is prohibited, '4 96 and concluded that even "'same-gender discrimination
... is within the statute's reach provided the discrimination occurs because of
the employee's gender.', 497 Immediately after announcing these principles,
however, the court undermined them. Based on its application of the twin
strands of the definition of harassment in the prevailing paradigm-sexual
desire and sexual dominance-the court proclaimed that Martin's hostile work
environment claim was not actionable as discrimination.498
First, to support the sexual dominance theory, the court cited Goluszek for
the proposition that sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII as sex
discrimination only where it involves "'the exploitation of a powerful position
to impose sexual demands or pressures on an unwilling but less powerful
person. '499 Extending Goluszek to its logical conclusion, the court stated:
"This [sexual exploitation] theory focuses on whether there is an atmosphere
of oppression by a 'dominant gender,' and thus assumes that the harasser and
victim must be of opposing genders. ' 5° Second, the court made clear that
it is the presence of sexual desire that supplies the inference of gender
domination or discrimination where the harasser and victim are of the
"opposing genders" and the male is superior and the female subordinate.
Drawing on the reasoning of early quid pro quo cases such as Barnes v.
Costle5 t the court noted that the presumption of sexual desire applies not
only to advances made by heterosexual men on women, but also to advances
made by homosexual men on other men (and, in a novel twist, to advances
made by bisexual men on other men):
In a situation where a male sexually harasses a female, there is the
presumption that he does so because she is a female and that he
would not do the same to a male. The same is true when a
homosexual or bisexual male harasses another male; there is the
presumption that the harasser does so because he is sexually attracted
to the male victim and would not treat a female in the same manner.
The presumption arises from the sexually oriented harassing conduct
and is predicated on the perceived need for sexual gratification.
Because of the demand by the harasser for sexual gratification, the
victim is singled out because of his or her gender.5"
496. Martin, 926 F Supp. at 1048 (citing Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822,
833 n.17 (D. Md. 1994)).
497. Id. (quoting Tietgen v. Brown's Westminister Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1500 (E.D. Va.
1996)).
498. See id. at 1050.
499. Id. at 1049 (quoting Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. III. 1988)).
500. Id.
501. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977), discussed supra text accompanying notes 89-93.
502. Martin, 926 F. Supp. at 1049. The court's casual extension of the Barnes reasoning to cover a
bisexual man's advances on another man is puzzling. As the passage quoted reveals, the Martin court
followed the Barnes court in reasoning that a heterosexual male supervisor's advances toward a woman
are based on sex because they are grounded in a sexual attraction that the supervisor would not feel for a
man; similarly, a homosexual male supervisor's advances toward a man are based on sex because they are
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Based on this reasoning, the court concluded in a final passage that
heterosexual male-on-male (or female-on-female) harassment could never occur
"because of sex" within the meaning of Title VII:
[I]n the case of same-sex heterosexual hostile working environment
sexual harassment, the presumption of sexual gratification and thus,
sex discrimination, ceases to exist .... Therefore, the court holds that
same-sex heterosexual hostile working environment sexual harassment
is not actionable under Title VII.°3
In the court's analysis, gender discrimination is compressed to sexual
desire. There is no room for an account of male workers' harassment of other
men that recognizes that sexuality can be a potent weapon, without reducing
the entire gender-based struggle over the definition of dominant masculinity to
a desire for sexual gratification. This analysis has an ironic implication: In
cases of male-on-male harassment, even participation in explicitly sexual
advances does not signify the presence of the desire that damns men who
harass women. Men who make sexual overtures toward other men are
presumed to be solidly heterosexual, absent proof to the contrary.O
In McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, 05 the Fourth
Circuit adopted these propositions expressly. Mark McWilliams was an auto
mechanic for a state agency who had a learning disability that had "arrested
his cognitive and emotional development."5' His coworkers-known
colloquially as the "lube boys"-subjected him to a host of harassment, which
expressed contempt for what they perceived as his failed masculinity. The men
grounded in a sexual attraction that the supervisor would not feel for a woman. See id.: see also Barnes.
561 F.2d at 989 & n.49. On first reflection, such reasoning would not cover advances made by a bisexual
supervisor because the supervisor would experience sexual attraction for. and thus might direct sexual
advances toward, both men and women. See Barnes. 561 F.2d at 989 n.49. Of course, even under a
desire-based paradigm, courts might avoid such a result by appealing to an arguably more nuanced concept
of causation in which a bisexual supervisor's advances would be based on sex because the supervisor would
experience sexual attraction for both men and women in gendered terms (that is. the supervisor would be
attracted to men as men, and to women as women). It seems unlikely that the Martin court had such an
analysis in mind, in light of the casual and unanalyzed nature of the court's reference to bisexual advances;
more likely, the court simply unthinkingly included such advances as close cousins of homosexual
advances, even though the inclusion of bisexuality rendered the court's own reasoning incoherent.
503. Martin, 926 F. Supp. at 1049.
504. Ultimately, such logic is tautological: In cases involving male-on-female sexual advances, courts
presume from the content of the harassment that the harasser is heterosexual and hence acted from the
sexual desire that, in turn, supplies the presumption that the advance would not have been made toward
a man. Yet, in cases involving male-on-male harassment, courts are not willing to infer from similar
conduct a parallel presumption that the harasser (who may self-identify as heterosexual) has any
homosexual inclinations. Instead, men who make crude sexual overtures toward other men are assumed to
be solidly heterosexual. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors. 72 F.3d 1191. 1195
n.5 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that in same-sex harassment claims, homosexuality may not be presumed from
actions, but must be proven). Thus, male-female pairings are deemed sex-based because they are presumed
to be driven by sexual desire while male-male (or female-female) pairings are denied that status because
they are presumed to be driven by considerations other than sexual desire.
505. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).
506. 1l at 1193.
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taunted him with such remarks as, "The only woman you could get is deaf,
dumb, and blind."5 7 They teased him about his sexual activities, exposed
themselves to him, and sexually assaulted him by forcing a finger in his mouth
to simulate oral sex and placing a broomstick to his anus while exposing their
genitals. Despite the sexually explicit nature of these overtures, the court
characterized the conduct as "heterosexual" and concluded, like the Martin
court, that such "heterosexual-male-on-heterosexual-male conduct" is not
"because of the [target's] 'sex."' 5 8 The court held, moreover, that even if the
men were not heterosexual and a different conclusion on causation were
required, "the fact of homosexuality (to include bisexuality) should be
considered an essential element of the claim, to be alleged and proved. ''509
Otherwise, feared the court, Title VII might be construed to cover "conduct
merely suggestive of homosexuality between persons of the same sex who
actually are heterosexuals." 510 Even the dissent adopted a desire-centered
paradigm.51 As with the Goluszek and Martin courts, it occurred to neither
the majority nor the dissenting judges that the sexual content of McWilliams's
coworkers' conduct might be only a tool to accomplish a larger project: that
of emasculating-and expelling-a mechanic so beset with gender affliction
as to be unfit to be a "lube boy."
In Dillon v. Frank,5 2 the Sixth Circuit squarely confronted such a
gender-based argument. Ernest Dillon was a postal worker who was tormented
by his coworkers. One fellow employee called Dillon a "fag," pushed materials
into Dillon's work area, turned off the bathroom lights when Dillon entered,
and physically assaulted Dillon so seriously that he suffered numerous injuries.
Other employees followed suit: They subjected Dillon to a "full orchestral
assault" of antigay epithets and such publicly displayed graffiti such as "Dillon
sucks dicks" and "Dillon gives head. ,5 3 Although the Postal Service fired
the man who assaulted Dillon, it did little or nothing to curb the harassment
507. Id.
508. Id. at 1195-96.
509. Id. at 1195 n.5.
510. Id. For critiques suggesting that in many cases it might be difficult to determine whether people
actually are heterosexuals or homosexuals in any fixed sense, see EVE K. SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOOY OF
THE CLOSEr 22-27 (1990); Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 933-63 (1989); and Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of
Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 274-89
(1995).
511. See McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1198 (Michael, J., dissenting). As Judge Michael wrote:
I believe the majority makes a mistake to affirm summary judgment on the ground that
there is no allegation that McWilliams and his male harassers are of different sexual
orientations.... I would simply hold that Title VII is implicated whenever a person physically
abuses a co-worker for sexual satisfaction or propositions or pressures a co-worker out of sexual
interest or desire. This can be established by an account of what the harasser did or said to the
victim, and proof of the harasser's sexual orientation should not be required.
Id.
512. No. 90-2290, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992).
513. Id. at *2-3.
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by his other coworkers. His employers "threw up their hands in despair, telling
Dillon not to waste their time with his complaints and to fight back when
taunted. 51 4 After enduring abuse for three years, Dillon eventually resigned
upon advice from his therapist.
Dillon alleged that his coworkers tormented him because he failed to
conform to their expectations of suitable masculinity. In his view, his
coworkers' antigay ridicule was in the service of sexism: "He contended that
he was subjected to [sex] stereotyping in that he was not deemed 'macho'
enough by his co-workers for a man" and that the "abuse relating to [his
perceived] homosexuality [occurred] solely because he was a man," in
violation of Title VII. 51 5 He argued that the Supreme Court's decision in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 5 16 supported this theory: Just as Title VII
prohibits an accounting firm from requiring a female partnership candidate to
conform to its gender-based expectations for appropriately feminine behavior,
the statute also prohibits an employer from permitting its employees to create
a hostile work environment for a male worker based on his failure to conform
to its gender-based expectations for a fitting masculine image." 7
Despite the simplicity of such reasoning, the Sixth Circuit rejected it on
two related grounds. First, the court inverted Dillon's argument in order to
reject it. According to the court, the fact that the content of the harassment
directed at Dillon was sexual was irrelevant-a hostile work environment
plaintiff must prove that the harassment was based on sex. Here, "Dillon's
co-workers deprived him of a proper work environment," not because of his
sex, but instead "because they believed him to be homosexual."5 '8 Yet,
discrimination on the basis of homosexuality does not violate Title VII, the
court concluded, and thus Dillon failed to state an actionable claim.
519
The court's analysis was beside the point, however, in light of what Dillon
had actually argued. Contrary to the court's characterization, Dillon had not
argued that the sexual content of the harassment or the fact that he was picked
on for his perceived homosexuality made the conduct illegal; to Dillon, those
facts were subsidiary. He had argued, instead, that the harassment was illegal
because it was based on his sex. That it consisted of crude forms of
gay-bashing was relevant only as evidence that his harassers had subjected him
to gender stereotyping; in their eyes, his alleged homosexuality made him a
lesser man not suitable to stand alongside them as a postal worker.
In a second passage, the Sixth Circuit purported to confront Dillon's actual
argument, but continued to misconstrue it: "Dillon attempts to avoid [the fact
514. Id. at *3.
515. Id. at *15.
516. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
517. See Dillon, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766, at *15.
518. Id. at *22.
519. See id. at *22-23.
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that discrimination on the basis of homosexuality is not proscribed] by alleging
that he was discriminated against because he was male."520 The court
rejected this argument on the ground that Dillon had "not shown that his
co-workers would have treated a similarly situated woman any
differently., 52' His inability to make such a showing, however, was based on
the fact that the court once again converted his argument about gender
stereotyping into one focused on sexuality. According to the court, Dillon's
argument that he was treated differently because of his sex "must presume that
the abuse was directed at his supposed homosexuality or at specific sexual
practices (such as anal sex or fellatio). ' 522 In other words, Dillon had to
show that a woman who was perceived to be a lesbian or to engage in oral sex
with men would not have been subjected to harassment. Once the court forced
Dillon into such a comparison, the court's ruling became a foregone
conclusion: "[Dillon] has not argued that a lesbian would have been accepted
at the Center, nor has he argued that a woman known to engage in the
disfavored sexual practices would have escaped abuse," concluded the court.
"Without such a showing, his claim to have been discriminated against because
he is male cannot succeed. 52 3
But this was not Dillon's argument. Dillon's analogy to Price Waterhouse
had been perfectly clear: Just as the female partnership candidate in that case
was treated differently based on her sex-in the sense that a male candidate
would not have been counseled to behave more femininely-so, too, Dillon
claimed that he was treated differently based on his sex, in the sense that a
female postal worker would not have been censured for failing to behave in
a more suitably masculine manner. The court's choice not to use Dillon's
framing of the male-female comparison was not mere semantics. As others
have pointed out, the results of a disparate treatment analysis can turn on the
way the comparison is framed;524 the choice of framework invariably
conveys something important about the way a court comprehends the problem.
The Sixth Circuit was wrong in stating that it was Dillon who was trying
to avoid the problem posed by his alleged homosexuality by framing the
harassment as gender discrimination. Rather, it was the court that sought to
avoid the truth of Dillon's contention that his male coworkers had
discriminated against him based on his perceived gender nonconformity. It did
so by renaming the harassment sexual orientation discrimination. In so doing,
the court set up a standard of two-tiered justice. True, it had initially declared
520. Id. at *26.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. Id. at *27.
524. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 147-48 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the resolution of an equal protection case "turns largely upon the conceptual framework
chosen" for comparison).
1784 [Vol. 107: 1683
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment
that the relevant hostile work environment inquiry turned on the motivation or
meaning underlying the harassment rather than the form or content of its
expression. But it then refrained the problem to permit the harassment to evade
substantive review merely because it included some antigay content. Yet, there
is no reason that harassers who engage in impermissible gender stereotyping
should be able to insulate themselves (and their employers) from Title VII
liability merely by including among their hostile expressions charges of
homosexuality or antigay sentiments.
This point may be illustrated by a hypothetical change in the facts of Price
Waterhouse. Imagine that Ann Hopkins had not only been counseled to "walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, [and] wear
make-up," 525 but also had been cautioned "not to be such a dyke." Surely,
the mere addition of this suggestion would not have changed the Supreme
Court's conclusion that the firm had engaged in impermissible gender
stereotyping. To allow such a result would permit the courts to deny Title
VII's protection to victims of sex discrimination simply because their harassers
regard or taunt them as homosexuals or because the victims have identified
themselves as such. This is tantamount to excluding people identified as gay
from the protection from gender stereotyping extended to all other people as
men and women. By denying Dillon the protection from gender stereotyping
he was due under Price Waterhouse, the Sixth Circuit effected precisely such
an exclusion.
There is another sense in which the Sixth Circuit's decision in Dillon
contributes to a two-tiered application of Title VII. Under the reasoning of
Barnes v. Costle, Martin, and McWilliams, a homosexual man who makes
sexual advances toward another man is responsible for the harassment. Such
harassment occurs "because of sex" because it is presumed that someone with
homosexual inclinations would not direct similar attentions toward a person of
the opposite sex. Under Dillon, however, heterosexual men who direct
sex-based harassment toward other men whom they accuse of being
homosexual will get off scott-free. Worse yet, McWilliams suggests that men
who direct forms of harassment other than explicit sexual propositions toward
other men will be presumed to be heterosexual, unless actually proven to be
otherwise. 526 Taken together, the cases create a biased form of justice: Men
who are perceived to be homosexuals are excluded from protection against
sex-based harassment, but men who engage in antigay harassment of other men
will be presumed to be heterosexual and will not be held responsible. Indeed,
some courts have expressly embraced such logic.5
7
525. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
526. See McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191. 1195 n.5 (4th Cir. 1996);
see also supra note 504.
527. See, e.g., Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am.. Inc.. 99 F.3d 138. 143 (4th Cr. 1996) ("(Wc hold that
a same-sex 'hostile work environment' sexual harassment claim may lie under Title VII where a
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There is nothing in the language or purpose of the statute, however, that
requires such a biased pattern of protection and responsibility. But for the
blinders of the prevailing paradigm, the courts would not have created such a
pattern. In reality, male-on-male harassment may have little to do with sexual
desire or practices.528 Male workers often resort to sexually explicit taunts
and assaults and make accusations of or derogate a harassee's homosexuality-
along with other forms of harassment that make no overt reference to sexuality
but operate to insult the harassee's manhood-as a form of branding men who
fail to satisfy their image of suitable masculine mastery for the job as different
and inferior.
Thus, accusations of and antagonism toward homosexuality are relevant,
but not because such actions signal anything about whether sexual desire is
present between harassers and harassees. They are relevant because antigay
harassment frequently evidences gender stereotyping.529 The allegation that
a man is gay is often an accusation that he does not live up to one's
expectations of masculine competence. Because the harassers' remarks about
sexual orientation provide clearer evidence of their purpose, proof of the
harassee's actual sexual orientation should not be required. It is the accusation
rather than the actuality that is relevant. Nor is evidence of the harassers'
sexual orientation relevant. The existence of sexual desire between harassers
and harassees should not be part of the inquiry; men of any sexual orientation
should be presumed capable of impermissible gender stereotyping of other men
(or women).
Indeed, courts should recognize that gender-based denigration of
competence may occur across various configurations of the sexes.530 Just as
homosexual male (or female) employer discriminates against an employee of the same sex or permits such
discrimination against an employee by homosexual employees of the same sex.").
528. Cf Zalewski v. Overlook Hosp., 692 A.2d 131, 133-34 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996) (recognizing a
cause of action for same-sex hostile work environment harassment regardless of the content of the
harassment and regardless of the sexual orientation of the harassers). As the Zalewski court wrote:
It is being the victim of anti-male or anti-female bias that forms the basis of a Title VII sexual
harassment claim, not simply being exposed to 'sexual'-type comments or behavior. Title VII
is meant to rectify gender bias in the workplace, not per se to outlaw foul mouths or
obscenities. Sometimes sexually-explicit comments are evidence of or constitute gender bias,
and sometimes not.
Id. at 134.
In Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), the Seventh Circuit recognized that
same-sex harassment, like harassment directed at the opposite sex, need not be explicitly sexual in content
to be based on sex within the meaning of Title VII. See id. at 581 (relying on Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989), to conclude that "a man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his physique is
slight, his hair is long, or because in some other respect he exhibits his masculinity in a way that does not
meet his coworkers' idea of how men are to appear and behave, is harassed 'because of' his sex").
529. For discussions of how bias against gay men and lesbians may evidence an underlying anxiety
that homosexuality subverts traditional gender roles, see Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche
Together?, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 511 (1992); Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the
Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REv. 499 (1991); and Sylvia Law, Homosexuality and
Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 187, 187.
530. Cf Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) (observing that "[s]exual
harassment of women by men is the most common kind, but we do not mean to exclude the possibility that
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some men may bash other men as gay in order to denigrate their masculinity,
men may also bait women as lesbian to demarcate them as gender deviants.
For purposes of hostile work environment analysis, both forms of antigay
ridicule are analogous to the forms of harassment directed at women workers
who cross the gender divide into male-dominated terrain.
Although this analysis recognizes that same-sex, gender-based hostile work
environment harassment may include antigay conduct, it does not conflate
harassment on the basis of gender with harassment on the basis of sexual
orientation. 3' Consequently, courts should not be concerned that adopting
this approach would merely accomplish indirectly a prohibition against sexual
orientation discrimination that Congress has, so far, declined to do directly. 532
The competence-centered approach contemplates that men of any sexual
orientation may seek to endow their work with an idealized masculine image
by denigrating women or men of any sexual orientation who detract from the
desired image. Just as the approach does not reduce all gender-based, same-sex
harassment to sexual orientation discrimination, neither does it treat all sexual-
orientation-based classifications as gender-based discrimination. Some
discussions and overtures-and perhaps even some forms of outright
discrimination based on sexual orientation-are not gender-based attempts at
denigration and would not be actionable under this approach. 53
Contrary to the reasoning expressed in Dillon, however, the fact that a
group of male workers might direct harassment of a similar form or content
toward both male and female workers does not mean that the harassment is not
gender-based. To the contrary, once a sexual desire model is abandoned, the
fact that the men who harass seek to police their occupational boundaries
against both women and nonconforming men might be evidence that the
harassment of each group is based on gender. What matters is not whether the
men direct even the very same taunts toward men and women ("Dillon sucks
sexual harassment of men by women, or men by other men, or women by other women would not also be
actionable in appropriate cases").
531. Recent work on sexual orientation recognizes that antigay discrimination has some of its own
unique dynamics that are not reducible to gender bias. See, e.g.. SEDGWICK. supra note 510. at 31
(speculating that gender-based analyses may have an implicit heterosexual bias that can only be corrected
by studying the unique dynamics of homosexuality beyond gender)- Janet E. Halley. Reasoning About
Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v. Hardwick. 79 VA. L. REv. 1721. 1724 (1993) ('Though
they intersect, gender and sexuality exceed and differ from one another.").
532. See 142 CONG. REc. S 10,129 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (documenting the Senate's rejection by
one vote of the Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 1996. S. 2056. 104th Cong. (1996)); see also
Desantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that Congress had previously
considered and rejected bills that would have prohibited employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation).
533. One can imagine some forms of harassment or discrimination of gay male workers that is rooted
in a stereotypical and irrational fear of them as carriers of AIDS, for example, that would not necessarily
be based on gender. As insidious as such discrimination might be, it would not be actionable under a
competence-centered paradigm. In addition, one can imagine some conversations about homosexuality that
would not be based on gender and would not be actionable under a competence-centered paradigm. For
examples of such discussions, see infra text accompanying notes 542-543. 561.
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dicks" and "Judy sucks dick"); 534 what matters is that, in both cases, the
men's taunts seek to humiliate and alienate the harassed women and men
because they fail to live up to their harassers' images of appropriate
masculinity and femininity. Just as in male-on-female harassment cases, proof
that a man went after women other than the plaintiff often confirms that the
harassment of the plaintiff was based on sex, so too evidence that some male
workers went after both women and men they perceived to be gender-deviant
may confirm that the harassment of each group was based on gender-based
notions of who should hold the job. Far from disproving the existence of
discrimination based on sex, then, the fact that the harassers target women as
well as men may tend to prove such discrimination.
This reasoning casts new light on cases like Lyman v. Nabil's, Inc.,
5 35
in which a court dismissed the claim of a male restaurant manager who
complained that the owner subjected him to a hostile work environment by
forcing him to observe and even to participate in the widespread harassment
of female employees. According to the plaintiff Lyman,
[the owner] offensively touched and directed offensive language at
women employees under Lyman's supervision. Lyman further
allege[d] that the women complained to him about these offensive
acts, that [the owner] made sexual comments about the women to
Lyman, and that [the owner] made Lyman transfer the women from
restaurant to restaurant in retaliation for their complaints .... Lyman
also allege[d] defendant. . . fir[ed] him for his complaining about the
alleged discriminatory acts, his being supportive of women
complaining of those acts, and his refusal to cooperate in defendant's
retaliation against women.536
Operating under the prevailing paradigm, the court could not comprehend
how the owner's sex-based harassment of women employees could constitute
harassment of the male plaintiff. As a consequence, the court accepted the
defendant's argument that "the conduct [the plaintiff] alleges was not offensive
to [the plaintiff's] own gender 537 and dismissed the hostile work
environment claim. Under a competence-centered account of harassment,
however, a court would recognize that Lyman experienced a hostile work
environment based on his own gender because the owner tried to force him to
behave as, and eventually fired him for refusing to become, a manager who
approves of and acquiesces in the harassment of women. Insofar as Lyman
534. Compare Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766, at *27 (6th Cir. Jan. 15,
1992), with Porta v. Rollins Envtl. Serv. (NJ), Inc., 654 F Supp. 1275, 1279 (D.N.J. 1987) (describing
"graffiti alleging 'Judy sucks Bernie's Dick'), aff'd mem., 845 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1988), quoted in Dillon,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766, at *27.
535. 903 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Kan. 1995).
536. Id. at 1445.
537. Id. at 1446.
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sympathized with and supported the cause of his female subordinates, he
betrayed the type of dominant masculinity his supervisor expected of him as
a manager. As a result, he was himself harassed and eventually fired. Although
this misconduct was nonsexual in nature, it would be actionable under a
competence-centered approach. 38
As the analysis of these cases shows, the competence-centered paradigm
would direct the courts' attention toward the processes through which men
create work cultures that sustain their own idealized definitions of masculine
mastery to the detriment of men who cannot or will not conform. The focus
would no longer be on sexuality or sexual orientation. Whether harassment
flows from men to women, men to men, women to men, or women to women,
and whether it is sexual or nonsexual in content, the focus should not be on
sexuality as such. The goal of harassment law should be to eradicate gender
stratification, not to banish all sexual expression from the workplace. The next
section elaborates on that theme.
B. Reducing the Risk of Prohibiting Benign Sexual Expression
Just as the sexual desire-dominance paradigm creates problems of
underinclusiveness, it may also create problems of overinclusiveness by
influencing courts and companies to characterize some benign forms of sexual
expression as hostile work environment harassment. We have already seen how
the sexual desire-dominance paradigm enables a paternalism that excludes
many women who do not comport with the image of the proper victim in need
of sexual protection. 39 In addition, such paternalism risks encouraging courts
and companies to overreach in an effort to protect women's sexual sensibilities
from mere discussions of sexuality that do not threaten their equality in the
workplace. Perhaps predictably, courts appear more likely to engage in such
overreaching where the discussion involves sexuality perceived as deviant u0
538. Cf. Childress v. City of Richmond, 120 F.3d 476. 478 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that white male
police officers had standing to assert hostile work environment claims where they were subjected to adverse
treatment after complaining that their precinct lieutenant's disparaging remarks against female and black
officers created both a gender- and race-based hostile work environment that undermined "the necessary
sense of 'teamwork' between officers of different sexes and races, and that this resultant loss of teamwork
raised the possibility that officers in one group might be reluctant to assist officers in another group dunng
the performance of their duties on the streets"), rev'd en banc. 75 Fair Empl. Prac Cas. (BNA) (4th Cir
1998).
539. See supra Section Il.D.
540. Cf Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin and Women's Liberaton. 72 TEX L. REV. 1097. 1119-20 (1994)
(noting that, in the context of pornography regulation. "'[]udges. junes, and most members of the public
are likely to find most explicit and 'deviant' sexual depictions repellant and view as degrading not only
sexual portrayals that descriptively, humorously, playfully, or ironically depict subordinated women, but
also those that are explicitly intended to challenge that subordination"); Nadine Strossen. A Feminist
Critique of "The" Feminist Critique of Pornography. 79 VA. L. REv. 1099. 1145-47 (1993) (stressing that
censorship of pornography would likely be used against homosexuals, feminists, and those perceived to
have deviant sexuality, and reporting allegations that Canadian customs censors have singled out gay and
lesbian, as well as radical, bookstores).
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By reorienting the focus of harassment law toward conduct that promotes
gender stratification, the new paradigm helps rectify this problem.
Contrary to the assumption of the sexual desire-dominance paradigm,
gender inequality is not synonymous with sexual relations. 541 Just as
gender-based oppression occurs outside the realm of the sexual, so too does the
sphere of sexuality encompass more than simply oppression. Sexual relations
(heterosexual or otherwise) do not inherently enact male dominance over
women. Indeed, to characterize sexuality as such risks allowing heterosexual
women to become the arbiters of others' sexual expression-including that of
marginalized sexual minorities-even where that expression does not hinder
women's full participation in the workplace. In Fair v. Guiding Eyes for the
Blind, Inc., 42 for example, a heterosexual woman who was the associate
director of a nonprofit organization alleged that her gay male supervisor had
created a hostile work environment by trying to draw her into conversations
about homosexuality. Although the court correctly concluded that the
supervisor's comments were neither gender-based nor actionable
harassment, 543 it is nonetheless disturbing that the governing legal paradigm
encouraged a lawyer to bring such a case without risking sanction.
That Title VII law can be construed to characterize this kind of sex talk
as actionable harassment may influence some companies to discipline or fire
workers for sexual expression in an effort to avoid legal liability. Recently, for
example, the Miller Brewing Company was assessed $26.6 million in damages
after it fired an executive, Jerold Mackenzie, whom a female employee,
Patricia Best, had accused of sexual harassment.544 Mackenzie, who had
worked for Miller for nineteen years, had commented to Best about an episode
of Seinfeld that aired the night before. In the show, Seinfeld cannot recall the
name of the woman he is dating. He knows that her name rhymes with a part
of the female anatomy, however, and incorrectly guesses such names as
"Mulva" and "Gipple." At the end of the show, as the woman breaks up with
541. This point is now widely recognized in feminist theory. Indeed, there is much feminist scholarship
that criticizes earlier feminist thought for conflating gender inequality and (heterosexual) sexual relations.
See, e.g., SCOTt, supra note 8, at 34 (criticizing feminist theoretical accounts of sexuality as the key to
gender inequality for embracing circular logic in which "there is nothing except the inherent inequality of
the sexual relation itself to explain why the [gendered] system of power operates as it does"); Dubois &
Gordon, supra note 46, at 32-39 (discussing how 19th-century social purity feminists' emphasis on
sexuality as a realm of danger and oppression for women replicated sexist and classist tendencies within
wider society to separate women into those deserving of protection and those deserving of condemnation);
Franke, supra note 441, at 759-62 (criticizing anti-subordination strands of 20th-century legal feminism for
reducing the universe of sexism to sexual relations); Meyer, supra note 15, at 27-32 (criticizing academic
feminists for overemphasizing sexuality as a mechanism for reproducing gender inequality and discussing
reasons that this group of feminists has focused on sexuality to the exclusion of other workplace issues
important to women).
542. 742 F Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
543. See id. at 155-56.
544. See James L. Graff, It Was a Joke! An Alleged Sexual Harasser Is Deemed the Real Victim, TIME,
July 28, 1997, at 62; see also Gretchen Schuldt, Former Miller Executive 'Shocked' by 'Seinfeld'
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 27, 1997, at 3.
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him, Seinfeld remembers her name and calls out, "Delores!" At work,
Mackenzie recounted this episode to Best, and when she did not get the joke,
he photocopied a dictionary page defining "clitoris" and handed it to her. Best
complained to Miller officials that she was offended by Mackenzie's action,
and they later fired him for "unacceptable managerial performance."' ' 45
The facts of the case, of course, bear more than one interpretation. It is
possible that Mackenzie's conduct was less innocuous than it appears from the
press accounts. Best testified, for example, that she was offended not merely
by Mackenzie's handing her the dictionary page, but by the way he looked at
her as he did so. Mackenzie had previously told her that he had dreamed about
her and had left her a "romantic" voice-mail message., After learning that
Mackenzie dreamed only that Best was divorced, however, and after hearing
Mackenzie's actual voice-mail message-in which Mackenzie refers to Best
as a "breath of fresh air," but in a business context4 7 -a twelve-person jury
that included ten women decided that Mackenzie's conduct did not comport
with their understanding of sex-based harassment. 48 Indeed, Miller may not
have fired Mackenzie out of a genuine concern that his conduct left them
vulnerable to liability for hostile work environment harassment, but may
instead have used Best's accusation of harassment as a subterfuge for firing
Mackenzie, whom they wanted to get rid of for other reasons.- 49
Regardless of the motivation behind Mackenzie's firing, the case has
disquieting implications. At least on the facts recounted in the press,
Mackenzie's conduct does not approach the sort of gender-based hostility or
denigration that threatened to undermine Best's-or other women's-equality
in the workplace. Instead, Mackenzie appears to have been railroaded out of
a company to which he devoted much of his life for having joked about a racy
television episode and referred to female genitalia. Only a misplaced concern
for women's sexual sensibilities accounts for Miller's action: Absent other
indicia that Mackenzie's actions constituted or promoted gender inequality, the
mere reference to sexual matters should not have been construed as harassing
conduct that justified discharge. Indeed, feminists should be concerned about
the prospect of companies firing men in Mackenzie's situation. For one thing,
feminism receives a bad rap when workers are fired in the name of a feminist-
545. Graff, supra note 544, at 62.
546. Gretchen Schuldt, Ex-Miller Exec. Copied Page with Anatomical Word, Man Suing over Firing
Says He Showed Copy to Female Co-Worker. MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 26. 1997. at I
547. Id.
548. See Dave Daley, Women Jurors Seen as Key to Mackenzie's Court Victory: Mock Trials Showed
That They Were More Sympathetic, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL_ July 17. 1997. at 10; Fired Etecutive
Awarded $26.6 Million over 'Seinfeld' Rhyme, LEGAL INrELUGENCER. July 17. 1997. at 4.
549. See Erik Brooks, 'Lighten Up' or 'Shut Up'?: Racy "Seinfeld" Chat Not Harassment. Jury Rules:
Women's Groups Angered, CHATrANOOGA TiMES, July 17. 1997, at A12; Dave Daley. S26 Million
Awarded in 'Seinfeld' Case; Miller Firing Improper, Jury Decides. MILWAUKEE J SLNINEL. July 16.
1997, at 1.
1998] 1791
The Yale Law Journal
inspired cause of action for merely talking about sex.55' For another, such
firings may sow the seeds of backlash against protecting women from
genuinely harmful forms of hostile work environment harassment. 55' Such
seeds may become bitter weeds that choke legitimate causes of action if juries
begin to assess damages against individual women who complain of
harassment, as the jury did against Patricia Best.552
Other cases appear more difficult. In Pierce v. Commonwealth Life
Insurance Co.,553 a male manager, Tom Pierce, was accused of sexual
harassment after participating in an exchange of sexually explicit cards with
a female office administrator, Debbie Kennedy. One of the cards Pierce sent
read, "Sex is a misdemeanor. De more I miss, de meanor I get. ''5 4 The other
was a cartoon valentine that read, "There are many ways to say 'I love
you' . . . but f-ing is the fastest. ' 555 According to Pierce and others in the
office, Kennedy had also sent Pierce cards with sexually explicit messages and
had engaged in other off-color behavior toward Pierce and other
employees. 6 In response to Kennedy's claim of sexual harassment, Pierce
was disciplined. He was summarily demoted, with a significant reduction in
pay, and transferred to another office on the ground that he had violated the
company's sexual harassment policy. After spending thirty years with the
company, Pierce was bid farewell by having "[his] personal belongings from
the office ... dropped off to him at a 'Hardee's' roadside fast food
restaurant. 557
As with the situation involving Mackenzie, it is possible that the facts
were less sympathetic to Pierce than they appear. Pierce was, after all, a
manager, while Kennedy was not. Pierce was responsible for managing three
offices and for enforcing the company's sexual harassment policy. The
company claimed that he already had been counseled about two sexual
harassment complaints in the past ten years-a record that Pierce denied. In
light of his position of authority, Pierce's sending the two sexually explicit
cards to Kennedy may suggest that his conduct veered perilously close to being
actionable. Even if so, however, the reasoning that led the company to such a
conclusion is unsound-and disturbing. The company relied on the sexually
550. In the media accounts I read, feminist concerns about the fact that companies might be using
feminism as a justification for firing men on such grounds were missing. Indeed, at least one feminist group
expressed the view that Mackenzie's conduct should have been punished. Deborah Lukovich, President of
the Wisconsin NOW, was quoted as saying, "We're missing the message that that sort of discussion in the
workplace is wrong." Brooks, supra note 549.
551. See Joanne Jacobs, Harassment Jury's Message: It's Time To Lighten Up, RECORD (Bergen, N.J.),
July 24, 1997, at L9.
552. See Will Verdict Chill Harassment Complaints?, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), July 21, 1997,
at 2A.
553. 40 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1994).
554. Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 825 F. Supp. 783, 784 (E.D. Ky. 1993).
555. Id. at 799.
556. See id. at 779 & n.2.
557. Id. at 800.
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explicit character of Pierce's actions, without ever examining whether such
actions denigrated Kennedy's competence or otherwise disadvantaged her or
other women in the office on the basis of their gender.55S In fact, in an
amazing bit of reasoning that conflates all forms of sexual interaction, Pierce's
superiors told him that he might as well have been a "murderer, rapist or child
molester, that [what he did] wouldn't be any worse." 559
Such reasoning is dangerous. It invites companies to discipline or
discharge workers for the wrong reasons. It is unclear how often companies
rely on the threat of harassment suits to discipline workers for engaging in
sexual expression, but some alarming stories have been reported. In one
account, a male social worker was fired for imitating David Letterman and
approaching a new female coworker with the comment, "I'm gonna flirt with
ya.' '560 In another, a lesbian psychology professor's guest lecture on female
masturbation prompted a sexual harassment lawsuit by a married, male
Christian student, who claimed that he felt "raped and trapped" by the
lecture.56' In a third story, a male religion professor was formally
reprimanded for "'engaging in verbal conduct of a sexual nature' that had the
effect of 'creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment'6 2 when
he recited a story from the Talmud, the writings that make up Jewish law. The
story involved a man who fell off a roof, accidentally landed on a woman, and
had intercourse with her. The professor related that in the Talmud, the man is
deemed innocent of sin because his act was unintentional. A female student in
the class was offended by the story, and her sexual harassment complaint led
the university to reprimand the professor and to record all his lectures with a
tape recorder to ensure that he did not say anything sexually offensive in the
future.
563
However subtly, the sexual desire-dominance paradigm enables (or even
encourages) these kinds of complaints by emphasizing the "sexual" nature of
harassment. These kinds of complaints tend to legitimate opposition to
558. See id. at 799. In fact, Kennedy's complaint against Pierce not only referred to the two sexually
explicit cards, but also protested her most recent evaluation and dened merit increase. Yet the company
apparently failed to investigate these facts. Under a competence-centered analysis, the company would have
inquired into whether the sexually explicit cards, the unfavorable evaluation, and the denied merit increase
were all part of a pattern of conduct that created a discriminatory work environment for Kennedy based
on her gender. As part of the inquiry, the company would have asked whether Pierce's conduct had the
purpose or effect of demeaning or devaluing Kennedy's competence based on her gender. To answer these
questions, the company would have investigated Pierce's (and the company's) overall record in hiring.
evaluating, paying, promoting, and dealing with other women, as well as any prior complaints of sexual
overtures or other sexualized forms of alleged misconduct.
559. Id.
560. Kirstin Downey Grimsley, In Combating Sexual Harassment. Companies Sometimes Overreact,
WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1996, at Al.
561. Asra Q. Nomani, Was Prof's Lecture Academic Freedom or Sex Harassment: A Male Student
in California, Irked by 'Male-Bashing,' Asserts It Was the Latter, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7. 1995. at Al.
562. Dirk Johnson, A Sexual Harassment Case To Test Academic Freedom, N.Y. TMES, May It,
1994, at D23 (quoting a formal reprimand issued to the professor by the Chicago Theological Seminary).
563. See id.
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harassment law on the part of those who are concerned about protecting sexual
expression 564 or who, for less salutary reasons, oppose placing the power of
accusation in the hands of women workers. Although some of the reported
sexual harassment complaints may raise First Amendment concerns, that is not
my focus here.565 My concern, instead, is the effect on gender relations. It
gives feminism a bad name when men (or women) are fired for merely talking
about sex at work. In my view, it is misguided to attempt to banish all hints
of sexuality from the workplace.566 For one thing, it will not work. One does
not have to be a Freudian to acknowledge that the old Taylorist belief that
sexuality could be banished from the realm of the modem organization was
incorrect; sexuality permeates organizations and, so long as organizations are
made up of human beings, will continue to flourish in one form or
another.567
Even if all sexual interaction could be eradicated from the work world, this
would not necessarily be desirable. Sexuality should not be conceptualized
solely as a sphere of gender domination, but also as a potential arena of
women's empowerment. 68 If some men use sexual behavior as a weapon of
gender struggle at work, one solution is for women to refuse to cede sexuality
564. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment Harassment" Law
Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997); Anthony Lewis, 71me To Grow Up, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1994, at A35;
Francine Prose, Bad Behavior, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 34.
565. It is interesting to observe that arguments that Title VII law impermissibly restricts free
speech--arguments that were raised and rejected in the early days of the statute's enforcement-began to
be revived only as sex-based harassment began to be conceptualized in terms of sexual content. Given this
timing, it is conceivable that the prevailing sexualized understanding of harassment raises free speech
concerns that are greater than any such concerns that would be raised by the alternative,
competence-centered account proposed here. Although this question deserves further research and reflection,
it is beyond the scope of my inquiry here.
566. For a different analysis of harassment reaching the same conclusion about the inadvisability of
attempting to eliminate all sexual expression from the workplace, see Franke, supra note 441, at 746-47.
567. See JEFF HEARN & WENDY PARKIN, "SEX" AT "WORK": THE POWER AND PARADOX OF
ORGANISATION SEXUALITY passim (1987); Gibson Burrell & Jeff Hearn, The Sexuality of Organization,
in THE SEXUALITY OF ORGANIZATION, supra note 410, at I, 13.
568. More than a few feminists who support legal protection against sex-based harassment have begun
to question the wisdom of attempting to banish all sexual interaction from the workplace; some have begun
to envision and express sexuality as a potentially positive resource for women and other outsiders. See, e.g.,
CYNTHIA COCKBURN, IN THE WAY OF WOMEN: MEN'S RESISTANCE TO SEX EQUALITY WITHIIN
ORGANIZATIONS 159 (1993) ("'Opposition to sexual harassment is only one component of a sexual politics
in the workplace.'. . . The long agenda for the women's movement in organizations must be to strengthen
women's position and confidence in many different ways so that we can re-introduce our bodies, our
sexuality and our emotions on our own terms." (quoting Rosemary Pringle, Bureaucracy, Rationality and
Sexuality: The Case of Secretaries, in THE SEXUALITY OF ORGANIZATION, supra note 410, at 158, 166));
Pringle, supra, at 174-77 (arguing that desexualizing the workplace accepts the modernist imperative of
rationality in which bureaucratic organizations replace arbitrary and personal authority with official and
rationalistic hierarchies of position, and arguing that rather than banishing sexuality from the workplace,
feminists should strive to reveal men's sexuality so as to discredit masculinity's claim to asexual rationality
and to redefine the play of sexuality so that women become sexual subjects rather than only sexual objects);
cf. BELL HOOKS, TEACHING TO TRANSGRESS: EDUCATION AS THE PRACTICE OF FREEDOM 199 (1994)
(urging professors to cultivate passion in their teaching and arguing that, "(t]o restore passion to the
classroom, professors must find again the place of eros within ourselves and together allow the mind and
body to feel and know desire").
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as a source of male domination and to use it to turn the tables on oppressive
men. History provides examples of women who successfully mobilized sexual
conduct or expression as a way of undermining authoritarian male control in
the workplace. 569 Even more fundamentally, women and sympathetic men
can work together to integrate the workforce. Research suggests that where
men and women work alongside each other in balanced numbers, harassment
is less of a problem. Workers in such settings report that sexual talk and joking
occurs with frequency, but is not experienced as harassmentY.
7 0
To some readers, it will seem too risky to acknowledge that the prevailing
paradigm may encourage some overreaching. Some will fear that to concede
that sexual expression does not always amount to gender-based discrimination
creates problems of line drawing that are dangerous to women's interests. Yet,
as we have already seen, relying on the sexual nature of alleged misconduct
has not solved the problem of line drawing and has itself created problems of
underinclusiveness.5 7' Furthermore, eliminating the current emphasis on the
sexual content of harassment does not mean that sexual expression would
always go unscrutinized. For one thing, the cause of action for quid pro quo
harassment would remain unaffected by my approach; where a supervisor seeks
to condition job benefits on sexual favors, the company would continue to be
liable. For purposes of hostile work environment harassment, courts and
companies would continue to review sexually explicit behavior, but they would
examine it along with any challenged nonsexual behavior to determine whether
all such activity, taken together, created a discriminatory work environment.
Part of the relevant inquiry would be an examination of the larger workplace
context-most importantly, the employers' past and present record of
recruiting, hiring, promoting, evaluating, and paying women (and gender-
nonconforming men) on an equal basis. Male supervisors' or coworkers'
deployment of sexual expression and activity in traditionally segregated job
settings may raise alarm bells that would not sound in more integrated
settings-particularly where such sexual activity is accompanied by other
actions that denigrate the harassees' competence.
Courts should examine such structural linkages between sex-based
harassment and other forms of gender stratification, rather than focusing so
much attention on the sexual content of the alleged misconduct alone. Women
569. Ruth Cavendish provides a wonderful example of the use of sexuality by women factory workers
whose supervisors attempted to exercise authoritarian control by prohibiting the women from lining up in
front of the time clock even a few minutes before quitting time. when the supervisors posted a male
chargehand in front of the clock, one of the women marched straight up to him and pulled down his pants.
The rest of the women bared their bellies and pretended to be pregnant. knowing that pregnant women were
permitted to stand at the front of the line. See CAVENDISH, supra note 395. at 89-90.
570. See GUTEK, supra note 13. at 143 tbl.2 (showing that. even though a random sample of women
working in sex-integrated settings experienced frequent sexual talk or joking, none of them considered
sexual harassment to be a major problem at work).
571. See supra Section III.B.
19981 1795
The Yale Law Journal
should not have to present themselves as Sunday-school teachers in order to
comport with the image of the good victim. But neither should women (or
men) be able to sue because they are offended by someone else's sexual
conversation or gestures. A competence-centered paradigm alleviates this
problem by focusing attention away from sexuality as such and toward gender
inequality in work roles. That is where Title VII's focus properly lies.
VI. CONCLUSION: TOWARD IMPLEMENTING THE NEW ACCOUNT
The new account of hostile work environment harassment would restore
harassment law to Title VII's original purpose. From the beginning, the central
purpose of the statute's prohibition against sex discrimination has been to
enable everyone-regardless of their identities as men or women, or their
personae as masculine or feminine-to pursue their chosen endeavors on equal,
empowering terms.
Over time, with the emergence of the sexual desire-dominance paradigm,
harassment law has moved away from this purpose. Indeed, the story of how
this paradigm came to predominate may hold important lessons about the
paradoxes of legal reform. Influenced by early feminist accounts that
politicized sexual violations long-shielded from scrutiny, courts overcame their
initial resistance to recognizing a supervisor's demands for sexual favors as a
form of gender discrimination and created a cause of action for quid pro quo
sexual harassment. As I have emphasized, this represented a step forward for
women: It was important for courts to abandon the view of sexuality as a
purely privatized matter and to acknowledge that gender-based discrimination
at work can take the form of employer-sanctioned sexual advances.
Ultimately, however, judicial recognition that workplace sexual relations
can be infused with gender discrimination evolved into an account that
collapsed the two. Courts began to view sexual advances as the quintessential
form of gender-based harassment and to suspect many less troubling sexual
interactions of an inevitable gender bias. Undoubtedly, some early feminist
accounts that portrayed heterosexual sexual relations as a primary force
disadvantaging women resonated with the conservative proclivities of many
judges, who shared the supposition that heterosexual sexual relations are
suffused with domination and danger for women. Such a perspective did no
harm in the context of quid pro quo harassment cases; companies should be
held responsible when supervisors condition employment benefits on sexual
favors. Yet, when courts and advocates transposed the emphasis on sexual
advances to hostile work environment harassment cases, they created a
framework that has proven to be more limiting than empowering for its
intended beneficiaries.
The sexual desire-dominance paradigm is too narrow. Although its triumph
has been viewed as a feminist victory, that success has rung hollow for the
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many women (and men) who experience forms of harassment that it does not
envision. Most centrally, the paradigm has failed large numbers of people who
are not subjected to sexual abuse, but whose competence as workers is
constantly thrust into conflict with their identities as women or
gender-nonconforming men. We need an account of hostile work environment
harassment that recognizes that sexuality is only one tool that male workers
can deploy in a struggle to maintain the masculine composition and image of
more highly rewarded jobs. Conversely, the account should acknowledge that
sexuality is not inherently gender-biased; in some contexts, it can be a neutral
or even positive resource for women (and nonconforming men). I have offered
a new paradigm for hostile work environment harassment that takes these
dynamics into account.
The competence-centered account deflects attention from the sexual content
of workplace conduct and refocuses it on the link between hostile work
environment harassment and job segregation by sex. This account emphasizes
the role of sexual and nonsexual forms of harassment in maintaining favored
lines of work as male-dominated. It also highlights the competence-
undermining character of such harassment. Our nation's history of excluding
women from many of the most highly rewarded forms of employment has
conferred on male workers a sense of entitlement to such jobs. By castigating
women as less competent to perform such work, hostile work environment
harassment warns women away or incorporates them as inferiors. In doing so,
harassment upholds the idealized masculine image of the work and those who
do it. Harassment is thus both a cause and a consequence of larger forms of
gender-based stratification of work, such as job segregation by sex and the
accompanying wage and status inequalities.
Implementing the new account would not be difficult; it would require no
greater resources than other Title VII sex discrimination cases. Indeed, as I
have emphasized throughout, the new account seeks merely to restore
harassment law to Title Vil's traditional focus on "break[ing] down old
patterns of... segregation and hierarchy."57- Doing so demands primarily
a shift in perspective. It entails reevaluating what type of evidence is relevant
and examining that evidence through new lenses.
The new account directs that, as in Berkman v. City of New York,"I
courts pay more attention to the larger structural context of the workplace,
including the company's record on job segregation by sex. Such contextual
information is frequently absent from hostile work environment harassment
cases, in part because the sexual desire-dominance paradigm has led to an
isolating focus on sexual abuse that renders such information irrelevant. As we
572. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616. 628 (1987).
573. 580 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). aff'd, 755 F2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985), discused supra Section
IV.C.
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have seen, the courts have disaggregated sexual conduct from other forms of
sex-based harassment and discrimination. The severing of the claims and
evidence along such sexualized lines is both a signal and a further source of
the problem. Once courts hold that only sexual conduct may contribute to
creating a hostile work environment and conclude that nonsexual misconduct
must be considered (if at all) as a separate form of disparate treatment, it is
clear that information about the history and structure of any gender
stratification in the workforce will not lend perspective to the court's view of
harassment.
To obtain such perspective and implement the new account, the courts
should first take one important step: They should cease the disaggregation of
hostile work environment harassment and other forms of discrimination along
sexual lines. Hostile work environment harassment is simply a form of
discrimination, one created to redress discriminatory working conditions that
do not necessarily affect a tangible job detriment. Judicial decisions that have
strayed from this insight and required elaborate elements to prove a hostile
environment claim have distorted the law and diverted it from its remedial
function. To restore the proper remedial focus, courts should consider all of
the challenged conduct-sexual and nonsexual-in connection with the hostile
work environment claim. For purposes of that claim, the issue should not be
whether the challenged conduct was sexual in nature, whether it reflected
gender "animus," or whether any of it effected a tangible job detriment. The
question is simply whether all the alleged harassment and discrimination, taken
together, created a discriminatory work environment based on gender.
There are a few ways courts can move toward such a unified approach.
First, judges should rely on McKinney v. Dole574 and its progeny to examine
as part of the hostile work environment claim any alleged nonsexual
misconduct that is not challenged as a separate form of discrimination. As we
have seen, nonsexual conduct that does not effect a tangible job detriment
frequently evades judicial scrutiny; many courts conclude that it does not
provide the basis for an independent disparate treatment (or presumably
disparate impact) claim, 75 while also excluding it from the hostile work
environment claim on the ground that it is not sexual in nature. Under the
McKinney rule, conduct such as nonsexual hazing or assault, work sabotage,
or failure to provide informal training, which may not provide the basis for an
independent disparate treatment claim, would count toward establishing a
hostile work environment.
Second, regardless of whether McKinney requires it, courts should also
consider whether any nonsexual conduct that plaintiffs are or could be
challenging as an independent form of discrimination has contributed to
574. 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985), discussed supra text accompanying notes 247-249, 296-298.
575. See supra notes 147-148 and accompanying text.
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creating a discriminatory work environment. We have seen that in many work
settings, practices such as differential training, evaluation, and promotion not
only directly harm the women subjected to them, but may also indirectly create
an atmosphere of inferiority for the victims of discrimination and other women
in the workplace. Thus, courts should consider whether any such practices have
contributed to a generally hostile work environment based on gender (and,
conversely, should consider any evidence of such overall hostility toward
women in determining whether any particular practices constitute independent
forms of discrimination based on gender).7 6 Proof of discrimination against
some women may help establish a hostile work environment involving others.
Similarly, evidence that may not suffice to establish an independent disparate
treatment (or disparate impact) violation may nonetheless serve to bolster other
proof of a hostile work environment. Of course, by identifying all the practices
that contributed to that environment, courts can also fashion a more effective
remedy.
Third, beyond considering all the sexual and nonsexual conduct together,
courts should also consolidate the trend away from disaggregation by
streamlining the elements of a cause of action for hostile work environment
harassment. The ultimate question is whether the challenged conduct created
a discriminatory work environment based on gender. Toward that end, a
simplified cause of action should require only three elements: (1)
Causation-Did the challenged conduct occur because of sex (or gender)? (2)
Harm-Was the conduct sufficiently harmful to "'alter the conditions of...
employment and create an abusive working environment"'? 577 (3) Employer
Responsibility-Was it conduct for which the employer is legally
responsible.
71
576. See, e.g., Olmer v. Beef Processors, 66 Fed. Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 843. 847 (D. Neb. 1994)
(relying on the history of egregious nonsexual harassment of the plaintiff maintenance crew worker to
supply an inference that her discharge was based on sex); Danna v. New York Tcl. Co.. 752 F Supp. 594.
614 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (relying on the evidence of hostile and sexist comments introduced in connection with
the plaintiff telephone worker's harassment claim for purposes of determining that her demotion was
discriminatory); cf. Margaret E. Johnson, Comment, A Unified Approach to Causation in Disparate
Treatment Cases: Using Sexual Harassment by Supervisors as the Causal Nexus for the Discriminatory
Motivating Factor in Mixed Motives Cases, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 231 (arguing that where a plaintiff proves
harassment, courts should assume that sex was a motivating factor in any related adverse employment
decision and should shift the burden of persuasion to the employer to show that the company would have
made the same decision even in the absence of the proven sexism).
577. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. Dundee. 682 F.2d 897.
904 (01th Cir. 1982)).
578. Cf supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of employer responsibility).
Although a full analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to recognize that
the courts' tendency to place undue emphasis on sexual advances may affect the resolution of the employer
responsibility element, as well as the causation and harm elements. In considering whether to attnbutc
constructive notice of the alleged misconduct to the employer, for example, courts may consider much of
the same evidence that they use to determine whether the conduct is severe or pervasive enough to be
actionable. Indeed, the Supreme Court has agreed to consider whether a finding that the harassment is
sufficiently severe or pervasive automatically establishes constructive notice for purposes of employer
liability. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, I I F.3d 1530, 1538 (11 th Cir.) (concluding that the district
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For purposes of causation, the courts should deemphasize the current focus
on whether the challenged conduct is sexual in nature. To determine whether
the conduct is based on sex within the meaning of Title VII, they should
inquire instead into whether it embodies gender-based expectations for the
workers or work involved. The touchstone is Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins.79 Although the inquiry will vary depending on the particular fact
situation, relevant questions may include the following: Are the women
expected to present themselves in ways that would be considered inappropriate
for a male worker? Are they depicted as less competent than the men? Are
men depicted or expected to present themselves in ways that reflect a narrow,
preconceived notion of proper manhood? In many cases, it will be helpful to
ask whether the conduct helps maintain a male-dominated composition for the
job or a preconceived masculine image of competence for the work
involved."'
As part of this causation inquiry, the larger structural context of the
workplace will be very relevant. In the context of a workplace with
longstanding inequality, a potentially "stray remark[] '58 1 about women or
even an apparently gender-neutral act of hazing may assume heightened causal
significance. Consequently, courts should examine the record for structural
indicia of gender inequality at work. For example: Was there a history of
discrimination or exclusion of women from the relevant occupation or field,
the workplace, or the job title? Were women present in skewed sex ratios,
which meant that they were likely to find themselves unwelcome among the
men who outnumbered them? Even if women were well-represented, had
supervisory positions or other positions of authority traditionally been held by
court erred in holding that "simply because conduct is pervasive enough to create an abusive work
environment the employer should be charged with knowledge of the conduct"), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct.
438 (1997); see also Domhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
that the severity of the alleged misconduct is relevant to determining the adequacy of the employer's
response for purposes of determining employer liability, and concluding that a company's assurance that
the plaintiff would not have to work with her harasser once the current business trip was over was a
sufficient response where she "was not propositioned, [and] she was not placed in any threatening
situation"). To the extent that the two inquiries overlap, my concerns about the courts' tendency to overlook
nonsexual forms of harassment also apply to the employer responsibility element.
579. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
580. Conversely, where harassment occurs in the context of a predominantly female job setting, it may
serve to reinforce the female-dominated makeup of the job or traditionally feminine image of what the work
entails. Such effects may occur at the hands of male supervisors whose conduct toward female workers
pressures them to conform to preconceived notions of appropriate feminine behavior for someone who
holds the job. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sage Realty, 521 F. Supp. 263, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (requiring the
incumbent of an all-female lobby attendant job to appear sexy by wearing a revealing costume that
subjected her to harassment by male onlookers). Or, conceivably, such effects may occur at the hands of
female supervisors or workers who harass outnumbered male workers by pressuring them to conform to
preconceived notions of masculine behavior that target them as "different" from those who are expected
to hold the job. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 412 (describing a hostile work environment case brought by
male employees of a Jenny Craig weight-loss center, who claimed that their female supervisor forced them
to perform traditionally male activities, like changing tires, while the supervisor and female employees
engaged in female-oriented conversations and activities that excluded them).
581. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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men? If so, how had that authority been defined and exercised? Had managers
and supervisors treated women with equal respect and dignity or had they
subjected them to paternalistic or authoritarian forms of supervision?
Conversely, when women were in positions of authority, had male subordinates
extended them their respect and cooperation or had they instead challenged
them and refused to take direction? What was the record and reputation of
women in the larger field? Had women's talents been overlooked or denigrated
or had their accomplishments been celebrated on an equal basis with men's?
Finally, of course, the courts should examine the particular situation of the
plaintiffs: Did the conduct have the purpose or effect of undermining the
women's "right to participate in the work place on [an] equal footing"?"
In cases involving harassment of women workers, there is an efficient way
for courts to operationalize the insight that the larger workplace context
matters: At least in close cases, courts could assume that the challenged
conduct is gender-based where it is directed at women who work in
"traditionally segregated job categories."' 83 We have already seen that most
courts are willing to assume that conduct that is sexual in content is based on
sex within the meaning of Title VII. I have criticized this assumption for
creating a two-tiered structure of causation in which nonsexual forms of
harassment fade from view. In order to remedy this omission, the courts should
extend a parallel assumption to nonsexual conduct that occurs in
sex-segregated job settings. Such an assumption, which could take the form of
a rebuttable presumption, is a sensible way to recognize the proven link
between hostile work environment harassment and job segregation by sex. As
we have seen, conduct that may appear innocuous or even gender-neutral may,
in male-dominated settings, be part of a campaign to drive away women or
denigrate their competence. Similar pressures may exist in female-dominated
settings.
In cases involving same-sex harassment, the causation inquiry should also
turn on whether the challenged conduct is based on gender (rather than
whether it is sexual in content). But here the relevant evidence may look
different. In many cases involving harassment of men by men, the harassment
will have the purpose or effect of denigrating the harassee's manhood. Antigay
ridicule will almost always do so, but other types of evidence may also suggest
that the harassees were targeted because something about them threatened the
dominant workers' views about the suitable masculine image for those who
hold the job. The harassees may be perceived to be too weak, too young, too
old, too asexual, too soft, or even too identified with women's interests to fit
the mold. In other cases, the harassment itself may utilize gender-based images
582. Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F2d 210, 213 (7th Cir. 1986).
583. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 630 (1987) (citing United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979)).
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as a form of denigration or competition (such as calling men epithets typically
reserved for women). Regardless of whether the harassment assumes an
explicitly gender-based content or more subtly attacks people because of their
failure to conform to the harassers' image of proper manly behavior, the
harassment is based on gender. The new account would recognize it as such.
Just as the new account would decenter the focus on sexuality in
connection with the question of causation, so too would it do so in connection
with the question of harm. In considering whether the challenged conduct is
sufficiently harmful to be actionable, the new account would deflect attention
away from whether the conduct is sexually offensive in favor of a focus on
whether it makes it more difficult for the harassees to do the job because of
their gender. Indeed, under the new account, courts would recognize that,
rather than signaling genuine sexual or romantic interest, even sexual advances
and other sexually oriented conduct may serve as a way of marking women or
nonconforming men as different and less adequate for the job.
Courts would also understand that overtly sexual harassment is not the
only, or even the most common, form of harassment experienced by women
or nonconforming men on the job. Once the sexual focus is abandoned, many
new forms of gender-based harassment and harm may come to light.
Importantly, judges would understand from the outset that hostile work
environment harassment frequently has the aim or effect of denigrating the
harassee's work competence. The spectrum of gender-based, competence-
undermining conduct sweeps broadly; the form of the conduct varies with the
occupational setting. Thus, judges should not only exhibit sensitivity to the role
of such competence-undermining conduct in creating hostile work
environments, they should also scrutinize carefully employers' attempts to
justify adverse treatment of women or harassed male workers on the ground
that such workers are less competent. Particularly where a history of job
segregation by sex or other structural indicia of gender stratification are
present, a harassee's incompetence may be as likely to be the consequence as
the cause of her negative treatment. 584 At a minimum, courts should evaluate
whether the gender-based mistreatment was a significant factor in creating any
diminished performance.
In contrast to the prevailing paradigm, the new account would render any
inquiry into the "unwelcomeness" of the challenged conduct irrelevant. Once
courts reconceptualize environmental harassment as an assault on competence,
the unwelcomeness inquiry no longer makes sense. Although some people may
welcome expressions of sexual interest, few employees invite conduct that
attacks their work performance in the name of gender conformity.
584. For an analysis of this point that refers to the interactional quality of workplace harassment and
diminished work performance as dynamic discrimination, see Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination
in "General Ability" Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1157, 1170-72 (1991).
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Although no single decision has analyzed hostile work environment
harassment in precisely these terms, there is support for the new account in the
case law. As I discussed earlier, a number of courts of appeals have followed
McKinney and held that conduct need not be sexual in nature to contribute to
a hostile work environment. 58 It is time for courts to take this point
seriously and to utilize the McKinney reasoning to end the disaggregated
treatment of sexual and nonsexual forms of alleged misconduct. The Supreme
Court's decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.5' 6 approves such a focus;
the opinion acknowledges that hostile work environment harassment is simply
a form of gender discrimination. As the Court observed, 'The phrase 'terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in
employment, which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily
hostile or abusive environment.
5 87
Indeed, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the majority in Harris highlights
the competence-undermining effect of such environments. It notes that "[a]
discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously
affect employees' psychological well-being, can and often will detract from
employees' job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job,
or keep them from advancing in their careers." 5' s Justice Ginsburg's
concurrence underscores the point: "The critical issue ... is whether members
of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment
to which members of the other sex are not exposed." 5 9 To establish a hostile
work environment, "[i]t suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected to
the discriminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff did, that the harassment
so altered working conditions as to '[make] it more difficult to do thejob.,,,59o
These passages from Harris suggest something close to the simplified
standard I am urging for hostile work environment harassment. Some lower
courts have used such a simplified approach.59 Others have acknowledged,
585. See supra notes 250, 269, and accompanying text.
586. 510 U.S. 17 (1993), discussed supra Section II.A.
587. Id. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
588. Id. at 22.
589. Id. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
590. Id. (quoting Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345. 349 (6th Cir. 1988)).
591. Indeed, some courts used such a simplified approach in early challenges to discriminatory
working conditions. See, e.g., Rimedio v. Revlon, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1380. 1383 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (holding
a company liable where the plaintiff account manager charged that her supervisor *harassed her. threatened
her with loss of her job, prevented her from exercising the authority and responsibility commensurate with
her position and generally treated her without respect"); EEOC v. Judson Steel Co., 33 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1286, 1295 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (holding a company liable where the plaintiff bricklayers were
treated differently in the assignment of work, overtime, breaks, and other day-to-day conditions of
employment, and were also subjected to harassment and sexual advances by their supervisor, because such
actions "created a working environment fraught with sex bias ... thus violating [the plaintiffs] nght to
work in a nondiscriminatory environment"); see also Porta v. Rollins Envtl. Serv. (NJ). Inc.. 654 F. Supp.
1275, 1282 (D.NJ. 1987) (concluding that the sole female managerial employee's claim that she was
19981 1803
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 107: 1683
like the Harris Court, that part of what can make a work environment harmful
is harassment that makes it more difficult for the harassee to do the job.5 92
Some courts have exhibited skepticism toward employers' attempts to attribute
women's adverse treatment to their own incompetence, where there is evidence
that any problems in performance are themselves an artifact of gender
harassment or discrimination.i Others have jettisoned the unwelcomeness
issue, acknowledging that a woman worker's use of profanity or other
"unladylike" behavior should not be deemed to provoke hostile, harassing
conduct from her coworkers-whether or not that harassment is sexual in
nature. 9  In addition, the Supreme Court itself recently held that
gender-based, male-on-male harassment may be actionable, regardless of
whether it is motivated by sexual designs.595 Finally, and most importantly,
subjected to a hostile work environment in the form of "crude comments and humiliating treatment and [her
supervisor's statement] that her opinion was not respected because she was a woman" was part of a
continuing violation), aff'd mem., 845 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1988). Perhaps because these cases were decided
before the judicial trend toward disaggregation of sexual and nonsexual conduct into separate hostile work
environment and disparate treatment claims was firmly established, the courts felt free to adopt a simpler,
common sense inquiry into whether all the alleged misconduct had rendered the plaintiff's work
environment discriminatory based on sex.
592. See, e.g., Flom v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., No. 95 C 1924, 1997 WL 137174, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
24, 1997) ("A victim does not need to prove a tangible productivity decline; instead the harassment must
merely 'make it more difficult on the job."' (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)));
Guy v. Day Prod. Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17620, at *I I (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1995) (concluding that
the harassment was sufficiently harmful to be actionable where the plaintiff manager testified that it "'added
incredibly' to what she had to deal with in the workplace, thus making her job much more difficult and
stressful, and that such behavior 'diluted' her energy" and "interfered with her ability to do her job").
593. See, e.g., Delgado v. Lehman, 665 F. Supp. 460, 467 (E.D. Va. 1987) ("Having created a hostile
working environment, defendant cannot complain that Delgado failed to perform. 'An employer cannot use
an employee's diminished work performance as a legitimate basis for removal where the diminution is the
direct result of the employer's discriminatory behavior."' (citations omitted)); Rimedio, 528 F. Supp. at
1389 ("Defendants often argue, as is argued here, that the women just do not perform a job as well, and
that is the reason for the disparate treatment. Such a defense must be closely scrutinized."); cf Harris v.
International Paper Co., 765 F Supp. 1509, 1524 (D. Me. 1991) (rejecting the argument that African-
American mill workers were not promoted because they were less qualified by noting that there existed
"substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that Defendant's decisions neither to train nor promote
Plaintiffs were susceptible to racial bias and were, in fact, corrupted by racial bias").
594. See, e.g., Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir.
1994) (concluding that a female drill operator's "unladylike" use of profanity and dirty jokes did not justify
the conclusion that she welcomed her harassment where her "violent resentment of the conduct of her male
coworkers toward her [was] plain"); id. at 1008 (stating that "welcome sexual harassment" is an oxymoron);
Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1325-26 (8th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that
hostile work environment harassment may be significantly comprised of nonsexual conduct such as making
a sales representative feel worthless despite her excellent record, and rejecting as irrelevant the defendant
company's argument that the plaintiff's private sex life showed she had "welcomed" the harassment).
595. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., No. 96-568, 1998 WL 88039 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1998).
In Oncale, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed a Fifth Circuit decision that had held that a male
supervisor's harassment of a male subordinate can never constitute gender-based discrimination in violation
of Title VII. The Court held that "nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because
of ... sex' merely because the plaintiff and the defendant ... are of the same sex." Id. at *2 (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000-e(a)(1) (1994)).
Several features of the Court's analysis conform to, and provide additional support for, the approach
proposed in this Article. First, the Court emphasized that hostile work environment harassment is simply
a form of sex discrimination and that Title VII protects men as well as women against "'the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment... in employment."' Id. at *2 (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
64 (1986)). Second, the Court made clear that regardless of whether harassment occurs between men and
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a number of courts have recognized the link between hostile work environment
harassment and job segregation."9 Some of the most perceptive judges have
even acknowledged the role of harassment in preserving the masculine image
of traditionally segregated jobs (and the men who hold them).59
It is cause for optimism that, in spite of the prevailing paradigm, some
courts are struggling toward a broader understanding of hostile work
environment harassment. Yet, it is not only courts, but also feminists and
sympathetic lawyers and activists, who must reconceptualize sexual
harassment. As the history of harassment law shows, it was the work of such
people that produced the political, cultural, and legal climate conducive to the
prevailing paradigm. To change that paradigm, these groups must once again
take the lead. We must envision more than a world in which women are
protected from sexual violation. We must also envision a world in which all
women and the least powerful men are fully enabled to work as equals in
whatever endeavors their hearts and minds desire.
women or between members of the same sex, proof of sex-based hostile work environment ha'assmcnt does
not turn on proof that the alleged misconduct was sexual in content or design. "\Vc have never held that
workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is automatically discrmination because
of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or connotations." Id. at *3. By the same token.
stated the Court, "harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of
discrimination on the basis of sex." Id. at *4. Although the Court did not specifically conceptualize
male-on-male harassment, for example, as a way for the harassers to warn away men who fail to conform
to preconceived notions of suitable manliness for the job, the Court's analysis leaves the lower courts free
to focus on such gender-based, but not necessarily sexual, dynamics of same-sex harassment. See. e.g.. Doe
v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 581 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that "a man who is harassed because
his voice is soft, his physique is slight, his hair is long, or because in some other respect he exhibtis his
masculinity in a way that does not meet his coworkers' idea of how men are to appear and behave, is
harassed 'because of' his sex"); Zalewski v. Overlook Hosp., 692 A.2d 131. 135 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1996)
(recognizing that where the plaintiff's male coworkers harassed him "because they believed him to be a
virgin and effeminate," a jury could properly conclude that he was discriminated against "because he was
a male who did not behave as they perceived a male should behave. i.e., that they discnminated against
him based on gender stereotyping").
596. See, e.g., Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 933-34 (D.NJ. 1978) (rejecting the
company's argument that an engineer was harassed and terminated because of psychological instability and
finding instead that she was harassed because of her refusal to accept second-class treatment in a company
that was thoroughly sex-segregated from top to bottom). aff'd. 647 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1981); Accardi v.
Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 292, 296 (Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing that the hostile work environment
to which a policewoman was subjected amounted to a campaign "founded upon the department's unwritten
policy that law enforcement has traditionally been a 'man's job' and, hence. 'no women need apply').
597. See, e.g., Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n. 766 F Supp. 1052. 1075 (M.D. Ala, 1990)
(recognizing that the defendant sheriff department's practice of harassing women and discouraging them
from advancement was "based on a belief ... that women should not be [law enforcement) officers because
they are less capable than men physically and mentally"); Lemhan v. City of New York. 636 F Supp. 998.
1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (concluding that, at the time the plaintiff was referred for psychological evaluation.
"[t]here was ... a general sentiment among many officers, including [the captain), that women could not
adequately perform as full-duty police officers"); Berkman v. City of New York. 580 F Supp. 226. -30
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (concluding that "the officers of the Department responsible for [the plaintiff firefighters')
training and evaluation instead deliberately set out to re-examine [the plaintiffs') physical capacities to be
firefighters"), aff'd, 755 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985).

